Frigid Fury:
The Battle on Snowshoes, March 1758

During the colonial period, New York was the scene of many hard fought engagements. None, however, was more bitterly contested than the action fought in the frozen woods west of Lake George some 239 years ago in March 1758 when a long range patrol of Captain Robert Rogers' Rangers got into deep trouble a long way from home.

Preliminaries

Captain Robert Rogers, commanding His Majesty's Independent Companies of Rangers, based on "Rogers' Island" adjacent to Fort Edward, noted in his journal:

"This gentleman, about the 28th of February ordered out a scout under the direction of one Putnum captain of a company of one of the Connecticut provincial regiments. . . giving out publical at the same time, that, upon Putnam's return, I should be sent to the French forts with a strong party of 400 Rangers. This was known not only to all the officers, but soldiers also, at Fort Edward before Putnam's departure."

Rogers was furious at this breach of operational security. He had good reason, for Captain Israel Putnam's patrol, drawn from the ranging company of the Connecticut Provincial Regiment, returned to Fort Edward on 6 March 1758 with one man, John Robens, missing in action, captured or deserted, and able to reveal Haviland's intentions to the French. Worse, that same day a convoy of sleighs bound from Fort Edward to Albany on the frozen Hudson river, was ambushed by a party of French and Indians north of old Saratoga and a servant of Edward Best, one of the rangers' sutlers, was carried into captivity. He too would have heard the talk of British intentions and be able to repeat them. Rogers became convinced that his mission was compromised before it had begun.

Although Rogers had good reason to think so, an examination of French sources suggests that they did not have advance warning of his coming. Rogers is first mentioned in French documents on 13 March 1758, the day of the battle. Burt Loescher, the historian of the rangers, is persuaded that, despite Rogers conviction, his patrol had not been betrayed. [See Loescher, Rogers Rangers, Vol. I, p. 237-238]

The rangers used the three days 7-9 March 1758 in the preparation of supplies and equipment for their mission. But on 10 March, when Lt. Col. Haviland formally issued his operation order, Rogers discovered that Haviland had decided to reduce the size of the patrol significantly. Rogers was to reconnoiter the French forts "not with a party of 400 men, as at first given out, but of 180 men only, officers included." Rogers was dismayed since he believed that, with the elements of secrecy and surprise already lost, he would need the additional fighting strength. In the end Rogers had no choice but to obey. Nevertheless he noted his reservations and bitterness toward Haviland in his Journal:

I acknowledged I entered upon this service, and viewed this small detachment of brave men march out, with no little concern and uneasiness of mind; for as there was the greatest reason to suspect, that the French were, by the prisoner and deserter, fully informed of the design of sending me out upon Putnam's return; what could I think, to see my party, instead of being strengthened and augmented, reduced to less than one-half of the number first proposed. I must confess it appeared to me (ignorant and unskilled as I then was in the politics and arts of war) incomprehensible; but my commander doubtless had his reasons, and is able to vindicate his own conduct.

The Patrol

On the second day of the patrol, the rangers marched to Lake George, passing the burned out ruins of Fort William Henry, then, proceeding onto the frozen surface of the lake, the column advanced as far as the Narrows and camped that night on the east side of the lake. Rogers, as might be expected, was acutely conscious of security. After dark he sent a small patrol three miles north to observe the lake, and placed listening posts and sentries around his camp.

On the third day of the patrol, 12 March 1758, the listening posts were brought in and the march resumed at sunrise, the rangers moving in extended order up the lake, using ice creepers on their feet, snowshoes stowed on their packs. Rogers kept the men close to the east bank so as to minimize observation on the lake.

About three miles up the lake, the point spotted a dog running across the ice. Rogers immediately pulled his party into the fur trees along the east shore and sent a small reconnaissance party forward to investigate the islands that lay just ahead because of the possibility of ambush. Everyone knew that dogs frequently accompanied parties of Indians. Loescher suggests that the lost dog may actually have belonged to the war party of fifteen Indians that attacked a local patrol near Fort Edward on the morning of 12 March 1758. Rogers was taking no chances. His recon party returned with a negative report. Nevertheless Rogers ordered ice creepers removed, snowshoes donned, and took his force into the woods where they moved parallel to the east shore of the lake as far north as Sabbath Day Point on the opposite side. Although they reached this point by ten in the morning the men must have been exhausted from the tiring, unnatural gait required to use snowshoes effectively. Rogers decided to lay up for the remaining daylight hours, officers keeping the surface of the lake under observation through "prospective glasses," i.e. telescopes, while his men rested.

