Bateaux and 'Battoe Men':
An American Colonial Response to the Problem of Logistics in Mountain Warfare
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Considerable care was taken in loading Bateaux. Barrels were laid on their sides and cushioned on a bed of "fashens" [fascines], or loose brush that was placed in the bottom of the batteau. Captain Moneypenny recorded in his orderly book: "Care to be taken that none of the barrells put in the boats stand on their heads."(27) Additional protection was offered by placing the cargo under a water-proof covering. In 1755, seventy-three "Painted Canvases for Covering Provisions & Ammunition" were listed among William Johnson's Bateaux supplies.(28) In the Abercromby expedition of 1758, "oil cloths" were specified.(29) In 1776, the Commissary General in Canada directed that "no cask should come here larger than a barrel which are calculated for our Carts and Bateaux." Thus it appears that Bateaux were developed to carry loads of specific size calculated in multiples of barrels. When used solely as a troop carrier and possibly with a few individual provisions, it was possible to carry thirty-two to forty men in a batteau.(30)

Two Bateaux, assumed to be from the Abercromby flotilla of 1758, were recovered from the south end of Lake George in 1962 and are now in the collections of the Adirondack Museum in Blue Mountain Lake, New York, and the New York State Museum in Albany, New York. Dennis M. Lewis, whose research report was commissioned by the State Museum, described the archeological remains of the two vessels:

Two Bateaux of the French and Indian War period ...measure 32 feet in length by four feet across the beam. They were of caravel construction [in which] the hull planking is laid one on top of the other with the edge on one plank butting against the edge of the plank below it [although] some Bateaux may have been built using lapstrake construction ...characterized by the narrow overlapping of the side planks. The side planks were attached to knees, which in turn were attached to the bottom. It appears that most Bateaux were iron fastened.

The Lake George Bateaux ...retain their original bottoms, stern, stern piece, some knees, and a little side planking. Four planks made up the thirty-two foot bottom. Each plank is a little over one foot wide and they are layed side by side. Cleats run across these planks between the knees and are nailed to the bottom planks. The stem and stern piece have a bevel cut on each side to facilitate the nailing of the side planks. The side planks are also nailed to the knees.(31)

The 1776 Admiralty plan specifies the materials to be used in the construction of a thirty-foot batteau. "All the wood will be soft except for an oak six inch plank on the bottom and the stem and stern pieces, which are also to be of oak. The bottom plank were to be one inch thick, the sides one and one half inches, and the knees two inches thick." The plan also shows nine thwarts [seats] "that scale out at being eight inches wide, two feet three inches apart and two feet off the bottom."(32)

Because of their relatively crude construction, the vessels' seams required constant caulking in order to keep them water-tight. Caulking with oakum was a frequent fatigue duty for soldiers on campaign. In the endless effort to keep seams water-tight, Bateaux were frequently filled with water, or even sunk, when circumstances permitted, so that their planks would swell to close the seams.(33)

The very simplicity of the Bateaux permitted them to be built in large numbers by unskilled or semi-skilled workers and to be readily maintained and repaired or replaced in the field with relative ease.(34)Lewis concluded: "In the context of the eighteenth century transportation system that functioned along the [Hudson] Champlain waterway the batteau was an ideal water craft ...capable of carrying large quantities of men and supplies through the roadless wilderness with a minimum of problems."(35)

To man the thousands of Bateaux constructed during the last great colonial war, the British created a "Battoe Service," usually referred to, after its creator and commander, as "Bradstreet's Battoemen." Like their contemporary sister organization, "Rogers' Rangers," the batteaumen have yet to be the subject of a scholarly study. It remains unclear even whether they were soldiers or civilians. First authorized in 1755 by Sir William Shirley, the batteaumen were raised and commanded by Captain (later Lt. Col.) John Bradstreet(36)and were responsible for the construction and operation of the thousands of Bateaux that moved the supplies, equipment, and men of the British and colonial forces up and down the Hudson/Champlain and Mohawk River corridors.(37)

Shirley made an excellent appointment when he designated Lt. Col. John Bradstreet to be in charge of the difficult and often dangerous task of keeping supplies moving from Schenectady to Oswego. Bradstreet was given command of a corps of 2,000 fighting batteaumen organized in forty companies. He was to supervise the construction of hundreds of batteau's and whaleboats for the army's use, the employment of wagons and sledges for moving bulky supplies over the several portages, and the clearing of any obstructions from the shallow waterways.(38)

Douglas Edward Leach points out that two of Bradstreet's companies were made up of Nantucket whalers and others were drawn from the coastal towns above Boston.(39) However Shirley's references to the "Albany Men" suggests that a substantial portion of the batteaumen came from that city.(40)

The bateau-men, apparently largely drawn from the Albany, Schenectady, and Mohawk River area, were a breed apart. Their "grousing, strikes ...desertions...unquenchable thirsts ...insatiable appetites" and "willingness to rifle any cargo" made them, to say the least, rather difficult to command. Not surprisingly, many British officers found them impossible to work with; but Bradstreet developed an excellent rapport with them, no doubt at least in part because of his own reckless disposition and Nova Scotia frontier background.(41)

The creation of the Bateaux Service, like that of other irregular military organizations, was a response to a specific need. In the spring of 1756, Shirley found the post at Oswego on Lake Ontario to be at the end of a long, tenuous supply line. Indeed, the isolated garrison had barely survived the winter.

