|Unit History Project|
The Thorny Rose: The
Americanization of an Urban, Immigrant, Working Class
Regiment in the Civil War. A Social History of the 39th New
York Volunteer Infantry
In the last decade of his life, social historian Herbert G. Gutman directed his work to a reappraisal of working class life away from the traditionally excessive emphasis on achievement and assimilation. He chose instead to explore what he called "the Sartre question" :"The essential is not what 'one' has done to man, but what man does with what 'one' has done to him." Gutman wrote:
Gutman lamented that historians of early and mid-Nineteenth Century" industrializing" America know far too little about how the "old" life became the new, whether we are talking about the changing preindustrial work habits of the rural-to-urban migrants, or the cultural continuities in the work lives of transplanted immigrants to American cities. These processes of change included a" constant theme" of "resistance to dependence and inequality." (2) that consisted of "collective ways of achieving independence" (3) or, perhaps we may add, just treatment. Gutman spoke of a "historic tension among working people" between the possessive individualistic and the collective ways of achieving autonomy. (4)
Prior to 1873, according to Gutman, many workers separated republican ideology from the new inequalities associated with rising industrial capitalism. Immigrant workers, in particular, "hadn't come to America to become proletarianized." (5) Republican political consciousness of those many among the foreign bom who had come from countries experiencing mid-century revolutions was often a factor in challenges to class and ethnic discrimination, the German language press offering a notable example in its consistent fight against nativism.. (6) The cultural, economic and political backgrounds of immigrants, their perception of American opportunity, and the ongoing reality of their American experience produced the grounds for their reactions to perceived inequality, whether in their workplace, on the streets of New York, where 90% of working people were immigrants by 1860, (7) or in the Union Army.
Cynthia H. Enloe's important work, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies, asserts the importance of studying mutinies in any analysis of the collective action of ethnic soldiers. "Neglect of mutinies," wrote Enloe, "deprives observers of an opportunity to see groups with minimal resources for the organization and articulation of political disaffection attempting to alter their conditions within a major institution of the state." (8) Although Enloe has dealt primarily with non-American groups such as the Sikhs in the Indian Army, the Berbers in Morocco, and the Ghurkas and the Scots in the English Army, the relevance of her writing to a mutiny that occurred in the Garibaldi Guard shortly after their arrival in Washington City makes it worth quoting her at length:
To attract men to the ranks of the Garibaldi Guard, Colonel D'Utassy had advertised that his regiment would provide the Union Army with Riflemen and that these men would be armed with the newest and most accurate "rifled muskets". In the earliest days of the war, before the glamour fell prey to grim reality, the role of a riflemen held a certain status in the infantry. Riflemen were intended to act as an extended line of skirmishers before the main line of attacking troops. (10) On the perfectly orchestrated ideal battlefield, the riflemen were the vanguard. They began the hostilities. For Colonel D'Utassy, being in the vanguard enhanced the image he wished to present of his European troops with their superior martial art and martial air. Naturally, it was impossible for the War Department to take every recruitment promise seriously, and upon arriving at the Arsenal in Washington City, the Garibaldians were issued old, altered flintlocks, which another regiment had just turned in. (11) Confusion prevailed; the men refused the antiquated weapons and marched back to camp in disorder. Colonel D'Utassy had not accompanied the regiment on the routine task of collecting arms, and the next morning he marched the men back to the Arsenal and ordered them to accept the inferior weapons until others could be procured. (12)
But the damage was done. Blame flew in all directions. If any kind of solidarity had existed among the soldiers of the 39th New York, it now began to crumble into ethnocentrism and divisiveness, jealousy among the officers and skepticism among the men. The Captain of the Spanish Company, Jose Torrens blamed the disorder on "some mutinous german non-commissioned officers who seem to exercise a great influence on the rest." His regiment, claimed Torrens, had been willing to take the arms proferred.(13)
The officers of the French company claimed to have been hoaxed by Germans under Captain Schwartz who "laid their muskets against the wall intending to abide with what the majority of the regiment would do; it was then that the same German company made a rush attempting to get the muskets away altogether from the french company." Members of the French company led by their Captain and officers "sabre in hand" were allegedly forced to defend themselves against the Germans. (14)
A letter arrived from Paymaster Norton in New York sounding a premature death knell for D'Utassy's aspirations:
Neither D'Utassy nor Repetti accepted Norton's verdict and the regiment was not disbanded. Peculiarly, the New York Times, which usually carried news about the Guard, reported no disquietude in the camp during this period, only the impatience of the men for battle.(16) The Tribune of June 26, 1861, the day a regular court-martial convened to try the instigators, reported only that the Garibaldians were encamped at the easternmost outpost of the city proper, guarding a powder magazine and the Maryland Avenue bridge, close enough to areas of Southern sentiment to observe "a Secession flag float[ing] only two miles distant" The men were ordered "not to touch it". The Tribune also reported that two hundred and fifty more recruits were on their way to join the regiment. (17) On the other hand, an undated article found among the Colonel's papers, possibly from the Washington Star states the following:
To help refute these charges, D'Utassy secured an affidavit from Hugo Hildebrandt, who would eventually command the regiment, that he had known D'Utassy as a Lieutenant in the Hungarian Hussars and later as an exile in Turkey. (19)
The only bright note for D'Utassy during the dark days of the rifles incident was a letter, dated May 24, from Alexander Sandor Asboth, comrade of Kossuth, who was in New York forming a brigade. Asboth expressed his regrets over the "rifles incident", urged D'Utassy to make a "prompt energetic response" and stated his desire to include the Garibaldians in his Brigade. Asboth would later extend his appreciation to D'Utassy for his patriotic services in the Hungarian Revolution and urge him to disregard the "anonymous aspersions...cast upon [him] by several journals".(20) But Asboth's American career would have its difficulties as well. John C. Fremont soon made Asboth his chief of staff, and when Fremont became commander of the Western Department, he commissioned Asboth brigadier general. But the Senate refused to confirm Asboth's commission, and the Hungarian worked his way up to a brevet major general solely through his actions on the field of battle. (21)
A court-martial convened June 26 to deal with the rifles incident and other infractions of discipline. Hermann Engel of the 6th Company (German) was charged with conspiring against the regiment because he denied knowledge of any U.S. Government regulations requiring the men's acceptance of inferior weapons when they had been promised better. Engel was given a light sentence of public reprimand, since he had never before been a soldier and due to "his ignorance of what he was doing, believing to do something good on behalf of his company." (22)
Another defendent, Friedrich Correll, offers an example of rank and file sentiment regarding the "rifles incident". Correll was charged with
Correll was sentenced to irons, hard labor in camp daily, and nightly imprisonment for twenty days, plus deprivation of his monthly pay. (24)
The problem of misunderstanding due to multilingualism would be a recurring one in the history of the regiment And apparently, as further events would suggest, the recruiters of the regiment made several promises that they were subsequently unable to carry out, either due to unknowing conflict with army practices, deliberate deception in order to more swiftly raise a regiment, or perhaps the inefficiency of Army command. At least it can be said that the details of enlistment were not made sufficiently clear in the particular languages of many recruits.
