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By Charles S. Kaune, MAJ, USA.

Chapter 2: The National Guard Between the Wars

The Army between the First and Second World Wars suffered from a number of problems all of which led to their pitiful state of readiness at the commencement of World War II. Treaties calling for arms limitations in 1922 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 dictated a United States military policy designed solely for defense.1 These treaties came on the heels of America's incipient pacifism and rising isolationism. Churches and so-called peace societies were at the forefront of the post-Great War mania to reduce military spending and the proposed compulsory military service.2 Colleges and universities in the 1920s, in support of this effort to promote peace, militated against the presence of military training on campus.3 College students by the thousands took the "Oxford oath", i.e., not to bear arms in future wars.4 The battle cry of the pacifists appeared to be: the diversion of resources to create a military juggernaut like pre-war Prussia would not make a better life for Americans. The implied argument inherent in their position was that greater military preparedness would only retard needed social advances.5

Aside from the wave of pacifism and isolationism the military was hampered by the depression of the 1930s and the attendant dearth of available resources. Though recruitment was easier, the Army still suffered because they were compelled to shift assets to programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps which received more Army money than did Reserve component training.6 All of the military, not just the reserve components, was a victim of these problems. The Army, in addition, fell victim to America's fear of a large standing force, it's preference being for a militia. The greater interests of the country were to be safeguarded by the Navy.7

Between 1920 and 1930 the Regular Army stood at approximately 130,000. From 1931 to 1939 the average was 164,000.8 Despite the paucity of forces this was not the greatest among the problems of the Army. Modernization of the force with tanks, aircraft, large caliber artillery, semi-automatic rifles, and radios was unachievable and would have a greater negative impact on the Army. Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, in 1932, recognized the need for funds for modernization and continued to lobby towards that end. Congress, however, would continue to fund horses, mules, wagons, and harness at a greater rate than armored vehicles until 1938.9 Congressional penury is best illustrated by their insistence on appropriating unlimited money for the repair of old trucks while not permitting the purchase of new ones.10 In addition, as long as stocks of ammunition for World War I vintage weapons existed there would be no appropriations for new equipment.11 As General MacArthur stated before Congressional budget hearings in 1934 the stockage of equipment was both inadequate and obsolescent.12 The War Department drew up a "Policy for Mechanization and Motorization" which, among other things, identified a need for the 105mm howitzer. Development of this weapon was never funded due to the lack of money.13 Furthermore, the Army was incapable of exploiting technological gains in the civilian sector for military purposes. Research and development was an almost totally unexplored region during the period between the wars.14

Appropriations for the Army increased modestly between 1922 and 1932 though not of sufficient amounts to increase their effectiveness. The depression caused this trend to be reversed from 1933 to 1935. From 1936 to 1939, as tensions increased in Europe, the annual appropriations went up.15 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower in his autobiography stated the results of the scarcity of money:

military appropriations during the thirties had restricted training to a unit basis. Even small arms ammunition for range firing had to be rationed in occasional doles. The Army concentrated on spit and polish, retreat formations, and parades because the American people, in their abhorrence of war, denied them­selves a reasonable military posture.16

In addition to the reasons already addressed the Army between the Wars was scattered throughout the United States and abroad in postings rarely as large as regiment. This and the imposition of non-military duties such as administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps taxed the Regular Army to the point where they were incapable of performing their traditional function.

The organisation of the Army in 1939 illustrates their lack of preparedness for war. There were 174,079 men in 130 posts, camps, and stations including 49,128 garrisoning Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Canal Zone. There were only three formally organized divisions each of less than half strength. There was one cavalry division at half strength and one mechanized brigade at half strength.17 The National Guard was organized in 18 divisions and consisted of 199,491 personnel which amounted to approximately half of their wartime strength.18 The strength of the Organized Reserve Corps was 119,733 of which only 3,000 were NCOs. About 90% of these Reserve officers were company grade and about 17% had not been participating in any kind of training.19