On March 17, 1756 Governor Shirley placed all the bateau-men involved in Oswego's provisioning under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bradstreet. He was authorized to assume control over all aspects of the transportation of men and provisions from the construction of bateaux through to the delivery of goods to Oswego was placed directly in his hands.(42)

Shirley authorized Bradstreet to "engage" 2,000 batteaumen to be organized in 50 man "companies," although it is unclear whether they were hired as civilians or recruited as soldiers. Bradstreet was ordered to proceed "as soon as may be with Two Hundred Whaleboats and the Same Number of Battoes all loaded with provisions and store" for the relief of Oswego.

Bradstreet undertook his new responsibilities with his usual energy. On 6 April 1756 he reported to Shirley "I have this day got of the remainder of the two hundred whaleboats and many battoos and I shall get the rest and myself gone in three days."(43) True to his word, Bradstreet reported on 9 April that he had left Albany and was moving toward Oswego which the convoy finally reached on 16 May.(44)

Bradstreet could not delay long at Oswego. By the morning of 18 May he was on his way back to Schenectady where he immediately set about organizing the next convoy. To sustain the garrison at Oswego a continuous flow of provisions, tools, and weapons as well as supplies and equipment for the British vessels on Lake Ontario was required. On 1 July, Bradstreet led 600 bateaux into Oswego loaded "with Provisions for the Garrison and Guns and Rigging for the Vessels."(45)

The Bateaux Service had successfully opened the supply line to Fort Oswego. Meanwhile, however, a French force of unknown size had commenced operations south of Lake Ontario designed to isolate the post again. "Bradstreet's Batteaumen" would add a hard-fought victory to their reputation for delivering the goods.

On 3 July 1756, Bradstreet again left Oswego for Schenectady with 350 Bateaux and about 1,000 batteaumen. Eight miles from the post the convoy fell into an ambush. The French and Indian force, consisting of about 180 French marines, 450 Canadian militia, and 100 Indians, lay in wait on the north side of the Oswego river. Allowing the first few Bateaux to pass unmolested, they struck the advance body of the convoy which included Bradstreet and about 300 Batteaumen.(46)

Bradstreet and his batteaumen recovered quickly from the initial surprise. Bradstreet himself, with six men, occupied a small island and from it beat back three attempts by the French to cross the river. His stubborn defense covered the remaining batteaumen, giving them time to get ashore on the south side of the river where hasty defensive positions were organized. Bradstreet then withdrew to the safety of the south shore. There he was informed that the French were attempting to flank him by crossing the river about a mile upstream. Hurriedly collecting some 250 batteaumen, Bradstreet hastened to the threatened point, hoping to prevent the French crossing, only to find about 400 French and Indians had already crossed.

Bradstreet attacked without hesitation, driving the enemy back to the river where "the Battoemen having now a fair View of them, took them down fast; and here it was that the Enemy sustained their greatest loss."(47) Pursuing the French across the river, the batteaumen found the entire French party had withdrawn "in the utmost Haste and Confusion, for they had left behind their Packs, Blankets and Provisions."(48) British casualties in the three-hour engagement were twenty men killed and twenty-four wounded, mostly in the opening fusillade. Bradstreet estimated the number of French and Indian dead at over one hundred, though the French commander, Captain de Villiers, reported "we lost in this affair a colony officer, six Canadians and colony soldiers and one Indian."(49)

In reporting the action, Hugh Gaine, editor of the New York Mercury, remarked on the wisdom "of taking large numbers of Battoemen into the service," and praised Bradstreet's "active, brave and Circumspect Behaviour."(50)

Bradstreet's biographer concluded:
Dispite the nature of the surprise attack, Bradstreet's bateaux convoy had not been cut to ribbons but had remained intact...The action proved that given leadership such as that offered by Bradstreet, the bateau-men were capable of withstanding...attacks...in the face of sizable enemy forces.(51)

Despite this triumph, however, General James Abercromby, concerned with the spiraling cost of logistics, mandated reduction in the size of the Bateaux Service by ordering the discharge of 400 batteaumen. The frustrated Bradstreet lacked "even the money necessary to pay the bateau-men" and so was forced to petition Lord Loudoun, the new British Commander-in-Chief, "for an additional ,9,000 sterling since the recently granted sum of ,4,800 New York currency, was not sufficient to meet the wages and other expenses of the bateau-men."(52)

During the last half of 1756 the batteaumen were paid off and disbanded. By 4 December when the last companies were paid off, the Bateaux Service had cost ,77,666/6/3 New York Currency, a substantial expense. Bradstreet wrote to his agent, Charles Gould, in London that although "the Battoe service" had won "the approbation & satisfaction of all," his appointment as bateaux commander would terminate in December with the final disbanding of the last remaining Bateaux companies.(53)

Bradstreet was down but not out. One year later, in December 1757, with his eye on British offensive plans for 1758, Bradstreet proposed the reconstitution of the Bateaux Service on a scale twice that of the previous establishment.