With darkness, the rangers continued their march north on the lake, scouts on ice skates moved out to the front. The legendary Lieutenant "Bill" Phillips took the point, and Ensign Andrew Ross, a Scottish volunteer from the Royal Highland Regiment, the "Black Watch," led a flank guard that marched along the west shore of the lake covering the main party against surprise from that quarter. Rogers himself kept the main body closed up to prevent separation in the darkness.

The rangers were within eight miles of the French advanced post located on Bald Mountain when Lieutenant Phillips reported sighting a fire on the east side of the lake. Rogers ordered the main party to drop packs and advanced in hopes of taking prisoners but, in the event, the fire could not be located and Rogers concluded that Phillips had only seen a patch of snow or rotted wood turned phosphorescent in the darkness. The rangers recovered packs, crossed the lake and established a defensive position on the west shore, where the command rested for the remainder of the night.

The Day of the Battle

The rangers marched in three divisions, Captain Charles Bulkeley commanded the point, Rogers himself the main body and Ensigns James White and Joseph Waite brought up the rear guard, with the frozen Trout Brook close on the left and Bald Mountain and the French outpost off to the right.

Unknown to Robert Rogers and his men, the French at Ticonderoga had been reinforced by Sieur La Durantaye of the Companies Franche de la Marine with thirty French marines and 200 Iroquois and Nipissing Indians from Sault Saint Louis and the Lake of the Two Mountains who had arrived at Fort Carillon the previous evening, 12 March 1758. According to legend, the Indians held council that night and their medicine man prophesied that an English war party was out. Thus, when the news reached Captain De Hebecourt, the commander at Fort Carillon, that Indians returning north had crossed the trail of 200 men on snowshoes where the rangers had struck inland from the west shore of Lake George, Sieur La Durantaye's Indians could hardly be restrained.

So it was that La Durantaye, with ninety-five men, mostly Indians, set out along Trout Brook approximately fifteen minutes before Sieur De Langy, the famous partisan fighter, mustered a 200 man plus reaction force of French marines, Canadian militia and Indians and set out hot on Sieur La Durantaye's trail. As these three parties moved toward contact the events are set in motion that would result in the Battle on Snowshoes.

The Battle on Snowshoes: Phase One
Roger's narrative describes the first, or contact, phase of the battle.

-We kept close to the mountain, that the advanced guard might better observe the rivulet, on the ice of which I imagined the enemy would travel if out, as the snow was four feet deep, and very bad travelling on snow shoes

- In this manner we marched a mile and a half, when our advanced guard informed me of the enemy being in their view; and soon after, that they had ascertained their number to be 96 chiefly Indians. We immediately laid down our packs, and prepared for battle, supposing these to be the whole number or main body of the enemy, who were marching on our left up the rivulet, upon the ice, and would come within 15 Rods of My party by the Course they then Steered

- I orderd Ensign [Gregory] McDonald to the command of the advance guard, which, as we faced to the left, made a flanking party to our right. We marched to within a few yards of the bank, which was higher than the ground we occupied; and observing the ground gradually to descend from the bank of the rivulet to the foot of the mountain, we extended our party along the bank for enough to command the whole of the enemies at once

- We waited until their front was nearly opposite to our left wing, when I fired a gun, as a signal for a general discharge upon them; whereupon we gave them the first fire, which killed about forty Indians, the rest retreated. My party pursued them & Scalped about forty Indians in about one quarter of an hour.

Thus ended phase one of the battle, a classic hasty ambuscade delivered with devastating surprise. But now, because of the accidental fact that the French and Indians started in two parties fifteen minutes apart, the ambushers were, in turn, about to be ambushed with equally devastating effect.

Continued on Page 2 of Frigid Fury: The Battle on Snowshoes, March 1758