Some of the problems in the regiment were undoubtedly exacerbated by the monotony of camp life on the heights above Washington. Although the building of fortifications in Washington's defensive line required a number of work details, and the men spent time in company, regimental and brigade drills, there was obviously too much time to ruminate upon broken promises and personal problems. A few soldiers decided, with the enticement of proffered sums of money by secssionists in Maryland, that the regiment was no longer worth their time, and deserted the Army. In mid-June, Captain Charles Wiegand took his company four miles from the city in the vicinity of Tavern Traveler's Rest, Maryland to accost a man "who a few days ago shot a man who intended to vote for the Union." Although this was the purpose Wiegand officially reported for the foray, other documents identify the man, whose name was Tarboe, as the same man who had enticed the Garibaldians to desert, (25) and the Captain suspected he was harboring them still. Wiegand posted his men around Tarboe's house, and the officers entered just as Tarboe was attempting to make his escape, firing at a corporal as he ran. Wiegand took the man and his companion prisoner and sent their captured guns to D'Utassy.(26)
A rash of officer resignations also occurred in June and July that are indicative of two sets of circumstances in the regiment; first, disappointment in the declining possibilities for upward mobility via a military career primarily because of the problems that seemed endemic to the regiment, and second, an amazing level of officer conflict and intrigue to secure better positions. The Civil War volunteer army was an extraordinary microcosm of the dog-eat-dog competitive marketplace of modernizing capitalism, in which commissions were the prized commodities and soldiers' lives the labor power sacrificed to the competitor's ambitions. A friend and correspondent of Colonel D'Utassy's and a patron of the Garibalidans, who was eager to see his friend rise quickly, told him how ultimately to secure a generalship when political influence seemed to be evading him:
On June 10, Major L. W. Tinelli resigned (28). And on June 15, protesting that he had nothing against D'Utassy personally and that he was ready to shed his blood for the Colonel if D'Utassy would only show good faith in his readiness to serve, Captain Takats resigned from the Hungarian Seventh Company. (29) Mahlon Sands, a good friend of the Colonel in New York and a patron of the Garibaldians, when it became apparent that Takats was behind some off the officer factionalism wrote to D'Utassy, "You should have shot Takats. I hope you will do it yet. In a regiment so heterogeneous as the Garibaldi Guard, it must be very difficult to control the different nationalities." (30) And in the days following the debacle at Bull Run Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Repetti would attempt to resign for the first time, Captain A. Otto Bernstein of the Eighth Company, Paymaster Charles Norton, Second Lieutenant Joseph Aigner of the Tenth Company, Second Lieutenant Louis Fermer of the Seventh Company, Captain John W. Siegel of the Fifth Company, and Second Lieutenant A. Dumager of the Tenth Company tendered their resignations. (31)
On July 4th, the New York troops participated in a Fourth of July parade reviewed by President Lincoln and General Winfield Scott which the New York Times characterized as an overall failure. But with their usual flair for the dramatic, the officers of the regiment planned an attention getting little gesture that would court favor from the higher echelons and make the hometown papers. As each company passed the reviewing stand, the men tore sprigs of evergreen from their wide-brimmed beplumed Bersaglieri hats and tossed them toward the reviewing stand; in addition, someone in the front of each company tossed a beautiful bouquet of flowers into the expansive lap of Winfield Scott. The men, including those wonderful Teutonic baritones from the singing societies, as was their custom, "marched to the music of their own voices, joined in chorus." (32)
But regardless of Fourth of July fanfare, the troubles in camp had not stopped with the "rifles incident" or various individual acts of insubordination. Tinder fed the spark of revolt with the fact that the men had not yet received their pay. On July 5, the regiment was ordered from camp north of the Capitol to the Virginia side of the Long Bridge. The men passed the Capitol en route again with their voices raised in song. But the music hit a sour note as they neared the Long Bridge to the other side of the Potomac. The men refused to go any farther without their rifles and their pay. The appearance of the Colonel, quite a while later, subdued the rebellion, according to D'Utassy himself. (33)
Charles Carleton Coffin, in his engagingly written Four Years of Fighting, described finding himself in the middle of what apparently was the third mutiny of Garibaldians in the days before Bull Run. Coffin was on his way to Washington from Alexandria riding in an open carriage and nearing the Long Bridge when he and his companion were accosted by a greatly excited "officer on horseback, in a red flannel blouse." The man identified himself as an "officer of the Garibaldi Guard" and he informed Coffin that his regiment had mutinied and the men were on their way to Washington. He implored Coffin to "hurry past them, give notice to the Guard at the Long Bridge and have the draw taken up." Coffin and his companion, who was another Union officer, attempted to pass the mutinous Garibaldians and carry out the desperate officer's request. He described the scene:
They had almost reached the head of the column of men when "out sprang a dozen in front of us and levelled their guns. Click- click - click went the locks. 'You no goes to Vashington in ze advance!' said one. 'You falls in ze rear!' said another." Coffin's companion demanded to see the captain of the company whom Coffin described as a "stout, thick-set German," and angrily challenged the company's authority to stop them from crossing the Long Bridge. Admitting that his men had no authority to stop the two, the captain, apparently trying to mask his men's intention, lowered his voice to ask them, with a great degree of politeness, if they knew the password. Coffin's companion told him that it was too early to post sentinels and that no password was needed. At that point a "tall, bewhiskered soldier" who "could speak English quite well" stepped up and attempted to explain, "You see we Garibaldians are having a time of it, and--." But before he could go on, the "captain gave him a vigorous push, with a 'Hush!' long drawn, which had a great deal of meaning in it" The German officer then apologized to the two men "extending his hand and bowing politely" and permitted them to move on. But the limits of the officer's authority became immediately apparent This time, according to Coffin, the leaders of the mutiny "thrust their bayonets in our faces, again saying 'You no goes to Vashington in ze advance.1 One of them took deliberate aim at my breast, his eyes glaring fiercely." They had no choice but to follow the Garibaldians over the bridge, and into Washington. (34)
Coffin reported that the guard allowed them to pass, but the New York Times correspondent inWashington sent a telegram to the paper published in the July 9th edition saying that the Garibaldians had been stopped and that the sentries were prepared to fire upon them if they did not surrender. (35) The Tribune maintained that the mutineers were not Germans at all but members of Takats Hungarian Seventh Company who then encamped upon the grounds of the Smithsonian Institution in order to petition for redress of grievances. (36)
Regardless of journalistic discrepancies, Coffin and his officer friend went directly to the headquarters of General Joseph K. F. Mansfield, then in charge of troops in the city, and informed him of the mutiny. "I'll have every one of the rascals shot!'" Mansfield swore, and "an hour later the Garibaldians found themselves surrounded by five thousand infantry," members of the President's Guard. (37) A full investigation was instituted, but after a few days' imprisonment, the mutineers were returned to the regiment and the Captain permitted to resign. The Tribune reported that eighty-one of Blenker's 8th New York were imprisoned for their attempt at mutiny the same day. (38) The Eighth was also incensed over the receiving inferior weapons. (39) Shortly thereafter, discouraged by the lack of discipline in the regiment and his own swiftly disappearing chance for distinction, Jose Torrens resigned as Captain of the Spanish Company. His resignation letter stated his reasons:
Although a formal study of mutiny in native and foreign-born regiments would be necessary to discuss the comparative frequency of such occurrences, neither the Times nor the Tribune offers much evidence of mutiny in native-born regiments. The majority of problems reported in this first year of war were attributed to individuals and to immigrant regiments.