Bradstreet argued that the mountainous and forested "nature of this country," made the movement of men and supplies "by Water and through woods" essential. He urged "that the Crown during the War, establish and keep up four thousand Chosen and well regulated Men accustom'd to the Woods and management of all kinds of Boats to be form'd into Companys." The batteaumen were to be recruited by the various colonies "in their several proportions from New Hampshire to Pensilvania." Experienced batteaumen would be induced to enlist by a pay scale for "Private Men" that offered "six pence per Day over and above what a Common Soldier receives." Non-commissioned officers were to receive proportionally greater remuneration. Bradstreet believed that the extra money was necessary because of the added responsibilities expected to be shouldered by the batteaumen. They would be expected to maintain the logistical system of the army and to transport regular and provincial troops and their supplies through the mountainous wilderness despite the "formadable and distructive" opposition of the French and their Indian allies. To Bradstreet the inflated pay scale, while seemingly "extravagant and unnecessary," was rather an "oeconomy and a necessary and prudent measure."(54)

As for the officers to command such special forces, Bradstreet also had specific recommendations. They must be "Natives of this Country in General from the Peoples apprehensions and fears of Serving under European Officers" and "well acquainted with the woods, the nature of the Indians and the management of Boats."(55) As his biographer has observed, "Bradstreet had ...deliberately fitted his background, abilities and past actions with what appeared to be the new British military needs in North America."(56)

On 27 December 1757, Bradstreet was named Deputy Quartermaster-General for North America and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. "His expertise with the bateau-men, his organizational abilities in terms of provisioning the forces, constructing boats, and arranging troop transports had proved his worth."(57)

Bradstreet and his batteaumen played a significant role in the campaign of 1758 from the very beginning. Despite myriad difficulties, 250 bateaux were constructed at Albany before the end of March and Bradstreet confidently promised an additional 1,200 completions by mid-May. By 22 May 1758, he had delivered, as promised, 1,500 Bateaux. This means that Bradstreet was supervising the completion of 120 Bateaux per week at Albany during the two month period April-May 1758, a remarkable achievement.(58)

Sluggish recruitment of batteaumen needed to man the new boats was belatedly stimulated by Abercromby's reluctant acceptance of the higher pay scale suggested by Bradstreet. Although never recruited up to full strength, the reconstituted Bateaux Service accomplished considerable feats during the campaign of 1758. Abercromby's army and attendant supplies were transported north on the Hudson River to Fort Edward, portaged to the entrenched camp at Lake George, and launched, in 900 Bateaux and 135 whaleboats, against Fort Carillon. Following Abercromby's disastrous frontal assault on the French lines, the army, with all its artillery and hundreds of wounded, was successfully moved back to the south end of the lake.(59)

Authorized to conduct a strike against Fort Frontenac [Caderaqui], Bradstreet's expedition with all its supplies were transported west on the Mohawk River, portaged across the Oneida Carry, and launched across Lake Ontario by a force of 300 batteaumen reinforced by drafts out of one of the Massachusetts Bay provincial regiments.(60)

The early months of 1759 saw Bradstreet back in Albany, involved again in preparations for the coming spring campaign and "the tasks he knew so well - bateaux building, procuring bateau-men, carpenters, wagoners & ox team drivers."(61) Yet charges of corruption and profiteering plagued Bradstreet's administration of the Quartermaster's Department and the Bateaux Service. "Rumors abounded concerning Bradstreet being in cahoots with some of the shady traders, boatbuilders, wagoners and bateaumen with whom he contracted the business of his department."(62)

Bradstreet encountered other problems as well. In the spring of 1760, the British army's preparations for its final campaign were hampered by the large number of civilians moving westward "in order to Trade with the Indians." Wages commanded by batteaumen were so extravagant that they threatened to "induce & carry off every good Battoe Man upon the Mohawk River which is evidently to the great prejudice of His Majesty's Service."(63) Moreover, even the regimental sutlers were tempting batteaumen as they loaded "their Battoes one half with Indian goods."(64) Logistic support for Amherst's final pincers movement against the last French stronghold at Montreal was handicapped by the lack of skilled batteaumen.(65)

With the end of hostilities, Bradstreet, like Robert Rogers of the Rangers, found himself wrestling with a long "paper trail" of accounts and expenditures related to the Bateaux Service that now had to be justified to the parsimonious peacetime administration of General Thomas Gage.(66) Despite a brief revival during the northwest Indian insurrection of 1763-1765, the days of the Bateaux Service, like those of the rangers, were over.

During the eighteenth century, the American colonies developed both a technological and a "human resource" solution to the overriding problem of logistics in a mountainous wilderness: the widespread employment of a simple, crudely constructed, easily replaced, indigenous, cargo-carrying water-craft, and the recruitment of an equally hardy corps of fighting boatmen to operate them. Together the Bateaux and the "battoe men" permitted the successful exploitation of the strategic river corridors of New York as "avenues of empire" through the barrier mountain chain.

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