

Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan



April 2014

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan



April 2014

Report to Congress

In accordance with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), as amended; to include reports in response to section 1221 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81), the Senate Report (S. Rpt. 112-173), to accompany the NDAA for FY 2012 (P.L. 112-81), and sections 1212, 1223, and 1531(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-239)

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This report is submitted consistent with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the thirteenth in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2014 and was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report reflects information through March 31, 2014. This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from October 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014, although some more recent updates of key events are included. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from April 1, 2014, to September 30, 2014.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Afghan security forces held their own against the insurgency, sustained the gains made in the 2013 fighting season and successfully secured the presidential and provincial council elections on April 5, 2014. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capabilities continued to expand during the reporting period, while insurgent territorial influence and kinetic capabilities remained static. The ANSF and Afghan election institutions laid the groundwork for a successful election, registering millions of voters and securing thousands of polling sites, with minimal international assistance. These preparations far surpassed Afghanistan's efforts in the 2009 and 2010 elections. Despite insurgent intent to disrupt the election process, ANSF layered security operations prevented high-profile attacks across the country and voter turnout was high. The large rise in attacks preceding previous Afghan elections did not occur.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) remains in control of its 34 provincial capitals and all major cities. Most insurgent-initiated violence still occurs away from populated areas and polling shows the majority of Afghans hold a favorable view of their soldiers and police. While the number of ANSF operations during the reporting period¹ nearly doubled as compared to the same time period the prior year, the ANSF now conduct virtually all of these operations independently. U.S. and coalition casualties significantly dropped in 2013 – a quarter of what they were in 2010. Several violence indicators are lower in this reporting period than they were a year ago, including decreases of 2 percent in enemy-initiated attacks, 8 percent in complex attacks, and 24 percent in improvised explosive device (IED) events.²

Despite substantial progress, the ANSF continued to face several challenges during the reporting period. ANSF logistics and sustainment capabilities remained underdeveloped, Afghan National Army (ANA) attrition was higher than its target, and corruption continued. Although the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continues to develop capabilities, ANSF requires more time and effort to close four key high-end capability gaps that will remain after the ISAF mission ends on December 31, 2014: air support; intelligence enterprise; special operations; and Afghan security ministry capacity. International funding and coalition force assistance will be critical to sustaining the force after 2014. If a second-round runoff election is required, securing the runoff during the summer fighting season will be a major test of the ANSF.

Opinion polling during the reporting period showed that Afghans remain largely optimistic about their country's trajectory.³ However, the ANSF's need for post-2014 assistance, the President of Afghanistan's refusal to sign the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), the consequent lack of U.S. and NATO post-2014 presence decisions, and simultaneous political, security, and economic transitions generated uncertainty throughout Afghan society. The Taliban tried to capitalize on Afghan uncertainty and fear of abandonment by the coalition through propaganda, without much success.

¹ The reporting period for this report is October 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. This report also includes some initial information regarding the April 5, 2014 elections.

² These figures compare data from October 1, 2012 – March 13, 2013 vs. October 1, 2013 – March 13, 2014.

³ ISAF ANQAR survey, Wave 23, March 2014.

ANSF CONFIDENT AS THEY REMAIN IN THE LEAD

The ANSF remain a cohesive and confident force despite significant casualties, demonstrating tactical superiority over insurgents and maintaining consistent control over Afghanistan's populated areas. The ANSF's capacity to execute large, combined combat operations across the country with minimal coalition assistance continued to improve. During the reporting period, each of the six ANA Corps planned and executed multiple complex combined arms operations involving the Afghan Air Force (AAF), special operations, and Afghan National Police (ANP). Although these operations faced several challenges, including coordination between ANA and the ANP, their objectives were achieved overall. Additionally, the ANSF's performance on Election Day served as a vivid demonstration of their growing ability to provide stability and to overmatch the Taliban.

As of March 2014, ANSF force strength reached 340,632 personnel, which is 97.4 percent of the 352,000 authorized end-strength. Including 26,632 ALP personnel, security forces totaled 376,264. Almost all ANSF unit and major equipment fielding is complete. The technologically complex development of the AAF lags behind other elements of the ANSF and some capabilities will not reach full operational status until 2017.

As the capabilities of fielded forces improved, the ISAF advisory mission continued to re-orient from combat advising at the unit level to functionally based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army corps, and the police zone headquarters. In this new role, advisors focused on developing ANSF sustainment capability and worked to close noted capability gaps.

Despite the ANSF's tactical successes during the reporting period, they face a number of developmental shortfalls (in addition to the four critical high-end capability gaps). Afghanistan's security ministries require substantive improvements in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. In the fielded force, counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) units, intelligence, fires, medical, and combined arms integration require improvement. Illiteracy, corruption, and ANA attrition persisted, inhibiting ANSF progress.

From the ministries down to the tactical level, GIRoA faced a major challenge in developing an effective, integrated logistics and sustainment system for the ANSF. A lack of trained maintenance technicians combined with a logistics system that struggled to resupply units in the field adversely affected every component of the ANSF. The ANSF relied on ISAF for limited enabler support, particularly in the areas of close air support, casualty evacuation, logistics, C-IED, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

With equipment fielding and continued ISAF training and advising in 2014, the ANSF are on-track to transition to full responsibility for security on January 1, 2015.

ANSF SUPPORTED AN HISTORIC ELECTION PROCESS

On April 5, 2014, Afghanistan held the first round of its presidential election, which marked another step in the first democratic transfer of power in Afghan history. This election, which the Afghans secured and executed, represents another important milestone in the development of Afghanistan's institutions and capabilities. The level of ISAF support provided to the ANSF on

Election Day was much lower than many analysts had anticipated being required. During the reporting period, Afghanistan's preparations for the election consistently exceeded expectations, with Afghan electoral institutions and security ministries working cooperatively to ready plans and deliver materials for a credible and transparent election. Prior to Election Day, hundreds of campaign rallies proceeded peacefully, with security provided by the ANSF. The ANSF developed comprehensive plans to secure thousands of polling sites across the country. Additionally, they bolstered domestic observation efforts to allow more than 12,000 domestic observers and more than 300,000 candidate agents to participate in monitoring efforts.

These preparations paid off on Election Day, which saw no successful major attacks and less violence than occurred during the 2009 and 2010 elections. Proactive ANSF operations disrupted attacks prior to execution, supporting security efforts at polling site. The successful security efforts visible throughout the campaign season built public confidence, resulting in high voter turnout. Although critical steps in the electoral process remain, including adjudication of fraud complaints, ANSF election security performance was a major milestone in efforts to develop confident, apolitical, and capable Afghan forces that are credible in the eyes of the Afghan people.

INSURGENTS UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH STATED GOALS

The Taliban-led insurgency failed to achieve its stated operational objectives over the reporting period. Their major goal over the last several months, and the main propaganda focus, was to disrupt the elections. They were clearly unsuccessful and the comparatively low levels of violence surrounding the election served as a reminder of their limited capabilities in the face of growing ANSF strength. Moreover, the high voter turnout, despite repeated threats issued by Taliban media outlets, reflected the insurgency's level of influence over the population.

The insurgency mounted attacks but was overmatched by the ANSF, generally could not capture or destroy well-defended targets, and was unable to hold significant territory. Nevertheless, the insurgency remained resilient, maintained influence in many rural areas, and carried out attacks with slightly lower frequency than a year ago. Although of limited tactical effect, these attacks allowed the Taliban to reap potentially significant publicity gains. Insurgents continued to seek to conduct high-profile attacks in population centers – as well as against remote outposts – to garner media attention, to project an exaggerated image of their capabilities, and to expand perceptions of insecurity.

Sustained ISAF and ANSF counterterrorism operations prevented al Qaeda's use of Afghanistan as a platform from which to launch transnational terrorist attacks during this period. Counterterrorism operations heavily restricted al Qaeda's presence to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan and limited access to other parts of the country. These efforts forced al Qaeda to focus on survival, rather than on operations against the West. Al Qaeda's relationship with local Afghan Taliban organizations remains intact and remains an area of concern.

The Haqqani Network evolved into the most virulent strain of the insurgency, the greatest risk to coalition forces, and a critical enabler of other terrorist networks. The Haqqani Taliban led the insurgency in the three eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost, and demonstrated the capability and intent to support and launch high-profile, complex attacks against Afghans and the coalition across the country.

UNITED STATES – AFGHANISTAN PARTNERSHIP

U.S. and Afghanistan political relations remained tense, exacerbated by President Hamid Karzai's refusal to sign the BSA and GIRoA's decision to release dozens of detainees over ISAF objections. Many of the detainees are dangerous insurgents, some of whom planned attacks on coalition forces. Although U.S.-Afghan negotiators finalized the text of the BSA in November 2013 and the Afghan people voiced their strong support for a continuing partnership with the United States, President Karzai deferred conclusion of the Agreement to his successor. The United States is prepared to sign the BSA and continues to seek to conclude the Agreement promptly; leading Afghan presidential candidates publicly expressed support for signing the BSA, if elected. The President of the United States made it clear that a signed BSA is necessary for a continued U.S. presence to support Afghanistan's long-term security and stability and to train, advise, and assist the ANSF post-2014.

CROSS BORDER RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

Pakistan's government sought to increase engagement with GIRoA, including direct meetings between President Karzai and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Cross-border incidents and lingering mistrust remained points of tension in their relations. Both countries continued to question each other's commitment to advancing a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Pakistan cooperated in some CT activities, applying pressure against Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and other militant groups. Pakistan did not take significant action against Afghan-focused insurgent groups in Pakistan during the reporting period. Elements of Pakistan's government continued to tolerate Afghan-focused insurgent groups attacking U.S. and coalition forces. Pakistan's civilian and military leadership increased engagement and cooperation with the U.S. on the issue of Afghan-focused insurgents in Pakistan, but efforts to interdict and disrupt the production of IED components fell short of coalition expectations.

