Bateaux and 'Battoe Men':
An American Colonial Response to the Problem of Logistics in Mountain Warfare

Mountains, and the strategic corridors through them, were the central geographic conditions of colonial North America. The great mountain chain that rises just south of the Saint Lawrence River and parallels the Atlantic seaboard - combining the White and Green Mountains of New England, the Adirondack, Helderberg, and Catskill Mountains of New York, and the Alleghenies and Great Smokies of the Middle Atlantic and Southern colonies - comprised an impenetrable physical barrier a thousand miles in length that separated the coastal plain from the continental interior. This barrier, known collectively as the Appalachian mountain chain, was passable at water level in only two places where river corridors permitted transit to the lands beyond. As the late Edward Hamilton observed, "These two corridors were to become the great strategic routes of North America, the easy routes for trade and, practically speaking, the only ones for military effort."(1)

Most important in the colonial period was the north-south corridor formed by the Hudson and Champlain valleys. Extending from tidewater on the Atlantic, it intersected the mountain barrier and continued into the heart of French Canada, to tidewater on the Saint Lawrence. Although the mountains sometimes pressed up to the water's edge, nowhere along their length did the lakes and rivers themselves reach an elevation of more than two hundred feet above sea level. The few barriers to travel, shallows and portage places, "were minor in view of the immense strategic importance of this vital waterway."(2)

From the Richelieu River, the narrow waters of Lake Champlain ran southward between the mountains for a hundred miles without obstruction. Just west of Lake Champlain and its tributary, Lake George, the Hudson River passes within sixteen miles of the Champlain/Saint Lawrence watershed, then flows southward, "stretching almost like a tightened string," through the Catskills until reaching the Atlantic Ocean at New York City.(3)

The second strategic corridor ran east to west from the Hudson River to the Great Lakes, extending from the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers westward to Wood Creek and thence via Lake Oneida and the Oswego River to Lake Ontario. Beyond lay the Niagara River, Lake Erie, the Ohio Valley, and the vast continental interior.(4)

Because these strategic river corridors were located within its boundaries, the Province of New York became a principal theater of colonial warfare. The Iroquois Indians knew it as the "Warpath of Nations," while Chancellor James Kent referred to New York as the "Flanders of America," doomed by its geography to be a continuous cockpit of conflict. Indeed, from 1689 to 1815, New York was the central stage upon which were fought four colonial wars (King William's War 1689-1698, Queen Anne's War 1702-1713, King George's War 1744-1748, and the French and Indian War 1754-1763), the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), and a second war (1812-1815) against the former colonial power.(5)

The European colonial powers, France and Great Britain, and subsequently the revolutionary Americans and the fledgling United States, sought to control the strategic river corridors by constructing forts at portages, narrows, and other "choke points." Examples include: Forts Crown Point and Carillon (Ticonderoga) on Lake Champlain, Forts George and William Henry on Lake George and Fort Edward on the Hudson River at the "Great Carrying Place," Fort Stanwix at the "Oneida Carry," Fort Ontario on the Oswego River, and Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario.(6)

None of these were places of great strength by European standards. Most of the rather primitive fortifications could be reduced with relative ease provided the attacking force could reach the fortified place with the requisite troops, artillery, and supplies.(7) Thus the critical factor in all the colonial campaigns was logistics. The solution, in an environment of mountains, primeval forests, and the virtual absence of road-net, lay on the river corridors themselves and on the indigenous colonial water-craft called the batteau.

The batteau was a flat-bottom, double-ended, shallow-draft, all-purpose cargo boat.(8) First appearing in the records as early as King William's War, by the eighteenth century Bateaux were the most common and most important cargo carrier found on the inland waters of colonial North America. The names, from the French batteau, "boat," and Bateaux, "boats," were commonly rendered in English as "battoe" and "battoes." Thousands of Bateaux were constructed by British, French, and American forces and used in the river corridors of New York in all the colonial wars, the American Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812.