The 450,000 man National Guard called for in the National Defense Act of 1920 was never raised. The peak enrollment between 1920 and 1939 was 199,491.20 This low number is not a reflection on the patriotism of the American public rather it illustrates the inadequate funding of the Army. In many communities the local National Guard company survived on the donated time of the Guardsmen, i.e., even without the meager drill pay the citizen-soldiers continued to serve.21 It was not uncommon for officers to leave their businesses and families to attend courses of instruction lasting up to three months in length.22 The leadership of the National Guard companies were often experienced veterans of World War I. Company I, 10th Infantry (the predecessor of the 106th Infantry), New York National Guard, had as it's commander in 1932 Captain George Wilkinson. Wilkinson, a Captain in the War, was a stern disciplinarian who conducted precise drills and range firing. His First Sergeant, Harold R. Murphy, had also served as a Captain in the War. The two worked in perfect harmony with 1SG Murphy accepting his role without animosity. The 2nd platoon leader, 2Lt John M. Nichols, was a veteran of the Marine Corps in China and he reflected that training in the way in which he handled his men.23

Recognizing the need for greater professionalism within the Army of the United States, command post exercises between the Regular Army and the National Guard were begun in 1934 with 1st Army. These continued with one field army annually for each successive year.24 Beginning in 1935 the field armies began conducting maneuvers with the regular component and the Guard as a shakedown for both troops and staffs. 1st Army began the exercises in 1935 and six National Guard divisions participated: the 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 43rd, and 44th. There were 58,000 soldiers participating in these Army maneuvers which equates to 9,600 per division, less than half it's authorized strength.25 In 1936, 2nd Army conducted maneuvers with: the 32nd, 33rd, 37th, and 38th divisions. In 1937, 4th Army was responsible for the exercise and it controlled the following divisions: 34th, 39th, 40th, and 41st. The 3rd Army conducted the maneuvers in 1938 with: the 30th, 31st, 36th, and 49th divisions. The cycle repeated itself in 1939 with the 1st Army again hosting the exercise with the same divisions as in 1939.26

Despite the successful appearance of these large field army maneuvers their lack of utility was apparent to the Regular Army hierarchy. There were too few officers skilled in the staffing and commanding of units as large as battalions. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, alerted his staff to this problem so that they might find a solution. In a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Omar N. Bradley, Marshall stated:

A serious weakness of the National Guard is the lack of trained staffs from battalion up, meaning staff teams that know how to function expeditiously and to the advantage of the troops This staff weakness will be destruc­tive of troop efficiency unless it is thoroughly understood as a weakness and everybody works to meet it.27

The National Guard, similarly, was emasculated by the lack of modern equipment and training that was only rudimentary at best. By and large the Guard armories were centers of community activities such as dances and festivals. The units stressed organized athletics, shooting competitions, and parades to raise morale, unit esprit, and for recruiting.28 The Guard was an army of amateurs in which the officers were attempting to learn their trade without proper guidance while the enlisted men were being trained without the proper equipment.29 Weekly drills of one and a half hours each was barely long enough to form the unit, inspect, and perform cursory functions. Training usually conducted during these brief periods was: close order and extended order drill; guard duty; first aid; disassembly of the Browning Automatic Rifle and assembly While blindfolded; small arms instruction; and general military knowledge.30 Prior to the annual summer training an intense train-up was conducted to prepare the soldiers. Instruction conducted by the non-commissioned officers of Company I, 10th Infantry consisted of: making the bedroll; tent pitching; care and cleaning of equipment; scouting and patrolling; small unit tactics; interior guard duty; and rifle marksmanship.31

The two weeks in the summer, training with obsolescent equipment, was valuable for developing unit cohesion but didn't prepare for modern warfare.32 The 27th Division's infantry usually trained at Camp Smith, New York while the artillery trained at Pine Camp. They conducted joint training at Pine Camp in 1927 and 1935; at Plattsburg in 1939; and at Dekalb in 1940.33 Typical of the training at summer camp was that experienced by Company I, 10th Infantry at Camp Smith, Peekskill, New York. The company would move from Mohawk by rail to Red Hook and then hike to camp which was one mile away. This march typically exhausted the troops who were carrying their rifles and packs. Company I, as all of the companies of the regiment, was billeted in squad tents pitched over concrete bases. There was a latrine at one end and a kitchen at the other end of the company street. Each evening the regiment would conduct evening parade and retreat with the troops dressed in their class A uniform complete with white leggings and waist belt with brass buckle. The regimental band performed for each of the evening parades.