After this last alarm quieted down, the men sullenly made camp at Abington Farms, Camp Grinnell, near Alexandria where the extent of internal dissatisfaction became increasingly evident and discontent took a more formal turn. During this time, communications from two distinct groups offering evidence of the serious decay of morale and esprit d'corp among the Garibaldians reached the Colonel and the New York newspapers.
As early as July 4th a letter had appeared in the Tribune from the company commanders of the Garibaldi Guard publicly protesting the actions of one of their brother officers, Captain Tassilier of the French Company. Apparently Tassilier had written a letter to a friend complaining about conditions in his company and the letter had found its way into publication in the French language newspaper Courrier .des Etats Unis. Tassilier contended that his company, at least, had been "ill-provided" with clothing and shelter and that his camp was "overrun with vermin". (41) Reid Mitchell, in his Civil War Soldiers: Their Expectations and their Experiences (1988), discusses the mortification and loss of dignity that soldiers suffered in their first encounter with army lice, other vermin and camp filth resulting from the "proximity of large numbers of men with varying habits of personal cleanliness" as part of the dehumanization that takes place as a result of war. (42) Bad weather and camp sanitation conditions were apt to contribute to the infestation, and problems of morale could often lead to a loss of self-respect and the sense of personal dignity that created good personal hygiene. Whether this loss occurred among soldiers in camp or low income people in miserable housing conditions, it was essentially a loss of control of one's circumstances, and thus a loss of power, a loss of choice, and a loss of freedom. Reid Mitchell quotes two Northern soldiers who resorted to the oft-used metaphor to describe Civil War soldiers relationship to the Army. They were no longer human but essentially "machines", "entities without wills of their own," (43) an interesting metaphor, not only about the accumulation of graybacks and the soldiers' helplessness in camp conditions, but also on the way in which period individuals used industrial metaphors to comment negatively on human consequences.
Tassilier's grievances were certainly legitimate. Some of the problems of supply and sanitation could be controlled by army attitudes, efficient and assiduous administration and camp discipline, but in the early days of the war, proper management was problematic. In this case, the other commanders insisted that Tassilier's letter was premature, written in the first days of the Washington encampment when it had been raining for several days and the soldiers had not yet been issued tents. They insisted that Tassilier retract the charges and he did so. (44) However, Tassilier's grievance was merely the tip of the iceberg.
Only a few days later D'Utassy received a petition from a group of regimental officers and company commanders, including Tassilier that give the first indication that there were serious problems and gross misunderstandings between the Colonel and the higher levels of his command. Signed by officers from seven different companies, the petition stated that the men had been promised with the word of honor of the Colonel: rifles as soon as they reached Washington, officers' commissions at the same time, and their pay. The petitioners were particularly concerned that their commissions had not arrived, and that they might die on the field of battle without them. They begged the Colonel to go with them to the commanding General for redress of grievances. They also respectfully asked the Colonel to inform the hospital matron, Mrs. Leigh, to "quit the camp inside three days." They gave D'Utassy seventy-two hours to reply. (45)
Apparently D'Utassy did not see fit to respond to his officers, because four days later he received an amazingly vituperative letter in French from Tassilier of the Tenth Company claiming to speak for the officers who had signed the petition including Captains Osnaghi, Takats, Schwartz, Unwert and Lieutenants Colani and Romano. Tassilier's list of serious charges against D'Utassy was extremely damaging. Tassilier demanded that D'Utassy resign because he was a menace to the regiment. He claimed to have twenty officers and more subordinates who would testify against D'Utassy, whom he accused of embezzling regimental funds, thereby allowing soldiers' families to fall into poverty, abusing the soldiers by striking them in public, menacing them with saber and pistol, causing general disaffection among the rank and file, mismanaging the hospital and allowing public women to remain in the camp, insulting officers who asked them to leave. Tassilier claimed that D'Utassy lacked simple notions of politeness in his treatment of officers and in the way he addressed them in front of the men. He accused the Colonel of unequal distribution of quartermaster stores and encouraging public intrigues. Worst of all, he accused D'Utassy of putting forth opinions and using expressions against American democracy, having monarchical and despotic ideas, and not caring about the lives of his soldiers while he lived a relatively sumptuous life. Finally, Tassilier accused D'Utassy of being an imposter and a Jew, and submitted his resignation. (46)
D'Utassy's corps of officers was obviously coming apart at the seams, or at least dividing into camps of contention. At least one officer, Chamone Victor, First Lieutenant of the Tenth Company, and of French descent, resigned during this period because of his contentious relationship with the other German officers. (47) And Hugo Hildebrandt, whom the Colonel had known in Hungary as a Lieutenant of Hussars and later as an exile in Turkey, (48) and who would eventually become Colonel of the regiment after the court-martial of D'Utassy in 1863, had experienced a confrontation with Tassilier that the Colonel had to help resolve in late June. This interaction laid bare some of the intra-regimental rivalries and the obsession with status and rank among the officers. Hildebrandt, apparently taking the place of a sick Adjutant was mounting the regiment in line of battle for drill when Tassilier confronted him and pulled rank. Hildebrandt complained that Tassilier:
