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By Charles S. Kaune, MAJ, USA.

Chapter 6: Okinawa

The Allies, through the Autumn of 1944 continued to make inroads against the Japanese held islands of the Central and Southwest Pacific. General Douglas MacArthur had conducted offensive operations on the Solomons and New Guinea while Admiral Nimitz had attacked and seized the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas. The ultimate goal for these converging pincers was Japan.

For MacArthur the next logical step would be the invasion of the Philippines. Once a foothold was gained then Operation CAUSEWAY, the invasion of Formosa and the China coast, could be initiated from there and the Marianas. MacArthur was ordered to move up his invasion of the Philippines from December to October 1944 and to bypass Mindanao and strike Leyte. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas, LTG Robert C. Richardson, advised Washington that the prudent decision would be to next invade Luzon and the Bonin Islands and use than as the jumping off point for an invasion of Okinawa. Okinawa than could be used as the principal staging base for an invasion of the Japanese homeland. Okinawa provided for a safe anchorage for transports and combat ships as well as extensive airfields capable of supporting the largest bombers.

MacArthur added his support to the invasion of Luzon and subsequent invasion of Okinawa as an alternative to Formosa. LTG Harmon, Commander of the Army Air Forces in this area, concurred. LTG Buckner, Commanding General, 10th Army, stated that there were insufficient service troops to support the invasion of Formosa and if Luzon was taken there would be no need.

The decision makers in Washington agreed and tabled CAUSEWAY. MacArthur was ordered to invade Luzon in December and Nimitz to invade the Bonins in January 1945. These two island masses would enable the Allies to keep up the pressure on Japan and attrit their forces. The primary reason for invading Okinawa would be to establish a staging area for the invasion of Japan and to cut the lines of communications between Japan and mainland China and the remaining island strongholds.

The plan for the seizure of Okinawa was simple and straight forward. The 10th Army would move under the operational control of the 5th Fleet commander, Admiral Raymond Spruance, command all ground forces and land on the western shore of Okinawa. The landing would occur on 1 April 1945 and would be supported by the naval surface and air arms of the 5th Fleet. XXIV Corps would land to the right and III Amphibious Corps, under MG Roy Geiger, USMC, would land to the left. Each of the two assaulting corps had two divisions, of their own service, and 10th Army had two divisions in floating reserve, the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions.

The mission of 10th Army was to rapidly eliminate enemy resistance and rehabilitate the existing airfields for use against the Japanese homeland. To execute this, III Amphibious Corps would attack across the island and then north while XXIV Corps would turn to the south.1

Following the cessation of organized hostilities on Saipan, August 1944, the 27th Division embarked for their rest and retraining Base at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides Islands. It would take almost two months for the division to close with all units on Espiritu Santo and complete their base camp. The 27th was located in a coconut grove, rife with malaria, and no facilities. The division engineers planned and supervised construction while the rifleman, gunners, and logisticians all did the actual building. Aside from billets for all soldiers the division was compelled to build training areas and facilities from nothing. Known distance and transition ranges for rifles and machine guns, and a 1,000 inch moving target, anti-tank range were constructed. Impact areas were designated and cleared for mortars and artillery. Due to the immensity of the task to build a base camp the division was unable to commence training until 23 October 1944.2

From then until 30 January 1945 the 27th underwent an intensive training program designed to overcome the deficiencies of the FORAGER Operation and to prepare for future missions. The training was organized into four phases: the first was a four week individual soldier reinforcement of basic combat training; the second was nine weeks in duration and dealt with squad and platoon tasks; the third phase was two weeks long and consisted of company and battalion level training; the fourth and last phase was of two weeks and centered upon the Battalion Landing Team including amphibious assaults.3

The individual training phase concentrated on patrolling, marksmanship, compass work, and swimming. All soldiers fired a qualification and transition course with his individual weapon and a familiarization course with all other weapons organic to his unit.

The small unit phase centered upon scouting and patrolling, infantry-artiilery-tank coordination, and the integration of bazookas, smoke, machineguns, and mortars into the battle. During this phase all individuals attended the Unit Jungle Training Course for eight days.

The company and battalion phase emphasized exploiting enemy weaknesses and coordinating supporting fires. The Commanding General conducted a series of twelve conferences to discuss Combat Principles and imperatives. All infantry and engineer companies engaged in combined tank-infantry exercises designed to stimulate habitual working relationships that were found so wanting on Saipan and Makin.