During the first week of camp the company would practise on a 200 meter known distance range with the .30 caliber, Springfield rifle. Other range work included a fire and movement exercise for a platoon on a 600 meter range which was designed to train fire control and distribution. One overnight tactical problem would be conducted which consisted of a six mile forced march, the pitching of tents, and then an exercise such as the platoon in the attack. The exercise invariably would be conducted in daylight and was followed by a critique, the striking of tents, and then another forced march back to the main camp. During inclement weather training usually consisted of mess hall lectures. The farced march to the train at red Hook at the end of camp would not result in the same exhaustion of the troops experienced at the beginning.34

As war began to loom ever closer in Europe the War Department began to press for improvements to the force. Their immediate needs were, in 1938, an increase of 58,000 in the ground force, 36,000 in the National Guard, and the purchase of sufficient equipment to outfit the Protective Mobilization Plan's M-day force of 730,000 plus the M-Day plus five months force of 270,000.35 To clarify these needs Chief of Staff, General Marshall, reported to the Senate Military Affairs Committee that both the Regular Army and the National Guard needed the following pieces of modern equipments new artillery, a semi-automatic rifle, and enough anti-tank and air defense ammunition to train the force.36

Due partially to Germany's 1 September 1939 attack of Poland training in the National Guard was accelerated. Annual drills increased from 48 to 60 and field training from 15 to 22 days. President Roosevelt signed an executive order authorizing an increase in the Army on 6 September.37 The alternating cycle of field army maneuvers changed so that all participated in an exercise in 1940.38 The summer maneuvers of 1940, which occurred prior to the Federalization of the Guard, had 90,000 troops of the Regular Army and National Guard exercising in the 1st Army area. The square National Guard divisions (two brigades each with two regiments of three battalions each) averaged 10,414 personnel or roughly half of their authorization of 22,000.39

The typical Guard division in those maneuvers had no light or heavy mortars, no new anti-tank weapons, one quarter of it's requirement of new rifles, stove pipes as cannons, and commercial trucks simulating tanks. The deficiencies noted by the Regular Army inspectors included a lack of discipline, leadership, liaison, sanitation, and improper communications and supply procedures.40 For too long the Regular Army had conducted ineffectual training at echelons below regiment with obsolescent equipment or none at all. This lack of professionalism was handed down to the National Guard.

As the war in Europe intensified America's Protective Mobilization Plan received the ultimate test. General Malin Craig, Army Chief of Staff from 1935 to 1939, initiated the PMP as a means to rapidly expand the military forces in conjunction with the attendant industrial base.41 Essentially, the PMP called for the activation of the National Guard which, with the Regular Army, would provide a force capable of defending the country during full scale mobilization. Over the course of mobilization, 4 million men would be called in 390 days.42

However, the protracted peace from the end of the Great War until President Roosevelt signed the Selective Service and Training Act of 16 September 1940 meant to war planners that there was no industrial base upon which to prepare for global or even limited war. The dearth of research and development funds not appropriated during the years of peace would mean that the Army would require a massive injection to modernize the force to current European standards.

Notwithstanding the shortage of modern weapons the Army felt that their peacetime organization was adequate to deal with any minor emergency without disrupting civilian operations. The Army was organized into nine corps areas each with one Regular Army division, two National Guard divisions, and the nucleus of three Organized Reserve Corps divisions. The boundaries of these corps areas were established to equalize the available population for service.43 PMP planners estimated that the Regular Army would number 260,000 after 60 days of mobilization and would be used as an expeditionary force. The National Guard would constitute a 435,000 man second echelon and the Organized Reserve Corps would be a cadre for the training of the millions of wartime conscripts.44 The Regular Army, however, being spread across the United States and abroad, found no opportunity for large unit training. The Organized Reserve Corps was but a collection of some 100,000 officers, and no NCOs, who would form the cadre for draftee divisions, and who had no opportunity to train in divisions. The National Guard was their sole participant in division size exercises between the Wars.