Hildebrandt, in his subordinate rank stepped aside, but Tassilier commanded the drill so erroneously that each company had a different number of files and it was impossible to "square the whole body of troops...in the formation of the mass." Hildebrandt implored D'Utassy to show Tassilier the regulations. (49)
In another case, a young man named Albert E. D. Hughes who had been promised the rank of staff sergeant ,honorary ensign and regimental flagbearer by D'Utassy found himself unceremoniously a corporal in Siegel's Fifth Company. The discrepancy in rank and his treatment by Siegel prompted a vendetta and Hughes wrote to D'Utassy asking for discharge from the regiment or at least transfer from the Fifth Company. His letter offers an example of what happened to a non-European in the regiment but also of the clash between Victorian self-esteem and the masculine sense of honor and the vitriolic competition for power and upward mobility within the regiment This interaction between changing ideals explains why inter-company disputes and troubles over regimental status were so rankling to those feeling themselves victimized. Hughes wrote:
Apparently Hughes received some redress of his grievances, but in late July, "dissatisfied with the reputation the Regiment [had] acquired," he resigned anyway. (51)
When Major L. W. Tinelli resigned from the regiment to return to Europe in order to attend to "important engagements connected with public service" (52) and unsuccessfully attempted to get his last paycheck, he wrote to D'Utassy asking him to act in his behalf. His letter, too, expresses what hopes these men placed in the ability of military service to improve their future status and security in the middle class, and how it made them subject to dramatically rising and declining circumstances when they gambled and lost, or when other matters intervened. It was mortifying to Tinelli to have to plead for the "trifle" owed to him but he was forced to do it. But later events would give D'Utassy reason to suspect Tinelli's sincerity:
D'Utassy received several communications from friends and patrons of the regiment back in New York that must have augmented his worries about the regiment. Some of these supporters were responding to adverse publicity and others to what they perceived to be the machinations of D'Utassy's rivals for power at the recruiting office on Broadway.
Charles B. Norton, whose hope was to be Paymaster of the regiment, wrote to D'Utassy after the first mutiny and expressed the absolute need for a "clear and complete refutation of the newspapers," especially of the charges about the quality of food and health of the men, as well as the alleged lack of discipline in the regiment. He warned D'Utassy to keep a clear record of the number of men in each company, because charges were developing that D'Utassy was taking the pay of non-existent soldiers. (54)
A communication from Norton dated the same day warned D'Utassy about the backroom officer politics in New York: "There is a new combination that may prove dangerous. This morning, Tinelli and Schmidt were seen walking together both in full uniforms and swords under their arms. Whatever this means, we must unite our forces and whip them." Norton also spoke of the increasingly worrisome money problems in the regiment. Until troops were mustered into the service, private individuals, most often the Colonel and organizer of the regiment, and organizations like the Union Defence Committee were responsible for provisioning the men. Since these organizations, akin to charitable institutions, were not regulated by law, there was no official definition of their responsibilities, creating grounds for much misunderstanding. Bills which D'Utassy and other officers assumed would be paid by the UDC or the government, were often refused by one or both. Norton, when asked by the UDC for a statement of expenses paid by their funds, examined D'Utassy's records and found an $1800 deficit for which no one could account Norton also informed the Colonel that he had taken on two more immigrant officers who had just arrived from Italy, Ajace Sacchi and Antonio Cattaneo, Garibaldians who had served under Repetti, as well as a corps of blacksmiths, carpenters and machinists, "competent to cut down trees, build bridges, make fortifications, etc. etc." (55)
War Department court-martial records offer an excellent source for the further study of problems of ethnic officers in the Union Army. In particular, the cross-examination of witnesses provides a forum for the analysis of the dynamics of ethnic, interethnic and class relationships in the regiment and the Army, as well as documenting the reaction of soldiers to perceived ill-treatment often due to nationality.
In her monumental work Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy, Ella Lonn noted that in July 1861 the War Department issued a directive "prohibiting acceptance into the service of recruits who did not speak English", a pronouncement that Chicago's German language newspaper, the Illinois Staats-Zeitung called "Cameron's Know Nothing Order." The uproar over the absurdity of such an order led to an explanation that the order was not intended to apply to foreign-born companies "in which the men and the officers spoke the same tongue." But this was less than convincing. The order was ultimately rescinded, but apprehension about the possible confusion and misunderstandings that could result from linguistic inconsistency was not an unrealistic concern. (56) In fact, as late as January 1862 officers of the Garibaldi Guard were subjected to an examination "to test [their] qualifications" for the positions they were currently holding, even those who had served with the regiment from the beginninf of the war. New York Congressman Elijah Ward wrote a letter to D'Utassy in concern that his constituent, Captain de la Mesa of the Spanish Company "not being well acquainted with the English language might not do himself justice...and might meet the fate of other foreigners in [the] regiment who have been subjected to this test after many months service." Ward vowed to make a visit to the War Department on Mesa's behalf if he did not do well on the examination. (57) There were many such bureaucratic devices that could be used with great subtlety and apparent impartiality to eliminate both incompetent and less than desirable officers, the language problem being only one of them.
Two examples from courts-martial, both involving commissioned officers in multiethnic regiments with large numbers of Poles, bear witness to the ways in which the language barrier could complicate the lives of foreign-born soldiers.