Afghan insurgent groups maintained sanctuaries in Pakistan, a major factor preventing their decisive defeat in the near term. The presence of ISAF forces partially mitigates the threat of Pakistan-based insurgents to GIRoA, but the use of these sanctuaries by insurgent groups will pose a long-term threat to the stability of Afghanistan following the reduction in coalition forces at the end of 2014.

AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES CONTINUE

National institutions continued to incrementally improve their ability to provide constitutional, stable, effective, and responsive governance. Significant gains in education, health, access to electricity, and rural development continued during the reporting period.

A variety of factors continued to hamper governance at all levels, including: widespread corruption, ineffective program monitoring, budget shortfalls, low revenue generation, insufficient financial management capacity, limited formal education and skills, illiteracy, a lack of coordination between the central government and provincial and district authorities, and an uneven distribution of power among the branches of the Afghan government. At the sub-national

level, official government services remained largely restricted to provincial and district centers despite efforts to improve capacity and extend government services to rural areas.

GIRoA leadership demonstrated little political will to fight corruption and struggled to increase transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. Corruption continued to be an obstacle to economic development and governance. GIRoA counter-corruption efforts made limited progress. Lack of action on anti-money laundering legislation created conditions that will complicate future international investment and support. The international community continued to be concerned that corruption undermines and lessens the effectiveness of its assistance efforts.

Challenges in governance and sustainable economic development, slowed the reinforcement and consolidation of security gains. Ongoing insurgent activity and influence inhibited economic development and improvements in governance. Predatory corruption, criminal patronage, weak rule of law, and reliance on the funding for the insurgency from narco-trafficking are factors which hindered the ability of the ANSF and local GIRoA governance structures to maintain a secure environment and provide essential service delivery. The immaturity of mutually supportive national institutions, such as the justice system, banking sector, and mining sector, exacerbates these factors.

Investments in construction and private consumption, driven largely by donor contributions and ISAF spending, bolstered economic growth and development. The reduction of ISAF personnel will likely have a negative effect on economic growth. GIRoA's failure to enact mineral and mining legislation limited the legal utilization of Afghanistan's natural resources and created a disincentive for international investment.

PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY

The people of Afghanistan, the GIRoA, and the international supporters of Afghanistan made important progress during this reporting period. The November 2013 Loya Jirga's overwhelming endorsement of the BSA and the high turnout for the April 2014 election were strong evidence of popular support for the Afghan government and a continued international partnership and presence. While the Taliban retained influence in parts of the country and maintained their ability to carry out attacks, the nature of these attacks – which frequently target civilians indiscriminately – highlight the differences between the current situation and that which allowed the Taliban to come to power originally. Even as the Taliban retain the ability to carry out attacks, they do so at the expense of any claim to significant popular support.

ANSF capability is no longer the biggest uncertainty facing Afghanistan. Since taking the lead for security operations nationwide in June 2013, the ANSF demonstrated an ability to overmatch the Taliban consistently, with limited ISAF support. The sustainability of gains to date will be dependent on a number of factors, to include: Afghan ownership of the security and economic problems facing their country, date; the outcome of the Afghan presidential election and Afghanistan's ability to reach internal political equilibrium; international financial support after 2014; the ability of the new Afghan government to put in place the legal structures needed to attract investment and promote growth; and the size and structure of the post-2014 U.S. and NATO presence.

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SECTION 1 – SECURITY

1.1: U.S. MISSION

The U.S. presence in Afghanistan aims to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates, contribute to regional and international peace and stability, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity. Our mission provides time and space for the ANSF and GIRoA to increase capacity and assume full responsibility for Afghanistan's security by the end of 2014.

Diplomatic efforts continued to complement military efforts. The United States and the international community continued to encourage Afghan reconciliation efforts with the Taliban as a means to a political solution to the conflict.

1.2: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) primary task changed from leading a population-centric, counter-insurgency campaign to developing the capacity and capability of the ANSF to provide security for Afghanistan. The campaign remained a comprehensive counter-insurgency but is now Afghan-led. The coalition continued efforts intended to deny safe havens for AQ and supported expanding GIRoA efforts to disrupt terrorist safe havens. The primary means to achieve this and, subsequently, the primary objective was the development and fielding of a capable, sustainable ANSF.

During the reporting period, ISAF executed a security force assistance (SFA) mission while preparing for a post-2014 NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) mission to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the ANSF. The SFA effort includes working with regional and international organizations to develop ANSF capability and capacity.

ISAF command and control (C2) structures are evolving in preparation for a shift to a post-2014 mission. While conducting SFA mission, ISAF continued to redeploy combat forces. ISAF reduced basing responsibly while maintaining operational flexibility, coalition cohesion, and force protection.

ISAF systematically transferred tasks or missions to appropriate U.S., international, or GIRoA entities that would not be executed under a follow-on RS mission.

Redeployment

ISAF's redeployment and retrograde efforts remained on track or ahead of schedule. U.S. forces in theater number fewer than 34,000. By December 31, 2014, U.S. forces will be at a post-2014 number that is yet to be determined by the President of the United States. As forces redeployed, ISAF closed, de-scoped, or transferred tactical infrastructure – ranging from large bases to small combat outposts – to Afghan control. There are fewer than 90 coalition bases and outposts, from a high of more than 850 in 2012. The closure and transfer of bases represented a positive


transition for Afghanistan. As of March 1, 2014, ISAF had transferred more than 480 fully functional bases to the Afghan government. These facilities now support the ANSF and GIRoA as they provide security or services to the Afghan people.

Redeployment and retrograde operations progressed to ensure a steady, responsible drawdown of personnel and equipment. ISAF maintained focus on good stewardship of resources while facilitating transition to the RS mission. Coalition partners used a combination of air and ground routes, including the Northern Distribution Network and Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication, to retrograde equipment. Currently, there are approximately 4,800 mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles in Afghanistan. The U.S. military intends to keep 3,200 for current and future equipping requirements.

1.3: ISAF COMMAND AND CONTROL

ISAF anticipates further C2 evolution will be required, as the current C2 construct is not optimized for the mission in late 2014, as the ISAF drawdown continues. ISAF has ongoing processes to evolve C2 to keep pace with the change in mission. Figure 1 below shows the ISAF C2 structure as of March 2014.

Figure 1: ISAF C2 as of March 2014



1.4: NATO-ISAF FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES

NATO Allies and operational partners remain committed to the ISAF mission, as they prepared to bring the ISAF mission to a responsible close at the end of 2014. By February 1, 2014, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) was at the force management level of 34,000 U.S. personnel in country, as directed by the Commander-in-Chief. As of January 1, 2014, ISAF personnel provided by 28 NATO nations and 21 non-NATO (partner) nations numbered just under 60,000 (including U.S. personnel).

ISAF assessed that its spring force posture is sufficient to provide operational reach in support of the Afghan elections and the start of the 2014 fighting season. Force protection remains a priority for ISAF and the proportion of troops dedicated to force protection will increase as the coalition force footprint shrinks.

1.5: REPORTING PERIOD SECURITY OVERVIEW

The ANSF emerged from the 2013 fighting season as a competent and confident force, capable of providing security for Afghanistan. The ANSF's growing capability was particularly evident during the Loya Jirga in November 2013, when roughly 3,000 Afghan leaders from around the country met in Kabul to discuss the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). The ANSF's ability to secure large events was also evident in 2014. The ANSF successfully secured the Ghazni Islamic Festival, the funeral of First Vice President Qasim Fahim, the opening of the Wolesi Jirga, and the Nowruz celebrations in Mezar-e-Sharif and Kabul. These events provided the ANSF numerous opportunities to build confidence, refine standard operating procedures, and prepare for elections.

The ANSF's main focus for much of the reporting period was on security planning for the April elections. For the presidential and provincial elections on April 5, 2014, there were more than 6,000 polling centers with more than 21,000 polling stations. Securing these locations consumed much of the ANSF's resources. The ANSF provided security for election workers and observers, as well as for the delivery of ballots and other election materials. Election security tested ANSF capabilities, while insurgents made a concerted effort to disrupt the election. The ANSF secured the election successfully and insurgents were unable to carry out any major attacks.

The ANSF are almost fully fielded and showed improvement in combined arms employment, utilization of indirect fire systems, and organic casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). The ANSF continue to demonstrate improving capabilities in executing large and complex combat operations across the country. For example, the ANA 215th Corps demonstrated strong combined arms capabilities in recent clearing operations aimed at securing key terrain and denying insurgents a safe haven. The ANA 201st Corps executed a search and clear operation in which they cleared and held a former insurgent stronghold, conducted village *shuras* (meetings), delivered humanitarian aid to villagers, and built combat outposts and checkpoints.


The ANA 205th Corps planned, executed, and sustained 14 days of continuous clearance operations. The operation was significant because of the cross-pillar coordination with the Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), ANA Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements, the Kandahar Air Wing, and the integration of the Civil Mine Reduction Group and specialized route clearance elements. Combined, the ANSF cleared 286 villages, finding and clearing 50 caches and more than 1,000 IEDs. Furthermore, the ANSF interacted

with the Afghan media and local communities during the operation, which highlighted the role and ability of Afghan forces to provide security for the population. Even with successes such as these, progress is neither evenly distributed across the force nor is it yet sustainable.