General Marshall, recognizing the need for a concerted effort to train up the existing Army establishment for war, founded the General Headquarters using as a model the AEF HQ of WW I. Brigadier General Leslie J. McNair established this organization on 26 July 1940 in the buildings of the Army War College, Washington, DC. His main effort was to plan the training of the individual soldier and oversee the preparation of squads through armies. Marshall first had to rid the Army of it's arcane intermediate level bureaucracy also known .as the Chiefs of Field Artillery, Infantry, Cavalry, and Coast Artillery. Exercising unlimited power in training and equipping their particular arm they had become a hindrance to the expeditious and efficient development of the Army as a whole.45 With their elimination McNair was then free to develop and implement a training plan without unnecessary interference.

McNair's position as chief trainer of the Army would put him at the right hand of the Chief of Staff. The preparation of the Army for war was the nation's most critical need in 1940. As General Eisenhower noted in Crusade in Europe, regarding training in the Army, "the mass of officers and men lacked any sense of urgency. Athletics, recreation, and entertainment took precedence in most units over serious training.46 Supporting Eisenhower's comments were the severe criticisms of the Corps maneuvers of 1940. Despite the weaknesses these exercises demonstrated the ability of the Army to coordinate and move large masses of troops far the first time since 1918.47

A major impediment to the rapid formulation of trained divisions was the need to maintain large body for hemisphere defense. General Marshall regarded the threat to America and South America to be very real. For this reason he didn't break up the Regular Army regiments to cadre a large number of new emerging divisions.48 What Marshall and the Army would rely on in this emergency was the National Guard. As General Marshall said in a radio broadcast on 16 September 1940,

For years the National Guard has been preparing for service in the event of a great national emergency. Today that emergency is recognized...they must establish themselves in camp and in the shortest possible time season and prepare their small nucleus of men about thirty per cent of full strength-to receive and train triple their number.49

General Marshall's speech coincided with the President's signing of the Selective Service and Training Act, the first peacetime conscription law in United States history, a tacit confirmation of the country's imminent involvement in the war in Europe. One month after the signing there were 16,000,000 men registered for military service though the Act limited annual inductions to 900,000 and appropriations could only support 800,000.50

The language of the Act required all men aged 21 to 35 to register and serve for a training and service period of 12 consecutive months and then in one of the reserve forces for 10 years or until age 45.51 If Congress declared an emergency, however, the President could extend the period of service indefinitely.52 Sufficient time, however, had not been allocated to build and staff replacement training centers, therefore, the first increments of draftees and volunteers, through December 1940, were sent directly to the activated divisions for initial combat training.53 During this period many of the new draftees and volunteers, would be integrated into the understrength National Guard and Regular Army divisions. Many others would fill the Reserve divisions which had been staffed by officers of the Organized Reserve Corps, National Guard, and Regular Army, and NCOs from the Guard and Regular Army.

General Marshall was concerned that the quality of the divisions be as equal as was humanly possible to ensure maximum flexibility for employment. He realized that the Regular Army officer was the most ready for combat due to his training and education and, therefore, care should be used in assigning their limited numbers (16,624 in 1940).54 The policy regarding National Guard officers, the next most abundant and qualified, was they should be retained in their positions and that vacancies would be filled by promoting or appointing personnel from that same unit. Further amplification of that policy came from General Marshall in a letter to his Army commanders on 23 October 1941:

In considering the capabilities of a National Guard officer to command a National Guardunit, it is not believed that we should compare him with the best available Regular Army officer. Rather, we should consider, in my opinion, whether or not the National Guard officer is capable of discharging the duties of the position in a creditable manner.55

The paucity of funds available in the lean years between the wars meant that none of the National Guard divisions had a full complement of people. The average strength was around 10,000 or roughly half the authorized total for war. The Guard divisions upon reporting to their training sites found they were to be cut even more as they would have to provide the cadre for at least one of the Organized Reserve divisions.56 Marshall had wanted to bring all of the National Guard divisions on active duty at the same time to speed up the process of forming the Army. He realized that the training of the Guard units was rudimentary, in many cases, but at least they were organized and could accept vast numbers of recruits and begin the initial orientation of civilians thus reducing some training time in the future.57