The first involved Captain August Heiss, commander of Company C, 31st New York Infantry who was charged with intoxication while in command of a picket guard "the morning after the advance over Munson's Hill." (58) A great deal of confusion attended this engagement with the the pickets becoming entangled in the woods, and the officers of the advance totally ignorant of the position of the enemy. (59) The primary witness against Heiss was Captain John Hastings, Co. B, 18th New York who testified that he came across two men trying to wake up Heiss, who was intoxicated and "incapable of commanding the picket guard." (60) According to Hastings, Heiss could not walk steadily: "I could not tell what his language was, for he spoke in German; he was quarreling with his men, and did not appear to have any control over them; his men were fighting among themselves; I should think most of them were drunk." (61) According to Hastings, Heiss then drew a pistol and Hastings "saw his first sergeant step out of the ranks and with two or three privates declare they would have nothing more to do with him in broken English; that they would not serve under him." Moreover, "most of the Company I thought was drunk; I saw one laying there three hours afterwards." (62)
Lt. Alexander H. Wands also of Company B, 18th New York agreed with Hastings testimony. He contended that the troops had no officers and that the Captain was asleep under a tree: "He was assisted onto his feet, took command of his company and marched it off." At this point in the court-martial, the accused questioned both Hastings and Wands, "How could you judge by my language whether I was intoxicated if you do not understand German? (63) Wands' answer was that he could tell Heiss was drunk by his accent, gesticulations and incoherence. (64)
When the court began questioning witnesses for the defendent, they swore in a private of the 63rd Pennsylvania to interpret. Heiss' witnesses were members both of his command and of his nationality and the testimony was a bastion of ethnic or at least regimental solidarity. Sergeant Charles Muller insisted that: 'there was nothing the matter with [Heiss] excepting that he was tired, and took a good sleep and when he got awake commanded as well as when perfectly sober." (65)
Colonel Calvin E. Pratt, regimental commander, testified that his (Heiss') company had been on fatigue duty all the night before, and then had marched to [Munson's] Hill before breakfast: "they also marched back from [Munson's] Hill about a mile when the regiment stacked arms, and the Captain was sent'out on picket duty; about sundown they were ordered to report to the Regiment in double quick which they did; afterwards while on the march the company stopped at Bailey's Crossroads as a picket" They had marched a mile and a half and the colonel had ordered rations for the men but did not know if the order had been carried out. When asked about Heiss' "usual manner of speaking or walking, Pratt explained, "I think he talks a little thick and his gait is somewhat unsteady...such as might give a stranger the idea that he was intoxicated. He also speaks broken English." Pratt stated that Heiss had been on duty for forty-eight hours when he reported to him for picket. (66)
First Lt Charles E. Kalmin, of Co. E, 31st New York testified that the men had had no sleep and although they had had "coffee on starting" and a loaf of bread each, some of the men had thrown the bread away and only half of them even carried their haversacks. (67)
Capt. John H. Watts of Company K testified that Heiss had appeared sleepy to him, but that he did see him take command of his company in "a proper manner." (68)
It is amazing that that the two rounds of testimony had so little in common. The witnesses from the 18th New York Cavalry testified to both drunkenness on the part of the Captain and, his men, and company discord to the point of mutiny against the Captain. Naturally, the men of the 31st New York had no desire to allow their regiment to be portrayed in such a bad light.
In this case, the language problem worked in favor of the defendent. Battle fatigue and the incomprehension of the witnesses served to get Heiss a verdict of not-guilty. (69)
The second case in which language played an important role was the court-martial of Major J. Lichtenheim, of the 58th Regiment New York Volunteers, another multiethnic regiment with a large number of Poles and Germans. This General Court Martial was convened under the direction of Colonel Von Amsberg, commander of the German 45th New York in the camp of Blenker's Division on November 19, 1861. Lichtenheim was charged with "Conduct unbcoming an officer and a gentleman in that he "did occupy a box seat in the Theater in company with two notorious harlots....at Washington D.C. on the evening of the 16th of November, 1861." He was further charged with disobedience of orders when he refused to "report himself to his Regimental commander" when placed under arrest by First Lieutenant O. P. Gooding of the 10th Infantry, who was Officer of the Day. (70) Lichtenheim protested that a respectable New York merchant named David Brucker invited him to the theater. The women in question were with Bruckner, who introduced them as respectable ladies. (71) Regardless of a seemingly plausible alibi, Lichtenheim was found "Guilty" on both specifications. (72)
Iichtenheim first protested that according to the 75th Article of War, an officer could not be tried by officers inferior in rank. Blenker's Division contained at least thirty officers who were equal to him in rank, and yet five out of eight officers sitting on the Court-martial were inferior in rank. In addition, Lichtenheim stated that he could prove that "some of the officers...had but lately arrived in the country and had but a very imperfect knowledge of the English language in which the proceedings were carried on, all the witnesses being Americans." Lichtenheim's argument was to no avail. He appealed to Lincoln calling attention to his record. Lichtenheim claimed to have enrolled seven hundred men "all of whom had served at least two years as artillerists in Germany and who were commanded by officers who had held commissions in the regular army." These men, according to Lichtenheim, elected him to the Colonelcy of the Regiment. Lichtenheim claimed that he had not only organized this regiment but had provided subsistence for the men and supported "those of their families who were in a starving condition for more than a month...I have spent my time and a large amount of money of which I have never been reimbursed." (73)
Lichtenheim's claim that he had enrolled seven hundred German ex-artillerists who had spent at least two years in the Prussian regular army may sound, at first, a little far-fetched. But Carl Schurz was convinced at the beginning of the war that he could easily organize a New York City cavalry force from the "hundreds of able-bodied immigrants from Germany who had served in German cavalry regiments, and who had only to be armed and put upon horses to make cavalrymen immediately fit for active service." Moreoever, there existed "a sufficient number of experienced cavalry officers trained in the Prussian or some other German army" to command them. General Winfield Scott scoffed at his inexperience and maintained that the the war would be a short one,— army dragoons would be sufficient Subsequently, Lincoln and Secretary of War Cameron gave Schurz the authority to organize a regiment, but by the time Schurz reached New York City, many of the Germans he had intended to enlist had already joined German infantry regiments. He was still able to organize several companies of what would become the 1st New York "Lincoln Cavalry" in a very short time before he was sent to Madrid on a diplomatic mission as American Minister Plenipotentiary. (74)
Lichtenheim's appeal was supported by his Colonel and by General Bohlen, his Brigade Commander in Blenker's Division. (75) But despite this support, his alleged skills in raising a regiment, and his legal and linguistic challenge to the justice of the court, Lichtenheim was dismissed from the service of the United States. (76)
One can only speculate about the backroom dynamics in this case. Blenker's Division had had its share of troubles by late 1861, but many of those troubles were far more serious than being caught at a theater in the presence of prostitutes. Perhaps Lichtenheim was in the wrong place at the wrong time, but it is hard to imagine that a fellow officer who saw him at the theater would be so morally scrupulous as to destroy the reputation and the military career of a man unless previous personal antagonism was involved.
One might even speculate that Lichtenheim may have been "set up." If he had, indeed, organized such a regiment, it would be a ripe cherry for plucking upon his demise. Perhaps this is why he protested the presence of officers on the court-martial who were not only new to the service and his inferiors, but also new enough to the country that they could not understand some of the proceedings in English. It is also possible that the War Department may have had its fill of German regiments and desired the dilution of Blenker's power.