In mid-2013, ISAF completed the transition to a TAA mission as the ANSF took the lead for security across the country. During the current reporting period, ISAF reoriented toward functionally-based SFA at corps and ministerial levels. SFA will continue to be ISAF's primary effort through 2014 and into a RS mission.

As displayed in Figure 2, the percentage of security incidents involving only ANSF units continued to rise, while those involving ISAF units fell.

Figure 2: Percentage of Security Incidents Involving ANSF and ISAF Forces



As seen in Figure 3, the number of Enemy-Initiated Attacks (EIA) decreased by two percent from October 1, 2013 through March 13, 2014, as compared to the same period a year ago. The majority of attacks were comprised of direct fire attacks and IED attacks. Insurgents continue to conduct high-profile attacks (HPA) and complex attacks against individuals, population centers, and remote outposts. Insurgents conducted 10 high-profile attacks in Kabul this reporting period and assassinated a number of GIROA officials. Although the resulting media coverage highlighted local and international perceptions of insecurity, such attacks have not generated operational or strategic momentum for the insurgency.


**Figure 3: Nationwide Security Metrics,
October 1, 2012 – March 13, 2013 vs. October 1, 2013 – March 13, 2014.**

Metric	EIA	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
% YoY Change	-2%	43%	5%	-24%	-11%	-8%	-15%

Violence remains highly concentrated. From October 1, 2013 through March 13, 2014, 80 percent of nationwide EIAs occurred where only 39 percent of the population lives. Fifty percent of nationwide EIAs occurred where approximately 8 percent of the population lives. As seen in Figure 4, the 10 most violent districts account for approximately 3 percent of the population and 29 percent of the violence nationwide.

Figure 4: Ten Most Violent Districts in Afghanistan

Top 10 Districts (01 Oct 2013 to 13 Mar 2014)					
	Top 10 Districts in EIA	Province	RC	% of Total Population	% of National EIA in Date Range
1	Sangin	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	6%
2	Nahr-e Saraj	Helmand	RC-SW	0.4%	5%
3	Nad 'Ali	Helmand	RC-SW	0.3%	4%
4	Darah-ye Pech	Kunar	RC-E	0.2%	2%
5	Shindand	Herat	RC-W	0.7%	2%
6	Maiwand	Kandahar	RC-S	0.2%	2%
7	Marawarah	Kunar	RC-E	0.1%	2%
8	Alingar	Laghman	RC-E	0.4%	2%
9	Musa Qal'ah	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	2%
10	Panjwa'l	Kandahar	RC-S	0.3%	2%
01 Oct 2013 to 13 Mar 2014				Total: 3.1%	29%



1.6: INSURGENCY

A major focus of insurgent efforts during the reporting period was to disrupt election preparations; they were largely unsuccessful. The insurgency did not maintain violence levels over the winter, and violence levels were consistent with seasonal norms. The large rise over seasonal norms in EIAs that had preceded previous elections did not occur. Enemy-initiated attacks in 2013 remained geographically consistent with those of 2012. Most EIAs were focused operations against the ANSF. Insurgent kinetic capabilities remained static over the reporting period. The insurgency made little progress in its ability to cache equipment and refit, in some measure due to continued proactive, successful ANSF operations during the winter months. Insurgent-influenced territory also remained unchanged. The Taliban failed to dislodge the ANSF in the priority regions of central Kandahar and Helmand. This was again largely due to continued proactive, successful ANSF operations during the winter months, aided by limited ISAF enabler support. The decentralized nature of the insurgency and C2 challenges will likely continue to impede Taliban senior leadership's ability to achieve its strategic objectives – expelling foreigners from Afghanistan and reestablishing an Islamic Emirate.

Sustained ANSF and coalition CT operations prevented AQ use of the country as a platform for terrorism. Operations restricted their permanent presence to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan and resulted in only a seasonal presence in other parts of the country. These efforts forced AQ to focus on survival, rather than on operations against the West. However, increased cooperation and coordination occurred between AQ and other extremist organizations, such as the Haqqani Network, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Continued ANSF operations will prevent AQ from regenerating degraded capabilities.

The Haqqani Network remained the most virulent strain of the insurgency, the greatest risk to coalition forces, and a critical enabler of AQ. The Haqqani Network and other insurgent groups share the goals of expelling coalition forces, removing the Afghan government, and reestablishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They led the insurgency in three eastern Afghan provinces (Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost) and demonstrated the intent and capability to launch and support high-profile, complex attacks against coalition forces across the country. In the reporting period, ANSF and U.S. special operations forces expanded their security and CT operations, successfully disrupting several plots.

The Taliban were unable to turn limited tactical successes into strategic or operational gains; they remain unpopular with the majority of the Afghans. According to the ISAF FOGHORN survey, only 12.2 percent of Afghans have a very favorable or somewhat favorable view of the Taliban.⁴ In the same survey, most negative sentiment focused on Taliban attacks, particularly those affecting civilians. The ISAF Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey revealed a majority of Afghans believe things are better now than under Taliban rule and that a return of the Taliban would be bad for Afghanistan.⁵ These respondents expressed confidence that future generations of Afghans will be able to live in peace and security.

⁴ ISAF FOGHORN Survey, Wave 18, February 2013.

⁵ ISAF ANQAR survey, Wave 22, December 2013.

The Taliban's ability to provide public services to the population is nascent and primarily limited to conflict resolution and judicial adjudication in select rural areas of Afghanistan. Despite efforts to build senior leader bureaucracies to oversee other social services, the Taliban made little-to-no discernible progress in this area.

Local ceasefires between ANSF and Taliban forces also continued during the reporting period. Ceasefire agreements, non-aggression pacts, and other accommodations made between insurgents and security forces are not considered a major problem for the ANSF or a significant threat to the campaign at this time. Ceasefires are often an operational pause for tactical units, both insurgent and ANSF, that offset logistic shortfalls, allow for reconstitution, and provide respite from high-intensity environments. Ceasefires encompass a spectrum of deals from tribal elders, who want to reduce or end violence to a specific ANSF unit to individual checkpoint agreements with insurgents. Ceasefires can have negative effects if ANSF leaders relinquish core responsibilities and local security standards when they enter into an accommodation with insurgents. In certain instances, ceasefires and other accommodations may contribute to an increased perception of security, which initiates stronger local national support for ANSF personnel in their area. In other instances, these agreements can throw off the balance of power in a given area, causing more destabilization than stabilization if agreements are achieved under coercion or co-option. However, ISAF is closely monitoring the ceasefires as a developing issue. The Afghan government does not endorse ceasefires.

The Taliban's failure to achieve their operational intent is partially offset by their effective leveraging of the information space, exacerbating perceptions of uncertainty and abandonment associated with post-2014. The Taliban continues to amend its strategic messaging in an effort to make the movement more palatable for domestic and international audiences. However, there were no discernable changes in Taliban battlefield behavior to suggest this rhetoric is embraced by leadership. Despite numerous propaganda statements from Taliban senior leaders professing active measures to reduce civilian casualties (CIVCAS), insurgents continued to cause the vast majority of CIVCAS nationwide. However unpopular, Taliban attacks, intimidation tactics, and propaganda enable the insurgency to project influence in rural areas. Moreover, as ISAF withdraws, some government officials, local powerbrokers, and segments of the population may be more receptive to Taliban engagement as a hedging strategy.

As insurgent and terrorist groups lack influence and the ability to contest ANSF conventionally in population centers, high-profile attacks remain a key operational tool to try to influence the population and discredit the Afghan government's ability to provide security. Although most violence metrics declined over the reporting period, HPAs rose significantly compared to the same period a year ago, in spite of ANSF operations to disrupt the attacks of insurgent networks. Insurgent networks remain resilient and will continue to reconstitute their capability to plan and conduct these attacks. Although the insurgent efforts had mixed tactical results, the insurgency will seek to capitalize on these media-garnering events based on their strategic information operations value.

1.7: TRANSITION

During the reporting period, the transition process remained on track for full transition by the end of 2014. Efforts to date enabled the Afghans to assume the lead, take the fight to the enemy, and secure the population in their first fighting season as lead.


Afghan provinces are assessed as being in one of four stages of completion of the transition process:

- Stage 1 – Local Support;
- Stage 2 – Tactical Support;
- Stage 3 – Operational Support; and
- Stage 4 – Strategic Support.

The Regional Commander gives each province an overall rating based on the status of the security environment, ANSF capability, and level of ISAF assistance.

During this reporting period, six provinces advanced in their overall stage rating. In addition, several provinces advanced in one or more elements while remaining at the same overall stage. Notably, no province regressed in its overall stage rating. Figure 5 outlines the confidence level, RC Commander assessed transition element stage and overall RC Commander assessed transition stage for each province.

Figure 5: Transition Stages, March - December 2013



1.8: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Reducing the number of CIVCAS remains a major objective for both ISAF and GIRoA. Insurgent actions caused the vast majority of CIVCAS during the reporting period, largely due to indiscriminate use of IEDs. From October 1, 2013 to February 5, 2014, statistics on CIVCAS and their causes are as follows: Insurgents (88 percent); ANSF (three percent); ISAF (two percent); and unknown sources (seven percent). Note: Due to a change in data sources, DoD is unable to compare this information with the allocation of CIVCAS from October 1, 2012 – February 5, 2013. In 2013, insurgents caused the vast majority of CIVCAS in Afghanistan. Insurgent actions resulted in 5,482 casualties, comprising approximately 88 percent of the total CIVCAS for 2013. Additionally, 56 percent of insurgent-caused casualties were from the indiscriminate use of IEDs.