This training program culminated in three large battalion size exercises in which service ammunition was used to include overhead fire. The first exercise was a night occupation of a defensive position followed by a daylight attack the following morning. The second was the hasty defense of a battalion front. The third exercise was a river crossing without engineer assistance, followed by a defense of the bridgehead, and then a daylight attack integrating tanks, infantry, and artillery.4

During these battalion training exercises the regimental command posts were set up but did not practise their art. This was a critical omission as the functioning of the regimental headquarters at Saipan was a noticeable shortcoming. Rather, these command posts were limited in their operational training to two division directed command post exercises, one in December and the other in January. The emphasis was on setting up, moving, and defending the command posts. All equipment was checked for accountability and serviceability and communications equipment was operationally inspected.5

The division loaded out from 20 to 25 March and rehearsed the ship to shore movement in the vicinity of Espiritu Santo. On 29 March the transport squadron embarked for Ulithi, the division's sole stop, which they reached on 3 April. During this leg of the journey the soldiers were given an orientation on the mission and daily discussions were held to include map studies. All available information was disseminated and operations plans published. Just as was the case en route to Saipan there was no deck space for physical training and the soldiers arrived in a pitiable state. The soldiers contented themselves with care and cleaning of their weapons and personal equipment. Education and information officers were designated within each unit to disseminate information about the war in other theaters The division departed Ulithi on 4 April and arrived off the coast of Okinawa on 9 April.6

After Saipan the division was short 117 officers and 2508 enlisted men. Between 1 January and 25 March 1945 it received 101 officers and 2692 enlisted men. Despite this influx of new personnel the division sailed with a shortage of 143 officers and 1825 enlisted men. This deficit is only partially justified by an increase in the number of personnel given furloughs, entering the hospital, and staying behind as the rear detachment.7

The 27th Division that sailed for Okinawa was vastly different from the one that fought through Saipan. Brigadier General Ogden J. Ross, the Assistant Division Commander and a member of the New York National Guard since 1910, was tasked to command the garrison at Kwajalein. He was replaced by Regular Army Brigadier General William B. Bradford. A veteran of 29 years in the Army, the 49 year old Bradford was a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, the Ecole d' Application de Cavalerie, and the Command and General Staff School. General Bradford had most recently served with the 25th Infantry Division. To fill the vital Chief of Staff position, MG Griner brought in Colonel Richard P. Ovenshine who had been serving as the Chief of Staff of the 98th Division in Hawaii. The 46 year old Ovenshine was a 1918 graduate of the USMA, the only two year course for graduation in that institution's illustrious history. The 105th Infantry's commander, Colonel Leonard Bishop, a New York Guardsman since 1916, was compelled to retire due to disability. He was replaced by Regular Army Colonel Walter S. Winn, Jr. a classmate of Colonel Ovenshine at the Military Academy. The division's DIVARTY commander, Brigadier General Redmond Kernan also was retired due to physical disability. His replacement, Colonel Charles Ferrin, had most recently served as the garrison commander on Makin. The commanders of the 106th and 165th Infantry remained the same, Colonels Albert K. Stebbins and Gerard Kelley, respectively.8

All of the infantry regiments lost battalion commanders either at Saipan or as a result of that action. The 105th lost LTC William J. O'Brien, KIA, and LTC Edward T. Bradt to deafness which precluded his continuance in command. The 106th lost 3rd Battalion commander LTC Harold I. Mizony. The 165th lost Major Martin Foery when he was compelled to return to the States due to a serious injury in the family. In addition, the 105th lost their executive officer LTC Leslie M. Jensen to physical disability. With Major Edward McCarthy moving up to the division staff the 105th was left with no original battalion commander. The new commanders were: LTC Rayburn H. Miller, 41 years old and a member of the Pennsylvania National Guard since 1922. He had graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1942; Major Holeman Grigsby; and LTC Charles DeGroff, 39 years old and a New York Guardsman since 1928. There was only one new battalion commander in the 106th, LTC David R. Crocker, a 29 year old West Pointer who was charged with bringing the Saipan-devastated 3rd Battalion back to life. The 165th retained the same battalion commanders with whom they began the Saipan campaign.9