Three other petitions received by Colonel D'Utassy from the married members of the Second Company, the Ninth Company and the Tenth Company of the Garibaldi Guard give enlightening evidence of the concerns of rank and file soldiers. These petitions stated that the men had enlisted with the understanding that their families would be assisted weekly "in the absence of their natural protector" with three dollars for a wife and fifty cents for a child. This assistance had never arrived, their families were suffering, and they directed an appeal to D'Utassy and the Union Defence Committee in New York for immediate action. (77)
These latter petitions were the most illustrative of the kind of psychological stress leading to loss of morale most likely to hit the working class soldier, whose motivation in joining was often economic. The various cash payments promised to soldiers' families in the absence of a primary breadwinner were for many the only thing that made enlistment a viable alternative to a marginal employment situation and the instability of life in the immigrant wards. When that promise of aid broke down, for whatever reason, the enlistment contract was broken, and fear for the survival of one's family members threatened morale. Although the enlistment of the primary breadwinner was certainly better than abandonment or his death, it still threw more family members into the workforce at less than sufficient wages, some for the very first time. After all, employed men could still make a dollar a day in moderate employment circumstances, and that added up to twice the soldier's monthly pay. But women and children earned significantly less than that. Bounty payments, relief to soldiers' families, and pensions in case of death were essential to make the enlistment "worth it". And the possibility of death or disability always hovered over such a difficult economic decision. Newspaper articles of July of 1861 pointed to the reality of destitution among working class soldiers' families. A Times editorial of July 8th protested the "beggarly pay which war, always barbarous and oppressive to the individual gives to the soldier" and events reported in the subsequent days offered further direct and indirect evidence of suffering in the immigrant wards. In the Thirteenth Ward, the health warden took two tiny children, ages two and four into the custody of the city when he found them vermin-covered and neglected. Their father was a soldier in the German Twenty-Eighth Regiment at that moment on his way to reinforce Union General Robert Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley. (78) The children's stepmother, relying upon the meager and quickly disappearing funds of the Union Defence Committee, was blamed for their neglect (79) That same day the Times reported a hunger meeting planned the next day in the Twenty-First Ward to dramatize the plight of starving soldiers' families and on July 13th City Alderman Datton described the "great amount of actual suffering among the working classes" many of whom had been previously "employed in mechanical pursuits" but now, due to the sluggish early war economy, found themselves without jobs. Many of these unemployed workers, (and we should remember that the working class included many young people under the age of eighteen) were among the family members of volunteers. (80) The decay of business threw many of these child workers into the arms of the New York Children's Aid Society which did the best it could to alleviate their "want and suffering." (81)
On July 12th the Tribune deplored the fact that thirteen boxes of rations, cooked meat and bread, weighing two hundred pounds each, purportedly for use of the DeKalb Regiment, were standing on Pier 2 and were about to spoil. The report suggested, "Why not distribute them among the poor families of volunteers who have received no money for two weeks? To thousands they would be an acceptable offering." (82) The same issue noted that the German Society had distributed $350 to the destitute, and the July 16th edition reported the playing of a "heartless hoax." Someone had spread the rumor in the 4th Ward that the Union Defence Committee intended to distribute funds to the families of soldiers and thousands of destitute women, "some with babes in arms," had flocked to the UDC office to get relief. (83) Just as modern journalists tend to sensationalize the irregularities in the welfare system, so, too, did the Tribune in its treatment of particular incidents occurring within the chaos in the Fourth Ward. Some of these incidents would have been comical had they not been so pathetic. Two German women applying to the UDC for aid using tickets given to them by the same man came face to face. A Mrs. Brennan presented her ticket to the clerk and was informed he had already paid a Mrs. Brennan. The other Mrs. Brennan, who came to the Union Defence Committee Ward office with her baby, insisted that she had lived with the man "off and on for eight years" and bore him two children. They had never married but she had taken his name because the children were his. In this case, the wife received $13 and the mistress $33. The soldier apparently got off lucky by joining the army, but he left two families at the door of starvation.
Another woman presented tickets from three husbands and some alleged prostitutes were found with a "half dozen tickets" procured for them by young men who received them from their officers. Whether they were gifts or offered in payment was not clear.
In modern situations of welfare abuse, the public often reacts to the few abusers highlighted by media sources by general condemnation of the system itself. Only rarely does the media make reference to the majority of sincere recipients who desperately need the funds because they cannot provide for themselves, or for that matter the many who SHOULD receive public assistance, at least for their children's sake, and do not, often because of warped conceptions of the relationship between "charity" and the work ethic. Nineteenth century media sources were not that much different, although wartime necessity permitted them to comment on what the abuse of a few did to the legitimate majority: "Aside from the deplorable fact that respectable and industrious women have been compelled to mingle in common with the vilest characters in society in order to receive the needed relief, the money thus bestowed upon imposters has caused many worthy persons to go unrelieved." (84) On July 20, the UDC made 2440 payments and faced depletion of their funds. They were forced to turn away many women with "new cards" to whom nothing had yet been paid: "Many of this class had come full of hope, expecting the wherewith to satisfy the cravings of their little ones at home for bread. Several women burst into tears and sobbed bitterly, but there was no help." (85) Sometimes the women were subjected to abuse by the clerks. One young woman named Ellen O'Brien was told to go to the next room for help by one of the young male clerks. When she asked if she could sit down to rest for a moment, the clerk brutally assaulted her, choking and kicking her and tearing her clothing. This was not the first time this man had "ill-used" women seeking aid, and he was arrested by the police. (86)
Nineteenth century middle class reform mentality, grounded as it was in Puritanism and bourgeois economic values, contributed to an ongoing analysis of what the poor did with their money and more particularly what the soldier did with his pay. The Times suggested that soldiers be given only $2 a month spending money. The remaining $9 would be automatically invested in interest bearing Government securities so that the three years volunteer would come out of the war with $400 in savings as well as free bounty land which would "set him up for life." What would happen to his family in the meantime was not addressed. (87) A July 22nd Tribune editorial took a swipe at the volunteer soldiers for "wastefulness and unreasonableness" leading to abuse of both their pay and public funding. Although the article admitted that some regiments had been "underarms four, six, eight or even nine weeks without receiving or being entitled to any pay" because entitlement began only when they were mustered into United States service, it contended that when they actually received the pay, they and their families should have no other problems:
This together with the bounty at the end of their service and their regular pay ought to support the volunteers and their families, without dependence upon the generosity of private citizens or Defense Committees. The regular soldier is never seen begging or dependent upon kindness or charity; and their families rarely or never become a burden either to citizens or Government. (88)
The writer, in this case, was apparently blithely unaware of either the immensity of the recruitment drive in progress and its ramifications upon the home folk or the immensity of a conflict that was already turning hotter as he wrote. But this variety of insensitivity was symptomatic of the emergence of bourgeois middle class economic mentality and its Social Darwinist apologia with its attitude that the poor create their own conditions. Accordingly, a Times editorial entitled "Relief of the Respectable Poor" first admitted that "Were it not for the workman, there would be no wealth," before it went on to outline the sufferings of the middle class. In what seemed to be a harbinger of the concept of "relative deprivation," the writer lamented the fate of middle-class people who found themselves jobless and beyond the jobs of the working-class, suffering from "mental misery", and too proud to apply for relief, an application that supposedly came more easily to the poor who were accustomed to relying upon charity. After all, the poor did not suffer as much for "where there is no intellectual hunger, there can no intellectual starvation," and unlike a member of the middle class, the poor man "can turn his hand to any kind of rough laboring work; his wife is probably a washerwoman or charwoman; his children have most likely been accustomed to gather sticks and cinders, and collect cast-off clothing and broken victuals." The middle class, unlike the poor, had no recourse. Finally, the writer begged the employers of the middle class to reduce their employees' wages instead of laying them off. (89) Despite the somehat insensitive portrayal of working people, this characterization does speak to the precarious nature of membership in the so-called middle class and the distinct possibility for many of losing that middle rung of die economic ladder.