ISAF applies a diverse range of techniques, methods and weapons to target the insurgency. These include targeting procedures that reinforce tactical restraint; training to apply the minimum level of force against the enemy; and calling off operations when there is an assessed risk to civilians. ISAF's policy of restraint produced tangible results. In 2008, there were 174 CIVCAS incidents involving ISAF forces, resulting in 561 casualties. In 2013, there were 49 CIVCAS incidents involving ISAF forces, resulting in 96 casualties.

ISAF instituted and follows a rigorous standard operating procedure (SOP) for reporting incidents that may have resulted in civilian casualties (including observable actions of USFOR-A, ANSF, civilian contractors, and insurgents). ISAF maintains close communication links with Afghanistan's Presidential Information Coordination Centre in order to gather information and cross-validate CIVCAS reports received through the GIRoA reporting chain.

In summary, ISAF is leading the way on CIVCAS mitigation in conventional military operations. The combination of tactical restraint, robust CIVCAS reporting and investigation, and the work of a dedicated CIVCAS mitigation staff demonstrated that ISAF is a disciplined and professional military force.

1.9: INSIDER ATTACKS⁶

Insider attacks against ISAF forces declined sharply from 48 attacks in 2012 to 15 attacks in 2013. There were two insider attacks against ISAF in the first quarter of 2014, comparable to the rate in 2013. Despite this sharp decline, these attacks may still have strategic effects on the campaign and could jeopardize the relationship between coalition and ANSF personnel. Insurgents remain intent on utilizing insider attacks as an integral component of their asymmetric strategy. Although ISAF is optimistic that mitigation measures implemented during the previous year reduced the threat against coalition forces, insurgents shifted focus, increasing insider attacks against the ANSF.

⁶ This section is submitted in fulfillment of requirements specified in section 1212 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. This section, along with the previous reports submitted consistent with sections 1230 and 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, is also submitted in fulfillment of the requirements specified in section 112-173 of the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on S. 3254 for FY 2013.

During the current reporting period, ISAF assessed that Guardian Angels (armed guards that accompany coalition personnel) mitigated casualties by engaging and killing the attackers. In combination with the use of Guardian Angels, situational awareness training (to identify behavioral changes or other indicators of an attack) and other mitigation measures described in previous iterations of this report allowed ISAF personnel working in close proximity to armed Afghans to protect themselves.

Insider attacks continued to pose a challenge for both ISAF and ANSF. Both ISAF and the ANSF employed a multipronged mitigation strategy to combat the threat. The ANSF continued to improve efforts to vet recruits prior to entering the force and to re-vet personnel upon return from leave. Increased force protection measures, including the Guardian Angel program and cultural and situational awareness training helped personnel identify behavioral changes or other indications of an impending attack. Commander ISAF and other ISAF leaders engaged Afghan senior leaders across GIRoA and the ANSF to ensure a coordinated and high-level response to insider threats. HQ ISAF utilized key leader engagements to strengthen military leaders' commitment to mitigating the risk of insider threats and preventing insider attacks.

ISAF, the ANSF, and GIRoA took a comprehensive approach to mitigate insider threats through (1) increasing understanding of the threat, (2) improving force preparation and training, (3) supporting ANSF vetting and other efforts, and (4) enhancing force protection measures. The mitigation measures described in previous iterations of this report remained in effect during this reporting period. ISAF developed a revised train-the-trainer program based on lessons learned in 2013 and delivered by military personnel. In 2014, a similar training symposium was implemented to address this topic regularly with ISAF Headquarters and Military Advisory Group staff personnel.

1.10: REINTEGRATION

Although the coalition footprint is growing smaller, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) continued its steady progress in support of GIRoA's peace narrative by removing insurgent fighters from the battlefield and providing community support development projects to districts and communities that supported the APRP and accepted reintegrees. The APRP continues to augment GIRoA legitimacy and to enhance conditions for ANSF development.

The successful Afghan Peace and National Unity Week (PNUW) held September 19-26, 2013, highlighted the spread of GIRoA's peace narrative on the eve of the current reporting period. Approximately 25,000 Afghans participated in more than 120 peace-related events across the nation; an estimated 3.5 million people indirectly received GIRoA's peace message during the PNUW.


There are 8,025 reintegrees enrolled in the APRP. Since October 1, 2013, 811 new reintegrees enrolled in the APRP. There is a backlog of approximately 500 reintegration candidates who have been fully vetted at the provincial and national level, and who only require biometric processing to complete their enrollment into the program; now that 2014 funding is available, biometric teams are moving out into the field to complete this intake. More than any other regional command, 44 percent of the 1,491 reintegrees in calendar year 2013 are from Regional Command-East, the most contested area of Afghanistan. There are 96 small grant projects and

The APRP faces a significant financial deficit in 2014 due to the lack of additional funding from the international community. The Joint Secretariat of the APRP emphasized that APRP requires a \$79 million budget to operate at the current level. Following new international community contributions of \$30 million, only \$58.1 million is available for the 2014 APRP budget. The \$20.9 million funding gap and associated delays in the budget approval process resulted in delayed biometric enrollment trips to process new reintegrees and delayed payments of Transition Assistance to current reintegrees. The shortfall will also preclude the initiation of new APRP-funded community recovery projects; however, the available budget is sufficient to continue community recovery projects that are already in process. The \$58.1 million budget was finalized and passed on March 30, 2014.

Figure 6: Reintegration Enrollments by Province



Figure 7: Reintegree Enrollments as of March 26, 2013



1.11: BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

The United States and Afghanistan agreed in the May 2012 Strategic Partnership Agreement to negotiate a Bilateral Security Agreement, which would supersede the 2003 SOFA between the United States and Afghanistan. Negotiations on the BSA began on November 15, 2012. The BSA is intended to establish the terms and conditions that the United States requires for supporting a future U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014. The Agreement is an opportunity to sustain the partnership between the United States and Afghanistan to support Afghans in achieving lasting peace, security, and development.

The draft BSA includes provisions typically included in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), as well as provisions typically included in a Defense Cooperation Agreement, detailing how the U.S. expects to focus its defense cooperation relationship. In addition to the common SOFA terms and conditions, the United States requires to maintain forces in Afghanistan after 2014, the BSA addresses how the United States and Afghanistan intend to continue their cooperation to develop and sustain Afghanistan's ability to maintain its security needs.

The BSA consists of a Preamble, 26 Articles, and 2 Annexes, which collectively provide a framework for ongoing security and defense cooperation and for the status and presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The Agreement is intended to enter into force on January 1, 2015 and does not have an expiration date.

The BSA provides the United States the following protections:

- a clear statement of U.S. exclusive criminal and civil jurisdiction for U.S. military personnel and DoD civilians in Afghanistan;
- clear exemptions from taxation on U.S. forces and on the work contractors do in Afghanistan to support U.S. forces, including work performed by subcontractors;

- clear acknowledgment of U.S. missions – counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and affiliates, and a mission to train, advise, and assist the ANSF – in language that preserves Presidential prerogatives to direct the use of U.S. forces and that preserves the right of self-defense; and,
- rights to access and use necessary facilities, the rights of freedom of movement, import and export, entry and exit, and other necessary daily activities, without intrusive coordination requirements that would undercut those rights.

The President of the United States made clear the United States must have an invitation from the Afghan government to extend the U.S. force presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014. If the BSA and follow-on NATO SOFA are signed by the GIRoA, a small U.S. force could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to train and assist Afghan forces, while conducting counterterrorism operations to pursue remnants of AQ.

The BSA does not require the United States maintain forces in Afghanistan, it does not address the number of U.S. forces that might remain after 2014, and it does not provide permanent bases to the United States.

In October 2013, Secretary of State Kerry met with Afghan President Karzai in Kabul to resolve key outstanding issues in the BSA text, and from their discussions a completed BSA text emerged. In November 2013, President Karzai convened a consultative Loya Jirga – a gathering of about 3,000 Afghan political, religious, tribal, civil society and other leaders – to review the Agreement. The Loya Jirga does not have legal authority under Afghan law, but it does have important moral and traditional authority in Afghan society. The Loya Jirga overwhelmingly endorsed the BSA and recommended that President Karzai sign the Agreement immediately.

Although the BSA text is final and the Afghan people voiced their strong support for a continuing partnership with the United States, as of the end of the reporting period, President Karzai had not signed the Agreement.

The United States continues to seek to conclude the Agreement promptly. The BSA would allow the United States to continue support for Afghanistan's long-term security and stability and to train, advise, and assist the ANSF post-2014. A signed BSA would also pave the way for a NATO-Afghanistan SOFA to allow SOFA protections for those nations during a Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan.

1.12: ELECTION PREPARATION

On April 5, 2014, Afghanistan held the first round of its presidential election, which marks another step in the first peaceful transfer of power in Afghan history. This election, which was run and secured by Afghans, represents another important milestone in Afghans taking full responsibility for their country as the United States and our partners draw down our forces. As of publication of this report, vote counting, detailed security and voting analysis, and fraud adjudication were ongoing. This report therefore assesses only the initial turnout and security outcomes of the election. A more comprehensive election assessment will be included in the next iteration of this report.

Afghan preparations for this election consistently exceeded expectations. Afghan electoral institutions and security ministries worked closely to plan, prepare, and deliver materials for a credible, inclusive, and transparent election. The level of ISAF support provided to the ANSF on Election Day was much lower than many analysts anticipated being required.

Important progress throughout 2013, including passage of electoral laws, appointments to electoral institutions, and finalization of an electoral operational plan, put the Afghans in a much better place than previous election cycles. The candidate nomination period was concluded successfully in October 2013, with associated vetting. Complaints against both presidential and provincial council candidates were adjudicated, and final candidate lists were announced – including an initial list of 11 presidential hopefuls and thousands of candidates to contest for Provincial Council seats. There were eight presidential candidates by Election Day.