The division staff remained the same with LTC Frederic Sheldon as the G3, LTC William Van Antwerp as the G2, and LTC Charles B. Ferris as the G4. In reviewing the senior positions from the commanding general through the division staff to the battalion commanders, the ratio of Regular Army to National Guard officers was 1:2. The CG, ADC, Chief of Staff, two regimental commanders and one battalion commander were RA; the G2, G3, G4, one regimental commander, and eight battalion commanders were National Guard. Only seven of the 36 infantry company commanders who went into action on Okinawa can be positively identified as National Guard. The remainder were either Organized Reserve or RA.10

The American 10th Army landed on the west coast of Okinawa on 1 April 1945 with four divisions in the assault waves 1st and 6th Marine Divisions and 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions. The 77th Infantry Division was programmed to assault Ie Shima and Kerama Retto while the 27th was scheduled to be the garrison force on Okinawa. The Marines turned to the north and advanced against meager opposition. The 7th and 96th, elements of XXIV Corps, turned south and fought through a series of interconnected Japanese strongpoints.

Okinawa was a rugged coral-limestone mass, heavily wooded in the uplands and terraced along the coastal flats. The ridgelines were not continuous and appeared to rise up abruptly with steep faces. The ridge pattern was east-west, providing for natural lines of defense. There were no elevation greater than 600 feet however the major hill masses which are that high have generally steep slopes making them appear higher. Natural caves and tunnels abounded because of the coral-limestone nature of the stratum. Drainage was very poor resulting in a quagmire when it rains.11

The expected strength of the enemy on Okinawa was 98,000-100,000. The major tactical units were the 24th Division, 62nd Division, and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade.12 The typical enemy position was strengthened with concrete and had a protective minefield. Mortars, artillery, tanks, machineguns, and rifle fire were all integrated and registered on the natural avenues of approach. Any commanding elevation was likely to be honeycombed with caves and tunnels. Ammunition and food was stored to make each complex self-sufficient. For the first time in the Pacific the Americans were facing an enemy with heavy artillery which had been registered to fire anywhere on the island within the Shuri Line. Each American attack, quickly evolved into a small unit action characterized by individual soldiers low crawling through the enemy's wire and mines to lob grenades into their fighting positions.13 To overcome the enemy's intricate system of defenses the Americans developed what the Japanese called "straddle attack" tactics. This assault was a well coordinated infantry-engineer attack under the direct fire of tanks, self-propelled guns, and flamethrowers. This assault always ended up with hand-to-hand fighting, including bayonets, grenades, and knives, into which the enemy invariably, and indiscriminately placed mortar fire. The infantry-engineer teams would attempt to seal the caves and tunnels from whence the enemy came with demolitions. Because there were often more than one entrance the practise of reorganization and rapidly consolidating on the objective area was necessary and vital.14

The XXIV Corps offensive ran headlong into the Japanese main defensive line in the vicinity of Shuri castle. This fortified position was called the Shuri Line. The Americans reached this defensive network on 8 April but their momentum was spent. The Corps would fight continuously against the depth of this defensive network until 24 April.

The 27th Division, minus the 105th Infantry, was assigned to XXIV Corps to help break the deadlock. The 105th was assigned the mission of assaulting and defeating the enemy on Tsugen Shima, an island off the west coast of Okinawa. The 3rd Battalion alone landed to reduce enemy resistance with the remainder of the regiment held aboard ship as the reserve. It advanced from the landing on the south shore to the northern end of the island, bypassing pockets of resistance to be eliminated the following day. By 1530, 11 April, all resistance on Tsugen Shima had ended with 234 enemy killed. The 3rd Bn, 105th had suffered 11 KIA, 80 WIA,, and 3 MIA. The battalion reembarked at 1830 hours and rejoined the regiment on another nearby island, Kerama Retto.15

The remainder of the division had begun landing on 9 April and had encountered obstacles at every turn. Unfavorable surf conditions inhibited the landing to the point where no supplies were able to get ashore. The 165th was able to land on the 10th and relieved the 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, in defense of the Corps Service Area. The 106th landed on the 11th and was attached to the 96th Division as it's reserve.16 XXIV Corps, by the time the 27th landed, had complete air superiority and could call for close air support at any time of the day. In addition to this was the continuous availability of naval gunfire from battleships, cruiser, and destroyers.

The 105th Infantry was the Corps reserve on 12 and 13 April. Surf conditions continued to disrupt the flow of vital supplies to shore. XXIV Corps issued a warning order to the 27th to prepare to be inserted into the line alongside the 96th on the Corps' right flank.