All of these problems attending the relief system, attitudinal as well as managerial, are what compelled the German company to list their grievances to begin with. Their families were being victimized, and to illustrate the seriousness of their claims, or perhaps in hope that someone would come to the aid of their helpless families, the men included their names, the ages of their children, and their ward addresses on the petition.
Moreover, on July 16th, the Times printed a letter of supplication from Ludwig S. Blenker himself, the commander of the German Brigade that now included the Garibaldi Guard. Written from Camp Blenker at Somersville near Arlington Heights on July 13, this letter was obviously the result of a major source of "mental misery" among his foreign born working class troops. Blenker asked:
Will the wealthy classes do their duty? Will they keep their word? Or will they be more parsimonious with their treasure than the warriors with their blood?...These questions form the topic of many conversations in the camp of the First German Brigade. the depressing news which our comrades of war get from home, cannot but raise many anxieties. I owe it to my men and to myself to remember to the Committees and Societies of assistance formed in the moment of enthusiasm the obligations they took upon themselves in the most solemn way. (90)
At Abington Farms, the Guard became a part of Ludwig Blenker's Brigade, soon to be Division, of Germans. Blenker was a Forty-Eighter who had been a battallion leader of revolutionary forces in the South-German insurrection of 1849 in the Palatinate. With the failure of that rebellion, Blenker came to the United States, and at Lincoln's call for volunteers raised the German 8th New York, a picturesquely uniformed and well armed regiment that with their "perfect stage general" of a commander gained the acclamation of the German community of New York. Carl Schurz, in his memoirs, described Blenker's lavish headquarters camp, his martial ostentation, and "theater oddities", but he also attested to Blenker's courage and organizational skills as well as his efficiency as an officer. (91) Regardless of the level of skill that Blenker brought to the service of the United States, his command, too, was fraught with troubles. Officer infighting characterized these troubles as well. Blenker's position was envied enough to gain him the opprobrium of many ethnic officers and their patrons, including Frederick George D'Utassy.
It is also true that a jumbled government bureaucracy, unschooled as of yet in the managerial expertise necessary to run a modem war, caused problems for thousands of soldiers, especially at the beginning of the war. Tardiness of pay was one reason for many desertions. (92) The poor adrninistration of home relief services brought many a soldier a tearful letter from home that caused him considerable anguish and consternation. (93) And thousands of new volunteers, native and immigrant, were issued outmoded and defective weapons in the scramble to arm them. (94) Indeed, general evidence demonstrates that camp life for the common soldier was dreary enough without the added frustration of ethnic slurs and bias so common in the Union Army and in the nation. Foreign-born soldiers were subject to taunting and ridicule at the least provocation. The mildest form of prejudice was evident in the mockery of dialect Popular songs of the period made fun of the German soldier's broken English in particular: "I Goes To Fight Mit Sigel" and "Corporal Schnapps". Whether malice was intended is irrelevant.
The brigading together of soldiers of a particular nationality perhaps made them less susceptible to petty abuses, but formed a bastion of ethnicity that invited other varieties of attack. Blenker's camp was a striking example of this. "German fashion, the tents stood in rows, each regiment separated from the others. The lanes between them were ornamented...with recently planted fir and cedar trees." (95) Moreover, in response to his men's inadaptability to American taste, Blenker was able to procure funds to buy rye and erect special bakeries to make black bread, and also to provide lager beer for his soldiers. His sutlers sold lager, Rhine wine and bologna. (96)
Responses to these ethnic distinctions were quick to evolve. One native born lieutenant who served with Germans in an artillery battery wrote: "What is what is most unpleasant to me of all, is that I have to live with these men, to eat their onions and drink their lager and very rarely to hear a word of musical English from American lips as I am almost the sole specimen of a Yankee in the Company."(97) He also told of:
Another native soldier, upon being disciplined by his German superior officer, told him to: "Hold your barking and speak English, you damned Dutch son of a bitch." And a New York soldier, placed in the custody of some immigrant guards, protested: "I am not going to be guarded by a lot of Dutch hounds." (99)
Since the regimental descriptive books of the Garibaldi Guard show that almost half of the men were of Teutonic origins, these men undoubtedly shared both the advantages and disadvantages of being members of the German Division at Abington Farms. But those soldiers who were not German must have been subjected to the same abuses with none of the ethnic benefits. And this disparity must have added to the tension and friction already existing in the regiment That friction led to a series of collective disciplinary infractions by the Garibaldians, that finally evoked a major reponse from the Fifth Division commander under whose jurisdiction Blenker's Brigade fell, Colonel Dixon Miles. Arriving at D'Utassy's camp on July 17, the order threatened that:
In this instance, the collective response to injustice or perceived maltreatment as well as to the Colonel's lobbying, may have served to alter the situation of the Garibaldians, for a few days after the July mutiny, the promised rifles arrived and the soldiers were given their first month's pay. (101) Perhaps the distribution process was working better, or political influence was felt in the right places, or perhaps it was only that the Confederate Army was on the move.