The presidential candidates started their official campaign period on February 2, 2014 while the official Provincial Council campaign period began on March 2, 2014. Posters appeared overnight and thousands attended rallies when presidential campaigning kicked off. The campaign was lively, perhaps highlighted most by televised presidential debates that captivated many Afghans. Afghan news outlets offered minute-by-minute debate updates on their portals, Facebook pages, and Twitter feeds as candidates exchanged views on security, foreign affairs, the BSA, corruption, economics, and women's rights, among other issues. Enthusiasm for the elections was high and Afghan civil society showed increasing political sophistication. Media coverage focused on candidate rallies and platforms, as well as voter opinions.

Three weeks into the campaign period, campaigns increased their activities outside of Kabul. Independent Afghan media outlets, such as Tolo News and Pajhwok, highlighted citizen requests for candidates to travel to the provinces and present their platforms in person. Afghan civil society organizations also invited candidates to events or question and answer sessions to explain their platforms and thoughts.

The Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) led planning efforts for the technical and security aspects of the elections. The Afghan IEC cooperated with the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the National Directorate for Security (NDS), the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and ISAF to ensure election planning was timely, realistic, and complete.

The IEC, constitutionally authorized to administer elections in Afghanistan, demonstrated its growing capacity and institutional strength in preparations for the 2014 elections. The successful “top-up” voter registration drive during the summer of 2013, in which over 3.5 million voters (34.5 percent women) registered, also demonstrated greater IEC capacity. The announcement of an electoral timeline, operational plan, ballot procurement, design and distribution, along with administrative guidance, staffing, and regular meetings with candidates, civil society organizations, and electoral organizations helped create an environment of transparency, contributing to confidence in the electoral process. The IEC also introduced a host of anti-fraud measures to improve the credibility of the first round of elections, applying a range of recommendations and lessons learned from previous elections. So far, it appears that political entities largely refrained from interfering in the IEC's preparations.

The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is a relatively new institution, permanently established under the passage of the Electoral Law last summer. On September 16, 2013, the presidential palace announced the appointment of the five commissioners for the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) in accordance with the new electoral framework. The ECC successfully adjudicated complaints stemming from candidate registrations in October 2013, but since then, made halting progress. After delays, the ECC made progress on establishment of procedures, recruitment and training of provincial staff, and preparation of its provincial offices. The publication of the ECC's rules of procedure, along with the February 18, 2014 inauguration of the 102 provincial ECC commissioners, was an important marker of progress. Questions remain regarding the ultimate capacity of the ECC to handle the complaints adjudication task.

The ANSF focused intensely on security planning for the elections and devoted most available resources and energy into planning for plausible contingencies. With the ANSF assuming nationwide lead for security in mid-2013, the Afghans had a solid foundation for electoral preparations, which they initiated well in advance of Election Day relative to the 2009 presidential election. The Ministries of Interior and Defense issued a strategic level concept of operations to their operational units well in advance of Election Day, allowing ample time to prepare. The Deputy Minister of Interior conducted two rounds of Operational Coordination Centre – Regional (OCC-R) visits to issue refined guidance on the national security plan and then received back-briefs on the development of regional plans. In turn, ANSF operational units developed detailed concepts of operations. Of note, 421,000 forces were present in theater on Election Day, 376,000 of which were Afghan.

The ANSF worked in coordination with the IEC to strike the right balance to increase participation without increasing opportunities for fraud. In January 2014, the Ministry of Interior issued its assessment of polling center security and concluded that 414 of the 6,845 polling centers proposed would be inaccessible on Election Day, either because of expected high threat levels or due to inaccessibility or logistics challenges. On February 19, 2014, the IEC publicly released the list of polling centers. The list totaled 6,775 polling centers with 21,663 polling stations (12,705 for males, 8,958 for females). Polling centers ranged in size from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 12 polling stations per center; most had at least 1 for each gender, though all-male and all-female polling centers also exist. On March 31, the IEC and the MOI announced the closure of an additional 352 polling centers due to security concerns and approximately 299 additional closures on Election Day, bringing the total to roughly 6,124 polling centers open on Election Day. The IEC released the polling center list early, marking an improvement from the 2009 election, when it was released only days before Election Day.

As of April 5, the IEC had accredited 358,536 election observers. This included 327,385 presidential and provincial council candidate agents (also called partisan observers), 11,357 domestic observers, 417 international observers, and 1,014 media representatives. The EU sent an election monitoring team, while the OSCE sent a more technical election support team. USAID is funding the National Democratic Institute and Democracy International to conduct two independent international election observation missions for the elections and an anticipated run-off. Through the Supporting Political Entities and Civil Society program being implemented by the National Democratic Institute, the U.S. Government supported the following three Afghan domestic election observation groups: Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization,

Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan, and Afghanistan National Participation Organization. More than 2,200 domestic observers were trained to be deployed nationally on Election Day. USAID convened a monthly donor domestic election working group to coordinate its funded domestic observations with the Europeans, who funded the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan to send out 10,000 domestic observers, covering 70 percent of the country on Election Day.

Events on Election Day were widely considered to have been successful. Initial estimates from the IEC stated that approximately 7 million⁷ Afghans voted on Election Day. The most commonly reported complaint on Election Day was the shortage of ballots across the country, which may be partially attributed to the high voter turnout. The IEC sent contingency ballots to many polling centers in response to the reported shortages. Although the IEC suspected that fraud or ballot theft might have played a role, the initial shortage of ballots affected less than 2.5 percent of the polling centers. After the delivery of contingency material, only 0.5 percent of the polling centers lacked sufficient ballots, according to the IEC. The IEC was investigating the shortage of ballots on Election Day. Going forward, the immediate issues will be the receipt and adjudication of complaints by the Electoral Complaints Commission. The IEC plans to release official preliminary results on April 24, 2014 and, following adjudication of complaints, the official first round results on May 14, 2014.

Afghan presidential elections are not a quick process. If no single candidate wins an outright majority in the first round of voting in April, a runoff between the top two candidates will be necessary. Under many scenarios, it may be late summer or even early fall before a new Afghan government is in place.

U.S. assistance, technical advice, and logistic and security support is designed to support Afghan efforts to ensure elections are credible, transparent, and inclusive. The United States government does not support particular candidates or parties.

⁷ As comprehensive voter participation data was still being compiled as of publication of this report, these numbers are estimates.

SECTION 2 – AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATIONS ⁸

2.1: ANSF SUMMARY

During the reporting period, the ANSF showed progress in combined arms training, utilization of indirect fires systems, and organic casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). However, additional areas, such as sustainment, staffing of specialists, aviation planning, and specialist equipment fielding, still need improvement. While the ANSF has made noticeable progress, international funding and coalition advice and assistance will continue to be critical to sustaining the force.

The ANSF led security operations at the national level since June 2013. With modest ISAF support, the ANSF emerged from the 2013 fighting season as a competent force capable of providing security for Afghanistan. In addition, the ANSF prevented insurgents from achieving their stated objectives this past fighting season. Despite suffering significant casualties during 2013, the ANSF are cohesive and confident force, demonstrating tactical superiority over insurgents and restricting the majority of violence to less densely populated areas. These trends are expected to continue into the 2014 fighting season. ISAF provided limited combat support and combat service support where ANSF capability gaps and development shortfalls remained.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are almost fully fielded with personnel and equipment. The ANSF's primary focus for recruiting is now the quality of personnel, as opposed to quantity. In terms of equipment, several key units and capabilities remain to be fielded, such as two Mobile Strike Force (MSF) *Kandaks* and a number of special *Kandaks*. Additionally, the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Special Mission Wing (SMW) will continue to field personnel and aircraft throughout 2014 and 2015. These two pillars of the ANSF provide essential capabilities required after ISAF transitions to a post-2014 mission.

The ANSF proved they were capable of planning and conducting combined operations with minimal coalition assistance and continue to progress in their operational effectiveness with modest ISAF support. As of the end of the reporting period, 61 of 85 key headquarters and units were assessed as capable or fully capable. The ANSF remained able to conduct large and complex operations. During the reporting period, each of the six Afghan Army Corps planned and executed multiple complex operations throughout the country with the support of the Afghan air force, special operations, and police. Highlights include an ANA 205th Corps operation in southern Afghanistan, where they cleared almost three hundred villages in 14 days with minimal casualties; in the process, they discovered and confiscated 1.5 tons of homemade explosives, and more than 1,000 IEDs and components. An operation by the ANA 207th Corps in western Afghanistan cleared insurgents along Highway 1, protecting the Afghan people and securing a vital road for commercial and military needs.

Although the ANSF's capabilities are progressing, improvement is necessary in sustainment, specialist staffing, aviation planning, special operations, and special equipment fielding – medical

⁸ This section is submitted in fulfillment of requirements of section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended.

and counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED). The development of viable sustainment systems at the institutional/organizational level is critical to ensure the sustainability of an enduring Afghan force. The ANSF's enduring problems involve the long-term sustainment capability. The ANSF require additional improvements to address inadequate supply management and responsiveness to demand, Class IX (spare parts) and fuel management, and the development of unit-level command maintenance programs with trained personnel. Further development of sustainment processes continued to require coalition advice and assistance during the reporting period.

ANSF sustainment development was limited by inappropriate use of personnel, where specialized personnel work outside of the scope of their training. Retention of personnel with skills marketable in the civilian sectors (e.g. mechanics) was problematic as well. The ANSF's supply system was limited, bureaucratic, and not responsive to demand as it matures from a "push" system to a request driven "pull" system. In addition, the ANSF struggled to account for what they might need in the future, as they did not conduct consumption-based requirements forecasting. Systems maintenance continued to be lacking across the board, especially due to the lack of a disciplined and systemic preventive maintenance program.