Marshall, having been an instructor with the National Guard during his career, knew better than most in the Regular Army community the challenge ahead of them and this he tried to pass on to his subordinate commanders:

it will tax the wisdom of leaders of all ranks to mold these citizen—soldiers into a unified Army prepared to accept cheerfully the rigors of long hours of training, the fatigue of marches, and the discomforts and hardships of services in the field...In accomplishing the foregoing there must be no pampering of individuals, no distinction between men because of their previous military experience or condition of entry into the service.58

Despite the need for a large number of officers for the ever-growing Army there was a reluctance to capriciously award commissions, to approve promotions without justification, or to revoke commissions of apparently unqualified officers. The hierarchy of the Army had to weigh the needs of the service as to the quality and quantity of it's officers. To assist him in the process of weeding out Guard and Reserve officers who were, either too old to perform or for other reasons, General Marshall established an advisory board made up of distinguished former officers of the Reserve components. The board would act on cases in which a Reserve component officer was removed from a position for a variety of reasons. In one instance a Guard Brigadier General was relieved of command by his commanding general and this action was supported by the Army commander and the War Department General Staff. The Board, however, intervened and advised that the officer be reassigned other duties rather than discharged from the service.59

In an other instance Governor Sam Jones of Louisiana, a National Guard captain, was recommended by his state adjutant for promotion to the grade of major although he had failed to complete the necessary courses and though there were no vacancies. The War Department General Staff supported the promotion recommendation but the Executive forReserve and ROTC Affairs refused to endorse it saying the promotion was the result of political patronage. General Marshall, understanding the long term benefits of such a promotion in conjunction with the prospective position on a larger staff which Governor Jones would hold, ruled in his favor.60 Marshall understood full well the relationship between the higher ranking officers of the National Guard and well placed government officials. He moved quickly but carefully to remove National Guard officers at division and regimental level who had many, years before exceeded their wartime usefulness. When members of Congress would attempt to intervene on behalf of one of their cronies General Marshall would cut them off with a response such as this:

I'll put it this way, gentlemen. I don't understand your position because I think that your principal interest--and here it seems to me that you are only considering one constit­uent and ignoring all your other constituents who are members of the division. I am concerned with them.61

In refining the Army, Marshall and the War Department General Staff found that there were more Regular Army officers to be removed from the active list than National Guard or Reserve. From June to November 1941, 195 Regular officers were removed; 31 Colonels, 117 LTCs; 31 Majors; and 16 Captains. Among the National Guard and the Reserve there were 269 removed: six Colonels; eight LTCs; 60 Captains; 84 1Lts; and 97 2 Lts. Also, 33 National Guard officers were reclassified and 74 resigned. Of the Regular Army removals, this was 1.3% of the total and of the National Guard and Reserve this was only .75%.62

General Marshall was probably the biggest supporter of the National Guard during this time period. His belief was that they lacked experience and not leadership ability. In a memo to LTG Drum on 26 April 1941 General Marshall said: "I have gone through a National Guard division and questioned practically every 2Lt in the artillery, and rarely have even found a man who has fired a gun more, than once."63 Therefore, they should be given every opportunity to prove that they were as efficient as the Regular Army officer.64 As General Marshall stated to the Secretary of War in a letter dated 30 September 1941, of the approximately 25,000 National Guard officers only 6,800 had ever completed a service school course of instruction.65

Officer vacancies in the Guard units prior to 1 February 1942 were filled with Organized Reserve Corps personnel and to Guard soldiers with commissions or those newly appointed.66 After 1 February, all components of the service now being consolidated in the Army of the United States, all officers were in competition against one another for promotion.