Oars were the primary means of propulsion for the batteau, although, in open water, sails or improvised sails were sometimes used, and, in shallow waters, they were often poled. In 1755, Gerret Lansing, of Albany, supplied "oars ...Large Padles...short Padles and Poles with Iron [tips]" for Bateaux to be used in the campaign against Crown Point. (12) In 1758, orders for the expedition against Ticonderoga required "Commanding officers & Regiments to employ their carpenters in making oars, paddles, & scoops," for bailing the Bateaux, since "Each boat will be allow'd from Colonel Bradstreet, only five oars."(13) The New England surgeon, Dr. Caleb Rea, confirms that there were five oars in his batteau, four apparently for rowing and one to serve as a rudder.(14)

This apparently typical use of oars as rudders is seen in the painting of Major General Jeffrey Amherst's army passing the rapids of the Saint Lawrence in 1760. The artist, Lieutenant Thomas Davies, an officer with the army, shows several Bateaux using an oar for a rudder. Most of the Bateaux [probably large 'Schenectady Boats'] have six oars for rowing.(15) During the Burgoyne campaign of 1777, British Bateaux were also "propelled by six oars, [while] a seventh served as a rudder."(16)

In open water, Bateaux were sometimes sailed, although they were rarely able to do more than run before the wind. When the point of sail was downwind, this technique could reduce the men's labor on the oars considerably. "Lakes Champlain and George [and the Hudson River] were especially suited to the sailing of Bateaux as winds are predominately north or south which were the main directions of travel."(17) Dr. Rea recorded that during the retreat from Fort Carillon in 1758, "we made Sails of Blankets and Tents."(18) The following year on Lake Champlain, General Amherst ordered training in the technique. On 1 October 1759 each of the regular regiments was directed to send a "Serjeant or aproper person" to the place "where the boats ly, to see a Boat Rigged there with two Blanketts for Sails, and each Regiment to Rigge 2 Bateaux in the same Manner." A week later, orders stated that the Bateaux were "to have their Sails fixed accordingly to the Pateron Collo. Haviland approved of." From these examples it appears that such "field expedient" sails were in common use during the French and Indian War.(19)

Numerous contemporary references give evidence of the load-carrying capacity of colonial Bateaux. In 1755, a twenty-four foot batteau was reported to "carry 8 barrells and 5 men." If each barrel was of standard size, four and two tenths cubic feet, this would yield a total of thirty-two and eight tenths cubic feet, a substantial payload.(20)

Bougainville recorded in his journal that Bateaux arriving at Fort Carillon in 1756 each carried three tons. These, of course, were French or "Montreal" Bateaux, built for use on the Saint Lawrence River and the Great Lakes.(21)

John Lees, an English merchant living in Quebec, wrote, in 1768, that "The Schenectady Batteaus...hold at most 14 Rum Barls" and that there was "another kind of Batteau...which they call a French one and Carries about double the quanity of the others."(22)

The substantial cargo capacity of large Bateaux built for Johnson's 1755 campaign is indicated in the specifications drawn up for transport of the artillery train. Six 18 pounders were to be transported in "6 Large Strong Battoes." Each of the 18 pounders weighed approximately 4,700 pounds. Thus, it is apparent that the large British Bateaux were capable of carrying well over two tons.(23)

Smaller Bateaux were used to transport provisions and troops during campaigns. During Abercromby's expedition of 1758, Bateaux were ordered to be loaded with "eight barrels of flour or six of pork" in addition to crew and troops.(24)

In 1759, Josiah Goodrich recorded in his journal that "Each battoo Will Carry 12 barriels of flower or 9 of poark When ordered to Load And it is supposed they will have About 20 men or a few more or less."(25)

Sergeant David Holden of the Massachusetts Bay Provincial Regiment, in 1760, noted "We took Battoes with 7 men to a boat...Loaded our boats with 30 Barrils of flower. Or 25 of Pork Pees or Rice," for a voyage up the Hudson River to Fort Edward. During the advance on Ile-aux-Noix, he recorded that each batteau was to carry "5 Barrils of flower & 3 of Pork...as well as [the] number of troops...assigned to the boat."(26)

Continued on Page 2 of "Bateaux and 'Battoe Men'

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