Cross-service communication remained a problem, despite the large operations described previously. The Operational Coordination Centers (OCC) did not have an approved and implemented SOP that delineates command relationships and reporting procedures between the OCCs, provincial, and national levels of command. This adversely affected ANSF ability to coordinate security and civil operations, synchronize and battle track cross pillar operations.

The Afghan security institutions (ASI) and ANSF still have capability gaps and developmental shortfalls. Capability gaps are those critical areas where the requisite capability is nascent or non-existent. Capability development shortfalls, by comparison, are areas where the ANSF or the ASI have some level of capability but still require significant development to achieve proficiency and requisite effectiveness. The four key high-end capability gaps that are expected to remain after the ISAF mission ends on December 31, 2014 are: air support; intelligence; special operations; and security ministry capacity.

Although the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) continued to make progress in both budget execution and accountability, critical support functions still required coalition assistance and are expected to require support for the near future, particularly with logistics and facilities. There were ministerial developmental shortfalls in acquisition and financial management; strategic plans and policy; and human resource management. ANSF capability development shortfalls were in command and control (C2), leadership, combined arms integration, training, and sustainment. Developmental shortfalls consisted of C-IED, medical, fire support coordination, and special operations capabilities, including counterterrorism (CT). The ASI and ANSF both continued to rely on support from ISAF to mitigate these shortfalls and gaps.

The ANSF identified lessons from 2013, and with the help of ISAF, are addressing them to improve the overall force. A review after this past summer's fighting season revealed that the ANA and the ANP struggled with everyday coordination in their efforts to disrupt insurgent activity. As a result, the MOD focused on improving cross-pillar coordination, as well as coordination across the ASI – the MOD, MOI, and National Directorate for Security (NDS).

Near-term priorities are (1) joint coordination in support of political transition and (2) assurance that the Afghans are postured for the 2014 fighting season.

The overall perception of the ANSF as an institution and their ability to provide security remains strong among the Afghan people. Afghan perceptions of security remain roughly consistent with last reporting period, with 64 percent having a favorable opinion of the ANP and 67 percent having a favorable view of the ANA. More than 57 percent of Afghans surveyed responded that either the ANA or ANP brings the most security to the area. Eighty percent of Afghan respondents believe that GIRoA is leading the effort to improve security in Afghanistan. Although perceptions of ANSF remain steady, more than half of Afghan respondents believe that the ANSF is capable but needs additional resources. Steady recognition of ANSF capability bodes well for the future of the force, but these survey results indicate that many Afghans believe that international community support and resources are necessary for long-term sustainability.⁹

The ANSF is a capable entity that maintains confidence from the Afghan population. However, without continued support from ISAF, the future sustainability of the ANSF is at risk. Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAAT) and ministerial advisors are necessary to sustain current development and continue advancing the ANSF into a fully self-sustainable force.

2.2: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

During the reporting period, ISAF continued to re-orient from combat advising at the unit level to functionally-based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army corps, and the police zones. In this new role, advisors focused on tasks that build the ANSF's long-term ability to sustain progress. This will remain ISAF's primary effort through 2014. At the security ministries, advisors focused on building ministerial capacity in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. Advisors also worked to improve integration between the security pillars – army, police, and intelligence service – at all levels. ISAF and the ANSF worked to connect the ministerial to the operational and tactical levels in an end-to-end process. In the fielded force, advisors focused on capability gaps like the aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They also focused on developmental shortfalls in areas like logistics, medical, and C-IED. At all levels, ISAF advisors worked to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources and to reduce casualties and overall attrition.

ISAF force posture continued to focus on providing security force assistance (SFA) to the ANSF, transitioning missions to the ANSF, and planning to restructure in preparation for RS. In addition, ISAF supported the ANSF in the lead up to the presidential elections in April 2014, although the level of support provided to the ANSF on Election Day was much lower than many analysts predicted would be required.

RS mission planning focused on the development and analysis of courses of action for the RS mission within forecasted manning levels. With the ANSF in the lead for all security matters, ISAF and subordinate commands actively managed force posture to accommodate reductions in

⁹ Source: ISAF ANQAR survey, Wave 23, March 2014.

force levels, equipment, and bases. This balanced operational needs with national redeployment plans, while maintaining force protection requirements and the momentum of the campaign.

ISAF prioritized its efforts on four tiers of tasks. Based on evolving mission requirements and projected availability of resources, these tiers were intended to ensure that the ASI and ANSF have baseline sustainable capabilities and enduring capacity beyond 2015. Tier 1 developmental shortfalls require focus before July 31, 2014 in order to fully enable the ANSF to secure the second round of the elections (if necessary), transition seamlessly into the fighting season, and maintain a high operational tempo throughout the fighting season. Tier 2 developmental shortfalls require focus before 31 December 2014 while ISAF still has the capabilities and authorities in theatre. In this second tier of tasks, ISAF worked to ensure that the ASI and ANSF have the foundational capabilities they need to grow capacity on a path to sustainability. Tier 3 developmental shortfalls and gaps are expected to endure beyond 2014 and will require Corps-level train, advise, and assist (TAA) to address. The third tier of tasks will target remaining ANSF development shortfalls and strengthen a nascent ability to sustain the force. Tier 4 issues are also expected to endure beyond 2014, and will require Ministerial-level TAA to address. This final tier will primarily focus on ASI capacity and capability gaps in the ASI, and coordination and integration of processes within and across the ANSF. During much of the reporting period, ISAF focused on Tier 1 tasks and ANSF operational readiness in order to achieve an optimized force posture in preparation for the elections and summer fighting season.

ISAF's SFA effort was conducted primarily by Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan's (CSTC-A) Ministerial Advisory Groups (MAG) and ISAF Joint Command's (IJC) SFAATs. CSTC-A MAGs conducted functionally based SFA within the MOD and MOI, and liaised and coordinated with the non-security ministries. The MAGs developed ministerial capability through daily interaction with the Afghans and ISAF subordinate headquarters. Advisors established professional relationships with senior ministerial leaders and their staffs to provide a two-way information conduit. The MAGs also coordinated coalition access to the ministries for Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and routine business that enhanced the ISAF/GIRoA strategic partnership. Functional enterprise advisors support the MAGs and other ISAF SFA providers by providing functional advice and support through the established advisor network. Through KLEs, CSTC-A and the MAG promoted ISAF campaign priorities with Afghan partners, capitalizing on the expertise and awareness of the advisor network. ISAF also focused on modifying DoD contracts for Afghan aircraft and ground vehicle sustainment to build more organic Afghan capacity to sustain their equipment.

IJC executed its SFA mission primarily through three types of SFAATs: Military Advisor Teams, Police Advisor Teams, and Operations Coordination Center Advisor Teams. SFAATs focused on five functional areas: command and control, leadership, combined arms integration (for the ANA), integrated layered security (for the ANP), sustainment, and training.

As of January 1, 2014, IJC transitioned to Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) 13.0. CJSOR 12.5, which accounted for coalition force levels from July to December 2013, reduced the number of SFAATs from 381 to 88. CJSOR 13.0 will further reduce the number of SFAATs to 77 by June 2014.

2.3: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT

The security ministries continued to make progress this performance period. Both the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) demonstrated their ability to deal effectively with crises and worked to develop their effectiveness as autonomous organizations. They continued to improve inter-ministry coordination by executing the bi-weekly Afghan-led Joint Security Forum between the ministers and senior staff of each ministry. However, friction remains on some crucial collaborative endeavors, such as staffing and equipping the Special Mission Wing. Nonetheless, both ministries continued to improve their ability to shape and manage their forces through the implementation of human resource management programs that better professionalize and account for their forces.

Logistics and facilities departments for the MOD and MOI still require coalition assistance and are expected to continue to require support in the near future. The personnel management and acquisition and procurement departments stagnated, requiring coalition assistance, particularly within the MOI. Both security ministries made positive gains in planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE), as well as overall budget management in Afghan FY 1392. The MOD and MOI launched deliberate efforts to build their FY 1393 budget through comprehensive PPBE working groups. However, the ministries lack foundational and sustainable capabilities in resource and financial management and PPBE that meet international community norms. Both ministries lack appropriate levels of technically skilled procurement officers, programmers, requirements and budget analysts, accountants, and auditing personnel. Progress continues, but additional Afghan capability must be developed to ensure the long-term sustainability of the ANSF.

The MOD and MOI lack comprehensive oversight organizations empowered to prosecute or engage the Attorney General's Office (AGO) to prosecute significant cases. Modest senior-level counter-corruption efforts have started, but these capabilities are essential at every level to meet international community norms for Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO). CSTC-A continued to employ annual commitment letters that require financial controls to ensure that direct contributions on budget are executed properly. ISAF extended its efforts to promote the investigation of major crimes by embedding coalition and Afghan criminal law expertise with the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) to support its ability to deliver prosecution-ready cases to the AGO.

Assessment of the Ministry of Defense

Areas of improvement

The MOD made progress this performance period. The MOD demonstrated its ability to deal effectively with crises and is working to develop into an effective, autonomous organization. The ministry made incremental progress in developing and implementing viable systems to field, support, and sustain the force. The MOD developed force generation and force management functions designed to support national military objectives, and made progress in areas of previous concern, such as the management of attrition and civilianization. The MOD still lacks the institutional capacity to plan, program, and budget effectively. MAG efforts will focus on

effective multi-year financial programming and development of a longer-term strategic horizon for ministerial thought.