The 165th was relieved of it's responsibility to defend the Corps Service Area on 15 April. On this same day the 27th assumed responsibility of the Corps right flank with the 2nd Bn, 106th. The division was prepared to participate in a Corps offensive as of this date although it was 2,000 men understrength.17 On 16 April the 105th Infantry relieved the 382nd Infantry. The division front had the 2nd Bn, 106th on the right and the 105th on the left. All units prepared defenses and conducted active patrolling. The division suffered nine killed and 55 wounded.18

On 17 April the front line had the 106th on the right and the 105th on the left with the 165th in reserve. All units continued to improve their defenses while actively patrolling their front. There were three killed and 17 wounded on the day.19

The division prepared for XXIV Corps' general offensive on 18 April. The 2nd Bn, 106th conducted a night river crossing with engineer assault boats and secured the town of Machinato. This was the key to a successful assault being conducted on the 19th by the 106th and 105th Infantry Regiments.20 At 0730 hours the division attacked, as part of the Corps attack with three divisions on line. XXIV Corps had 27 battalions of artillery fire, the most intensive preparation in the Pacific.21 The attack of the 106th and 105th made moderate gains against heavy Japanese resistance. Enemy anti-tank fire and satchel charges crippled 22 of 30 tanks in the supporting tank battalion. The division had 17 killed and 242 wounded while claiming 188 enemy killed.22

The characteristic Japanese defense on the Shuri Line was any elevation covered with foxholes, anti-tank emplacements, machinegun positions, and caves all with cleared fields of fire. The beaten zones of their weapons interlocked at maximum range with mortars and artillery registered on the dead zones. The fighting positions themselves were connected by an intricate series of tunnels which were reinforced to withstand the punishment of artillery and aerial bombardment. The Japanese maintained relative mobility by using the tunnels to mass maneuver forces at the critical point and time.

The Corps continued the attack on 20 April and the 27th participated with the 165th now on the extreme right, the 106th in the center, and the 105th on the left. The 2nd Bn, 106th was in division reserve. The 106th and 165th made gains of up to 1,000 yards against numerous strongpoints. The 105th encountered heavy resistance and was counterattacked by the tenacious Japanese. They also incurred heavy enemy artillery which completely disrupted the attack of the 2nd Bn, killing or wounding most of the line officers. The division had 32 killed and 401 wounded on the day.23

Fighting on 21 April at the Shuri Line was characterized by stubborn enemy resistance and high casualties. All three regiments of the division had attacked on line at 0630 hours and were by intense small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. The 3rd Bn, 106th was relieved by the 2nd Bn, of that regiment and became the division reserve. There were 43 killed and 192 wounded on the day.24

The enemy counterattacked during the early morning hours of 22 April with heavy artillery fire and maneuver forces. The 27th reportedly killed 200 Japanese. For the remainder of the day the three regiments conducted limited operations to reduce the enemy to their front. The 2nd Bn, 105th was pulled back to reorganize. TF Bradford, 3rd Bn, 106th and 3rd Bn, 381st (96th Division), was organized by the Commanding General, XXIV Corps to reduce the resistance in Kakazu, a vital enemy strongpoint that was holding up the entire Corps' advance. The 2nd Bn, 165th was attached to the 105th to help close the gap between the 27th and the 96th Divisions. The 102nd Engineer Battalion, under LTC Harold Gormsen a veteran of the First World War and the New York Guard since 1920, was brought forward as the division reserve. Resupply continued to be a nightmare because of the large number of enemy which had been bypassed. The 165th was being supplied almost entirely by sea via Alligators. The 106th was receiving the preponderance of their supply from air drops.25

The 10th Army had received replacements in large blocks to make-up the huge deficit in fighting men that this battle was developing. On 13 April it received 1,200 which were evenly distributed among the 7th and 96th Divisions. On 23 April it got 3,000 of which approximately one—third went to the 27th Division.26

Neither the 27th nor the 96th Divisions were able to gain ground in their respective sectors due to an intense concentration of enemy on a hogback ridge called Kakazu. The inability of their divisions to progress led to great frustration for the two commanders, MG Griner and MG James Bradley. MG Hodge, the XXXV Corps commander eventually had to intercede to ensure proper cooperation to reach an end to the stalemate. On 23 April, Hodge organized an ad hoc force under BG Bradford. He was given the 2nd Bn, 165th, 3rd Bn, 17th (7th Division), and detachments of the 193rd and 763rd Tank Battalions, to add to his other two battalions for the reduction of the strongpoint at Kakazu. In the remainder of the division sector all three regiments continued to patrol and eliminate small pockets of resistance. The division lost 32 killed and 121 wounded.27