Footnotes for Chapter 4
1 Herbert G. Gutman, Ira Berlin, Ed., Power and Culture: Essays on the American Working Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 326.
2 Ibid., 327.
3 Ibid., 328.
4 Ibid., 329.
5 Mike Merrill, "Interview with Herbert Gutman, in MARHO Radical Historians Organization, Visions of History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 192.
6 Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1951.) See especially Chapters 5: "Military Units of Germans," Chapter 7," The Rank and File," and Chapter 19, "Numbers and Rewards."
7 Robert Ernst.
8 Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980), 34.
9 Enloe, 37-38.
10 New York Times, May 26, 1861.
11 Defense of Frederick George D'Utassy, War Department Court Martial Records, Washington D.C., 1863, 5; George Waring, "The Garibaldi Guard," Liber Scrirptorium (1893), 568-75.
12 Defense, 5.
13 Letter from Jose Torrens, May 31, and June, 11, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
14Letter from French Company, D'Utassy Papers, May 31, 1861.
15 Norton to D'Utassy, June 11, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
16 New York Times, June 6, 20,30, 1861.
17 New York Daily Tribune. June 26, 1861.
18 clipping, D'Utassy papers.
19 Hildebrandt Affidavit, July 2, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
20 Asboth to D'Utassy, May 24 and July 3, 1861.
21 Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy. 210.
22 Court Martial Proceedings, D'Utassy Papers, June 26, 1861.
23 Ibid. When reading direct quotes, readers should remember that neither native-born or foreign-born writers used perfect English.
25 D'Utassy to Brig.-Gen. Joseph K. P. Mansfield.
26 Weigand to D'Utassy, June 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
27 Mahlon Sands to D'Utassy, December 29, 1862, D'Utassy Papers.
28 Tinelli to D'Utassy, June 10, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
29 Takats to D'Utassy, June 15, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
30 Mahlon Sands to D'Utassy, July 15, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
31 Repetti to D'Utassy, J; Bernstein to D'Utassy; Norton to D'Utassy, 1861; Aigner to D'Utassy,; Fermer to D'Utassy; Siegel to D'Utassy; Dumager to D'Utassy-all July 26, 1861: D'Utassy Papers.
32 New York Times July 6, 1861.
33 D'Utassy Defense, 6.
34 Charles Carleton Coffin, Four Years of Fighting (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1886), 11-12.
35 New York Times. July 9, 1861.
36 New York Daily Tribune. July 10, 1861.
37 Ibid; Coffin, 13.
38 New York Daily Tribune. July 13, 1861.
39 New York Times July 9, 1861.
40 Torrens to D'Utassy, July 8, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
41 New York Daily Tribune. July 4.1861.
42 Reid Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers : Their Expectation and their Experiences (New York: Viking Press, 1988), 59.
43 Mitchell, 58-59.
44 New York Daily Tribune, July 4, 1861.
45 Petition from Non-Commissioned Officers, D'Utassy Papers, July 6, 1861.
46 Tassilier to D'Utassy, July 10, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
47 Victor to D'Utassy, early July 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
48 Hildebrandt to D'Utassy, July 2, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
49 Hildebrandt to D'Utassy, June 22, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
50 Hughes to D'Utassy, July 1, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
51 Hughes to D'Utassy, July 30, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
52 Tinelli to D'Utassy, June 10, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
53 Tinelli to D'Utassy, July 18, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
54 Norton to D'Utassy, July 3, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
56 Lonn, quoting the Illinois Stoats-Zeitung, August 6, 1861, 162-163.
57 Elijah Ward, 37th Congress, Washington D.C. to D'Utassy, January 10, 1862.
58 Although there was a skirmish at Bailey's Crossroads near Munson's Hill, Virginia in late August 1861, the date of September 27, 1861 on the record suggests that Heiss' arrest took place before a larger engagement September 28-29, 1861. OR, I:5, 119-122; 217-220.
59 Report of Lt. Col. Dennis O'Kane, 69th Pa. Inf., HQ 2nd Regt., Baker's Brigade, Sept. 29, 1861, OR, I:5, 218; Report of Lt. Col. Isaac J. Wistar, 71st. Pa, Inf., HQ California Regt., Sept. 29, 1861. 218-220.
60 War Department Court-Martial Record, August Heiss, 31st New York Infantry, 3.
61 lbid., 4.
62 Ibid., 5.
63 Ibid., 6.
64 Ibid., 7.
65 Ibid., 7-8.
66 Ibid., 9.
67 Ibid., 10.
69 Ibid., 1.
70 General Orders #17, HQ, Army of the Potomac, Jan 18, 1862.
71 War Department Court Martial Record, Maj. J. Lichtenheim, 58th New York Infantry, 1.
72 Gen. Orders #17. Lichtenheim Court-Martial Proceedings.
73 Lichtenheim Court-Martial, p. 1-2.
74 Carl Schurz, The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz II, (New York: The McClure Company, 1907), 229-236.
75 Union Correspondence, OR, I:5, 716; Lichtenheim Court-Martial, 2.
76 General Orders 17, p. 1.
77 Petition from the 2nd, 9th and 10th Companies, July 9, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
78 New York Times. July 10, 1861; Maj. Gen. R. Patterson to Col. E.D. Townsend, Asst. Adj. Gen. U.S. Army, July 9, 1861 (Martinsburg, Va.), OR, I, ii, 162-63.
79 New York Times, July 10, 1861.
80 New York Times, July 13, 1861.
81 New York Times, July 17, 1861.
82 New York Daily Tribune, July 12, 1861.
83 New York Daily Tribune, July 16, 1861.
84 New York Daily Tribune,. July 20, 1861.
85 New York Daily Tribune, July 20, 1861.
86 New York Daily Tribune, August 21, 1861.
87 New York Times, July 7, 1861.
88 New York Daily Tribune, July 22, 1861.
89 New York Times, July 18, 1861.
90 New York Times, July 16, 1861.
91 Schurz, Memoirs, 233-35.
92 Donald and Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1961), 330.
93 Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (New York: Doubleday, 1952), 291.
94 Donald, 327.
95 Lonn, 351.
96 Lonn, 362.
97 Wiley, 312.
100 Miles to D'Utassy, July 17, 1861, D'Utassy Papers.
101 New York Times,. July 16, 1861.
Copyright by Catherine Catalfamo, 1989
New York State Division of Military
and Naval Affairs: Military History