In accordance with the precepts of the Selective Service and Training Act Lieutenant General Hugh Drum, Commanding 2nd Corps, on 9 October 1940 ordered the 27th Division (New York National Guard) to concentrate at Ft McClellan, Alabama. The division began the move by train and wheel convoy on 17 October 1940 and the last unit closed on 26 October.67 The division had approximately 10,000 soldiers on the rolls and would need 7,000 to rise to mobilization strength. Details were immediately sent to Ft Dix, New Jersey, Camp Upton, New York, and Ft Niagara, New York to begin the reception of recruits arriving on 21 January 1941. Major General William N. Haskell, CG of the division since 1926, established a training regiment to facilitate the initial combat training of the 7,000 recruits and who would later be added to the established regiments of the division.68

Chapter One


1 Mark S. Watson, The US Army in World War II: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Wash., DC: Historical Division Dep't of the Army, 1930), p. 35.

2 George C. Reinhardt and William R. Kintner The Haphazard Years (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1960), p. 120.

3 Ibid.

4 J. Barry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., The First Peacetime Draft (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp.38-39.

5 Reinhardt, The Haphazard years, p. 17.

6 Clifford, The First Peacetime Draft, p. 40.

7 Reinhardt, The Haphazard years, p. 119.

8 Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry History of Military Mobilization in the US Army 1775-1945 (Wash., DC: Center of Military History, 1984), p.379.

9 Reinhardt The Haphazard Years, p.161.

10 Ibid., p.155.

11 Ibid., p.127.

12 Ibid., p.188.

13 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 38-39.

14 Reinhardt, The Haphazard Years, p. 132.

15 Elbridge Colby, The National Guard of the United States (Manhattan, KS: MA/AH Publishing, 1977), ch.IX, pp.2-3.

16 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe. (Norwalk, Conn.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948), p.7.

17 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p.148.

18 Ibid., p.149.

19 Irving Heyont and E.W McGregor, "Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of U.S. Army Reserve Components", (McLean, VA: Research Analysis Corporation, October 1972), p.2-3.

20 Colby, The National Guard of the United States, ch.IX, pp.2-3.

21 Ibid., ch.IX, pp.3-4.

22 Ibid., ch IX, p.11.

23 Fred C. Kaune, ILt (AUS, Ret), personal letter, p.1.

24 Colby, The National Guard of the United States, ch IX, pp.14-15.

25 Ibid., ch IX, p.15.

26 Ibid., ch IX, pp.14-15.

27 Larry I. Bland, ed., The Papers of George C. Marshall, vol 2, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ Press, 1986), pp. 181-182.

28 John K. Mahon, The History of the Militia and the National Guard. (NY: The Macmillan Co., 1983), p.177.

29 Jay Luvaas, "Buna, 19 Nov 1942-2 Jan 1943, A Leavenworth Nightmare", ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America's First Battles. (Lawrence, KS: Univ of Kansas Press, 1986), p.229.

30 Kaune, personal letter, p.5. 31 Ibid., p.6.

32 Martin Blumenson, "Kasserine Pass, 39 Jan-22 Feb 1943", ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America's First Battles. (Lawrence, KS: Univ of Kansas Press, 1986), p.229.

33 Edmund G. Love, The 27th Infantry Division in WW II. (Wash., DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1949), p.7.

34 Kaune, personal letter, p.7.

35 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p.142.

36 Ibid., p.149.

37 Ibid., p.156.

39 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p.209.

40 Ibid.

41 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System, p.242.

42 Ibid.

43 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System, p.230.

44 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense, (NY: The Free Press, 1984), p.367.

45 Forrest C. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, (NY: The Viking Press, 1966), p.293.

46 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p.7.

47 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p.204.

48 Ibid., p.190.

49 Major H.A. Deweerd, ed., Selected Speeches and Statements of the General of the Army George C. Marshall, (Wash., DC: The Infantry Journal, 1945), p.88.

50 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System, p.247.

51 Mahon, History of the Militia, p. 179. 52Watson Prewar Plans and Preparations, p.220. 53Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System, p.248.

54 Kreidberg. History of Military Mobilization, p.379.

55 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp.258-260.

56 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, p.180.

57 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 193.

58 Ibid., p.232.

59 Ibid., p.244.

60 Ibid., p.254.

61 Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p.99.

62 Watson. Prewar Plans and Preparations, p.245.

[Missing notes for numbers 63-68.]

Chapter One

New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs: Military History
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