TF Bradford advanced after a 13 minute artillery preparation with 2nd Bn, 165th on the right, 3rd Bn, 17th in the center, and 3rd Bn, 381st on the left. They moved through the town and onto the dominating ridge to the south against moderate resistance. The 105th and 106th advanced along with TF Bradford. The 165th met strong resistance from an intricate defensive network which friendly tanks couldn't penetrate. There were only seven killed and 106 wounded on 24 April. The Japanese had conducted a general withdrawal from the Shuri Line on 23 and 24 April to predetermined defensive positions to the south.28

The 106th and 105th continued to improve their positions on 25 April prior to resuming the offensive on the following day. The 165th attacked again to reduce the strongpoint in the center of their front. Their effort was not, however, coordinated and resulted in a series of company-sized attacks which the enemy was able to stop. LTC Dennis Claire, 36 year old commander of the 2nd Battalion and a veteran of the Guard since 1928, was relieved prior to this attack as he demurred when Colonel Kelley ordered the assault. Claire's position was that proper preparation had not been made and that this assault was futile under the circumstances. The 2nd Bn had been attacking this particular piece of terrain for three days without success and now it was being ordered to attack with no change in the conditions. In other words neither regiment nor division materially effected the situation to enable the battalion to attack with any greater probability of success. Claire was replaced with another long-time Guardsman, Major Herman Lutz, a member since 1922. The regiment achieved only limited success and that by individual companies though they paid a high price in casualties. The 27th incurred a loss of 16 killed and 119 wounded.29

On 26 April the division resumed the attack with all three regiments on line. The 105th, on the left, advanced steadily against moderate resistance. The 106th encountered negligible enemy but held their advance to maintain contact with the regiments on their right and left. The 165th fought through the heaviest resistance of the day meeting numerous pillboxes and Japanese filled caves. Naval gunfire was used extensively and effectively. Two companies of the reserve 3rd Bn, 106th were inserted into the 105th's line to strengthen it. All of the regiments were understrength and stretched thin. There were 29 killed and 164 wounded on 26 April.30

The 165th attacked on 27 April and made moderate gains against stiff enemy resistance. Through heavy rifle, machinegun, and artillery fire, the regiment secured the northern third of Hachinato Airfield. Despite the limited success. Colonel Kelley was relieved by MG Griner and replaced with LTC Joseph T. Hart. The 165th had been fighting a wholly uncoordinated action since coming ashore. The regiment, for the two weeks that they had been in the line, had been managing companies rather than battalions. As a result they had neglected their own responsibility of setting the conditions for the battle and then permitting their battalions the flexibility to use their initiative to accomplish the particular mission. Colonel Kelley and his staff failed to understand their role and thus micro-managed a fight that realistically belonged to the battalions.31 The 106th mopped up and patrolled during the day. The 105th consolidated their position and eliminated caves with demolitions. The division suffered 26 killed and 123 wounded on the day.32

The division continued the attack on 28 April with the 165th securing the whole of Machinato Airfield. The enemy they had encountered were reduced through a coordinated tank and self-propelled gun attack with infantry following up. The 106th continued to meet only minimal resistance and, therefore, their primary function was maintaining contact with the flank regiments. The 105th made a moderate advance against light opposition. The 27th had 29 killed and 184 wounded on this day.33

The division attacked on 29 April and made significant gains in the 165th's sector. The 106th met heavy resistance but pushed through and maintained contact with the 165th. The 105th made small gains against intense enemy resistance. The division made preparations to be relieved by the 1st Marine Division. The 27th suffered 27 killed and 164 wounded in action.34

The division attacked, on 30 April, with the 165th on the right against moderate opposition. That regiment had significant success. The 106th and 105th improved their positions and continued to patrol to the front. The 165th was relieved late in the day by the 1st Marines. The division had 20 killed and 67 wounded on the day.35 The 96th Division was relieved by the 77th Division. They had suffered 688 killed, 2,968 wounded, end 1,087 non-battle casua1ties in 30 days fighting.36