The minister and ministry staff developed, staffed, and published three distinct strategy documents designed to provide guidance and direction for the ANA's force structure and requirements generation in support of the Afghan *National Military Strategy*. During the reporting period they simultaneously closed out this year's budget, planned and formulated next year's budget, and developed the strategy, requirements working groups, and sustainment plan for the subsequent three years. This critical and complex undertaking was a significant first for the MOD. They also executed their first Command Program Review to determine if the force structure is able to support and execute assigned missions. This was a promising first step to understanding long-term development and sustainment of the force based on written requirements.

The minister is focused on developing the structure, architecture, and professionalism required to increase ministerial capacity. The MOD is slowly developing a battle rhythm to establish the continuity and consistency required to complete normal staff actions and allow staff officers access to the ministerial decision-making process. This should help reduce the effects of influential personalities within the system.

The Minister of Defense acknowledged the deficiencies and weaknesses within the MOD and made incremental modifications to the inherent and ingrained patronage networks that are the norm in Afghanistan. The transparency and accountability requirement to meet or exceed the international community's counter-corruption expectations, tied to Chicago NATO Summit donations, is accepted within the MOD and it made progress in establishing appropriate structures to fight corruption. However, oversight mechanisms and counter-corruption lag significantly behind other areas of development.

Considerable focus was applied to building the staff capacity to conduct operations and execute organize, train, and equip functions. To this end, the Chief of the General Staff (CoGS) established detailed strategic, operational, and tactical military priorities for the ANA. To facilitate agility in prosecuting the current fight, the general staff and fielded corps assumed the role of central planning facilitators and coordinators among ANSF partners at the provincial and district level. These processes are facilitated by the commanders of ISAF and IJC during the biweekly Afghan-led Joint Security Forum and reinforced by an Afghan-only operational and tactical security forum.

To address the issues of organization, training, and equipment, the general staff focused on planning and synchronization across the general staff and subordinate commands. Logistics, force management, training resource management, and human resource systems were a primary focus of the CoGS and his coordinating staff. This focus, and an increased emphasis on the development and professionalization of the force, resulted in a number of orders, initiatives, and directives to prepare the ANA for the elections, the new government, and the "decade of transformation."

Areas of Concern

Although many aspects of ministerial capacity are developing well, much work remains to be done. The strategic documents produced over the reporting period are a start, but they do not align resources and requirements to the national military objectives.

The MOD, in conjunction with an advisory team, conducted budget planning for the next fiscal year. This planning effort included visits to corps to aid in requirements development. Although there are many faults in the document, it is their first attempt at generating requirements based upon military objectives and national strategic guidance.

The Afghan FY 1392 budget execution was burdened with bureaucratic processes, personal impediments to forward momentum, and substandard implementation of MOD processes and regulations. The FY 1393 budget will include detailed spending plans, codified processes, and targeted training opportunities to ensure the process is promulgated throughout the MOD.

The CoGS managed to focus priorities and effort within the ANA and is confident in the fighting capacity of the force, but not its sustainability and professionalism. His major concerns in achieving a sustainable ANA are the effects of corruption and political nepotism within the ANA and MOD, and his ability to provide and manage the logistics necessary to prevent tactical and operational degradation of the force.

Afghan Inherent Law is an additional area of concern. The lack of distributed authority to hold subordinate leaders accountable and have a merit based assignment and promotion system facilitates corruption and nepotism, and enables unethical command influence in prosecuting issues involving corruption. This issue is widely recognized in the MOD, but there is little appetite to confront the issue in the current political environment. The MOD made some progress towards implementing counter-corruption policies and processes with the establishment of eight additional Transparency and Accountability Committees (TAC). However, the TACs currently function haphazardly, without consistent agendas, coherent messages, consistent schedules, reporting mechanisms to headquarters, or direction.

Figure 8: MOD Capability Milestone Ratings (as of December 31, 2013)

MDB Results - As of 31 December 2013						
Assessed Area	Current CM Rating	Expected Date of CM1B		Assessed Area	Current CM Rating	Expected Date of CM1B
Ministry of Defense	CM1B	1Q 2012		CoGS	CM2A	Post 2014
First Deputy MoD	CM2A	Post 2014		Vice CoGS	CM2A	Post 2014
AMoD S&P (Prog & Analysis)	CM3	Post 2014		VCoGS-Air	CM2B	Post 2014
AMoD Strategy &Policy (S&P)	CM2B	4Q 2014		Sergeant Major of the Army	CM2B	3Q 2014
AMoD Intelligence	CM2B	Post 2014		Director of General Staff (DoGS)	CM2A	Post 2014
AMoD Acquisition Tech & Logistics	CM2B	3Q 2014		GSG1 Personnel	CM2B	Post 2014
Acquisition Agency	CM2B	1Q 2014		GSG2 Intelligence	CM2B	2Q 2014
AMoD Personnel	CM1B	3Q 2013		GS G3 Operations	CM2A	Post 2014
AMoD Education	CM2B	3Q 2014		GS Engineer	CM3	Post 2014
AMoD Reserve Affairs	CM2B	3Q 2014		GSG4 Logistics	CM2B	3Q 2014
AMoD Chief of Legal Dept.	CM3	Post 2014		GSG5 Policy & Planning	CM1B	1Q 2013
MoD Chief, Finance	CM2B	Post 2014		GSG6 Communications	CM1B	4Q 2013
MOD Chief, Construction & Property Management Division (CPMD)	CM2B	1Q 2014		GS G6 Comm. Support Unit	CM1A	1Q 2012
MoD Inspector General	CM2B	2Q 2014		GSG7 Force Structure, Training & Doctrine	CM2A	Post 2014
Director Strategic Communications	CM2B	1Q 2014		GSG8 Finance	CM2A	Post 2014
MoD Chief, Parl, Soc. & Public Affairs	CM1B	1Q 2012		Chief Religious & Cultural Affairs (RCA)	CM2B	3Q 2014
(CFA) Gender Integration	CM3	Post 2014		GS Inspector General	CM2A	Post 2014
(CFA) Civilianization	CM2B	3Q 2014		GS Legal Department	CM2A	Post 2014
				ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC)	CM1B	4Q 2011
		CM4		CM2B		CM1B
		CM3		CM2A		CM1A

4	The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.
3	Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.
2B	Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.
2A	Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.
1B	Coalition oversight
1A	Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.

Assessment of the Ministry of Interior

The MOI made progress during the performance period, but will require sustained coalition assistance in numerous strategic and operational functions to achieve its mission. The Minister of Interior's top two priorities are (1) to make the MOI the center of gravity for GIRoA and the ANSF, and (2) to make immediate changes to ensure the most capable leaders are in place to direct the MOI into and through the election cycle. Numerous leadership changes at the deputy

minister and director levels were made over the reporting period. These frequent changes in MOI leadership are indicative of the political pressures directed at the MOI, and the resulting turmoil is disruptive to the pace of ministerial development. Despite the leadership changes in the ministry, coalition advisors continue to develop enduring solutions that transcend these changes to keep the ministry on a positive vector towards self-sufficiency.

On a strategic level, the March 2013 release of the minister's 10-Year Vision was the catalyst for working groups and departments to develop nested two-year plans. Although this is a positive sign for the future of the ministry, the effectiveness of these plans will not be apparent until their distribution and implementation in the coming months. Several MOI departments made significant strides toward autonomy during the reporting period. Overall, progress at MOI was slower than initial estimates. The average time to advance among the 32 departments within the ministry was eight months and 10 days. Each of the security pillars are deemed effective, but still require some coalition assistance. The most capable pillar is the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which consistently proved to be a viable and effective force during deployed operations. They are capable of rapid deployment in support of its own mission or the missions of other ANSF units. ANCOP is a well-trained, well-led, effective, and sustainable force capable of autonomous operations without coalition support. The Public Affairs Department also demonstrated its ability to function autonomously within the MOI.

The MOI still struggles with significant weaknesses in critical support functions. Logistics and Facilities Departments still require coalition assistance. Personnel Management and Acquisition and Procurement Departments stagnated, requiring continued coalition assistance. Progress continues, but additional Afghan capability must be developed to ensure the long-term sustainability of the ANP.

Logistics/Acquisition/Finances

The MOI relies on coalition assistance in several areas. The MOI is not yet capable of self-sustainment for equipment, infrastructure, and forces with available resources. CSTC-A assists in the areas of budget planning and execution, end-to-end procurement, and operational maintenance and logistics. The MAG ensures all actions that are performed support an objective in one of four key processes: requirements generation and prioritization, resource advocacy and allocation, execution and accountability, and measuring performance and reacting.

Training

The ability to train and maintain a professional force is critical to the MOI's ability to achieve autonomy in executing its mission. Retention has not been a significant problem. The development of acquisition, logistics, and finance professionals is a greater challenge, because the MOI has yet to demonstrate commitment to an aggressive training and education program in the sustainment functions. At the ministerial level and in the capital region, training and education is more evident. The newly appointed Deputy Minister for Support indicated his desire to expand training beyond the capital region. The MOI MAG continues to advocate for the use of civilian personnel in non-security, technical, and professional positions as one solution to the limited expertise at MOI.

Capacity Building

The Deputy Minister for Support continues to make slow progress in its capacity to perform specified tasks related to defining requirements, and its ability to execute the basic sustainment activities of logistics, acquisition, and finance. Organizational and institutional capacity building continues to be a focus of effort. The Deputy Minister for Support established a committee with the Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy to develop and prioritize requirements at every level of the MOI.