On 1 May the division was relieved by the 1st Marine Division. Of the three Army divisions in the line the 27th had the least combat power due to increasing casualties. The 27th was also programmed to garrison Okinawa after it's capture and, therefore, was taken out of the line to permit some build up of combat power.37 The 27th DIVARTY, minus the 249th FA Bn, was attached to the Marines. The 27th moved to the northern end of the island to eliminate remaining pockets of resistance. On the day the division lost 27 killed and 5 wounded.38

The division was in action from 19 April until 1 May a total of twelve days. In that time it advanced 4,200 yards, killed 5,006 enemy, and took 13 prisoners. The division suffered 672 killed and 2,547 wounded. In addition it incurred 781 non-battle casualties.39 By comparison, during this same timeframe, the 7th Infantry Division on the far left of the Corps' sector incurred 223 killed, 1,284 wounded, and 670 non-battle casualties. The 96th Division, in the center of the Corps' sector, suffered 238 killed, 1,215 wounded, and 234 non-battle casualties.40

The fighting on Okinawa was very much similar to that which the 27th had experienced on Saipan. The training routine which they had endured on Espiritu Santo was designed to correct the identified deficiencies from that last campaign. That the division didn't achieve great success upon landing on Okinawa was more of a tribute to the tenacity of the Japanese fighting men than to the ineptness of the 27th Infantry Division. None of the American units: 7th, 77th, 96th Infantry Divisions, 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, were able to blithely overcome the Shuri Line and it's successors.

The shortcomings of the division could be found in the functioning of the headquarters at regimental and division level. The fighting performance of the individual soldier through company level could not be faulted. The commanders and staffs above them were unable to orchestrate the fighting to take full advantage of their soldier's heroism and determination.

From 2 May until 30 June 1945 the 27th mopped up the northern half of the island. There were countless enemy caves and fighting positions uncovered and still hundreds of Japanese willing to resist. The division fought several pitched battles against well organized company sized units. In the end the 27th had killed 507 enemy soldiers, captured 118 and interned 34,739 civilians.41 The division remained on Okinawa until late August, after the War with Japan had ended, and then moved to Japan for occupation duty.


Chapter Five


1 HQ, XXIV Corps After Action Report, 1 Apr-30 June 1945, p.l.

2 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", 16 July 1949, p.18.

3 Ibid., p.18.

4 Ibid., pp.18-20.

5 Ibid., pp.20-21.

6 Ibid., p.21.

7 Ibid., p.10.

8 Official National Guard Register for 1943, (Wash., DC:  US GPO, 1943) and Edmund G. Love, The 27th Infantry Division in World War II (Wash., DC:  Infantry Journal Press, 1949), p.520.

9 Ibid.

10 Official National Guard Register for 1943 (Wash., DC:  US GPO, 1943)

11 HQ, XXIV Corps, After Action Report, 1 Apr-30 June 1945, p.103

12 Ibid., p.118.

13 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", 16 July 1945, pp.80-81.

14 HQ, XXIV Corps, After Action Report, 1 Apr-30 June 1945, p 58.

15 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", 16 July 1945, pp.29-30.

16 Ibid., pp.30-31.

17 HQ, XXIV Corps, After Action Report, 1 Apr-30 June 1945, p.26.

18 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", 16 July 1945, pp.34-35.

19 Ibid., p.36.

20 Ibid., p.37.

21 HQ, XXIV Corps, After Action Report, 1 Apr-30 June l945, p.27.

22 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", 16 July 1945, p.38.

23 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", p.39.

24 Ibid., p.40.

25 Ibid., p.41.

26 HQ, XXIV Corps, After Action Report, 1 Apr-30 June 1945, pp.100-101.

27 Ibid., p.42.

28 Ibid., p.43.

29 Ibid., p.44.

30 Ibid., p.45.

31 Love, The History of the 27th in WW II, P.612.

32 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", 16 July 1945, p.46.

33 Ibid., p.47.

34 Ibid., p.48.

35 Ibid., p.49.

36 HQ, XXIV Corps, G3 Reports, no.30, .30 April 1945, pp.3-4.

37 HQ, XXIV Corps, After Action Report, 1 April-30 June 1945, p. 28.

38 HQ, 27th Division, "Operation Report Nansei Shoto Phase I", 16 July 1945, p.50.

39 Ibid., pp.95-96.

40 HQ, XXIV Corps, After Action Report, 1 Apr-30 June 1945.

41 Ibid., pp.51-55.


Chapter Five

New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs: Military History
Last modified: April 22, 2008

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