Contracting

The MOI continued to assume responsibility for contracts that were U.S.-managed to MOI-awarded and managed. The MOI's ability to estimate resource requirements accurately remains a weakness, primarily due to the ministry's lack of visibility on end user requirements for Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS). The infrequent use of other electronic information systems inhibits accurate planning by the Finance and Procurement Directorates. However, the new Deputy Minister for Support set requirements generation as a priority and the MOI is actively implementing the use of AFMIS throughout the ministry. Implementation of AFMIS is a requirement in the financial commitment letter between MOI and CSTC-A. The Procurement Directorate demonstrated greater involvement with other governmental agencies and increasing transparency. They also trended towards increased advertising and better marketing of opportunities. Although improving, the Procurement Directorate needs greater discipline to adhere to Afghan procurement law, Ministry of Finance (MOF) rules, and proper procedures.

The MOI uses a contracted vehicle maintenance and supply capability; however, it is in the process of developing the next concept of support that sees gradual transition from contract maintenance to organic maintenance. With limited capacity, conversion to a wholly organic maintenance support is not likely in the near term. The National Logistics Centre (NLC) Wardak is the hub for all supply and maintenance activities, providing significant capacity and capability to perform all levels of maintenance, and distribute almost every class of supply. Supply and maintenance support is further distributed to the provinces using regional logistics centers (RLCs), MOI supply points (MSPs), and contracted mobile maintenance contact teams. Despite all of this capability, most customers remain disconnected from the process, resulting in suboptimal implementation of the system. Part of this disconnect was due to MOI logistics leadership that actively pursued an agenda, which was counter to the concept of support. Indicators of positive change resulted from recent changes in leadership, including increased pressure from the new Deputy Minister for Support.

Finance

The MOI's overall financial management capability and capacity still requires consistent guidance and direction from the coalition to develop and execute the budget for accuracy, transparency, and accountability. The diverse landscape of the ANP contributes to the challenges of providing standardized guidance and policies to all 297 payroll stations. Many overspending issues exist for various provincial food contracts for food, which demonstrates a lack of control within the ministry to execute the budget properly. This situation requires senior leadership

engagement with the MOI to direct the pillars to contract only the authorized amount for the food contracts.

Quality Management

No quality management or leadership review processes exist across the sustainment functions of the Deputy Minister for Support. Implementation of some form of quality management system with the essential processes, procedures, and metrics is required to monitor the performance of the Logistics, Procurement, and Finance Directorates. Without this, the ANP will find it extremely difficult to operate in a resource-constrained environment.

IG Transparency and Oversight

General Assessment. Development of the MOI Inspector General (IG) continues to lag due to the lack of staff and the limited vision of the IG. The IG lacks formalized processes and any accountability with MOI senior leadership. Oversight mapping will reveal a model of oversight to advance transparency, accountability, and counter-corruption efforts. This approach was recently validated by the investigation, arrest, and eventual conviction of a provincial chief of police by the Counter Narcotics Police rather than IG. Ninety-one percent of the cases sent to the AGO are investigated by MOI agencies outside of the IG's office. There was some recent success, publicized on local media, of the IG office conducting internal sting operations at the city gates. Consequently, there must be a balanced approach within the IG's office between TAO and traditional internal affairs type investigations.

The criminal prosecution of corrupt actors remains unreliable due to the lack of independence of investigators and the poor performance, if not outright corruption, of the AGO. Weak administrative discipline structures compound this issue and make it difficult to remove bad actors other than by transferring them at the order of the minister. Much work remains to be done before the MOI maintains an enduring anti- and counter-corruption program to promote transparency and accountability.

Progress. The automated Afghan Human Resources Information Management System is progressing and promises to reduce the payment of non-existent personnel significantly. The capability to pay ANP personnel properly and accurately continued to challenge the MOI. For the months of October, November, and December 2013, the MOI experienced a significant shortfall in paying the salaries of ANP personnel. The MOI took corrective measures and processed back pay for ANP. The MOI is assessing preventative measures to execute their budget successfully.

Additionally, MOI Security Operations and Strategic Policy conduct the Police Performance Assessment Program to assess police performance and the validity of policies, but this project is still in its infancy. The recent replacement of the IG changed the relationship of the oversight office with the minister, which may improve TAO and counter-corruption efforts in MOI.

Figure 9: MOI Capability Milestone Ratings (as of December 31, 2013)

Ministry of Interior Overall Rating	Current CM	Projected 1B Date
CM2A		
Chief of Staff / Special Staff		
Public Affairs	1A	Achieved
Inspector General	3	1Q, 2015
Legal Advisor	1B	Achieved
Legal Affairs	1B	Achieved
Intelligence	2A	2Q, 2014
Democratic Policing	3	N/A
Gender Affairs	2B	4Q, 2014
DM Counternarcotics		
Counternarcotics	2A	4Q, 2014
DM Strategy and Policy		
Strategic Planning	1B	Achieved
Policy Development	1B	Achieved
Force Management	1B	Achieved
DM Support		
Logistics	2B	2Q, 2015
Finance & Budget	2B	1Q, 2015
Facilities & Installation	2B	2Q, 2015
Surgeon Medical	2A	3Q, 2014
Info, Comms & Technology	2B	4Q, 2014
Acquisition & Procurement	2B	3Q, 2014
DM Admin		
Personnel Management	2B	2Q, 2015
Civil Service	2A	3Q, 2014
Training Management	1B	Achieved
Recruiting Command	2B	4Q, 2014
DM Security		
Afghan Uniform Police	1B	Achieved
Fire Services	2B	1Q, 2014
Afghan Border Police (ABP)	2A	4Q, 2014
GDPSU	1B	Achieved
Anti-Crime Police	1B	Achieved
ANCOP	1A	Achieved
Afghan Local Police (ALP)	2A	3Q, 2014
Plans & Operations	1B	Achieved
Force Readiness	1A	Achieved
Counter-IED	2A	2Q, 2014
DM Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)		
APPF	2B	4Q, 2014

Key	
4	The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.
3	Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.
2B	Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.
2A	Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.
1B	Department or institution capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only.
1A	Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.

2.4: INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS

According to the Combined Joint Status of Requirements, version 13.0, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) has a requirement for 241 mentors/advisors, of which 202 are in place. Despite the current shortage of 39 required mentors/advisors, NTM-A can fully accomplish its mission with the current number of trainers. As specific capability milestones are reached for a particular training mission, personnel are reduced at those training sites and the mission is transitioned to the ANSF. This reduction in the requirement is reflected in the CJSOR version 13.0 that took effect in January 2014.

Figure 10: NTM-A Trainer Requirement (CJSOR version 13.0)

Forces/Skills to be Trained	# of Trainers Required
Army	169
Police	40
Medical	32

2.5: ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Literacy training is now mandatory for all ANA and ANP recruits. There are three levels of literacy training/proficiency. Level 1 = first grade; level 2 = basic literacy; level 3 = “functional literacy”. As of February 2014:

- 82,437 ANSF personnel completed level 3 literacy,
- 102,155 completed level 2, and
- 242,120 completed level 1.

2.6: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) DEVELOPMENT

As of March 2014, ANA manning was 187,954 personnel (slightly below its 195,000 cap), including 6,780 AAF personnel, 9,321 civilians and 10,312 trainees, transients, holdees, and students. The ANA is nearing completion of fielding its programmed 309 *Kandaks*. The ANA is scheduled to receive all of its equipment by July 2014 and the last *Kandak* will complete training in January 2015.

During the reporting period, the ANA fielded key enabling capabilities to the 207th Corps Engineer *Kandak* (CEK), the 209th Corps Signal *Kandak* (CSK), and the 209th Corps CEK. The majority of ANA units were fielded at the close of December 2013, with the exception of two Mobile Strike Force *Kandaks* and a number of special *Kandaks*.

The ANA made impressive progress, and maintained its tactical overmatch over the insurgency. Nonetheless, the ANA faces major challenges, mainly in two areas: sustainment, and the development of the more complex enabling capabilities. Logistics and sustainment remains a problem across all areas of the ANA. Most ANA brigades are now capable of sustaining themselves at the tactical level for a short duration (between 48 and 96 hours). The lack of trained maintenance technicians and a logistics system that struggles to resupply units in the field adversely affects every component of the ANSF.

The development of enablers, and in particular air and ISR capabilities, lagged the development of other ANA capabilities. The AAF remains relatively nascent, with some systems not scheduled to be fielded until 2017. The ANA are still having issues coordinating and integrating aviation planning. Finally, attrition remains a significant problem for the ANA, although recruitment was, as of the end of the reporting period, able to make up for losses.

Due to these remaining challenges, the ANSF continued to rely upon ISAF for enabler support during the reporting period, particularly in the areas of close air support, casualty evacuation, logistics, C-IED, and ISR.

Manning

A high attrition rate, particularly in the ANA, continues to pose challenges to ANSF development. The ANA averaged 2.6 percent attrition for the past 12 months with a low of 2.2 percent in November 2013 and a peak of 3.3 percent in February 2014. In the first quarter of 2014, ANA average monthly attrition rate was 2.6 percent. Since initially reaching their authorized end strength of 187,000 personnel, the ANA maintained end strength at near the 100 percent level. Until December 2013, the ANA was authorized to staff to 115 percent of the *Tashkil* authorizations for enlisted soldiers. Directives in December 2013 and January 2014 rescinded this and authorized that payment would only be made up to 100 percent manning levels. This policy resulted in a slight increase in near-term attrition, but overall attrition in the ANA was stable for the past 12 months. ANA recruitment potential will allow them to both balance the force and replace losses from attrition. This process could result in slight fluctuations of end strength from month to month.

Figure 10: ANA Attrition by Corps/Division, March 2014

ANA	Attrition*
201 Corps	1.6%
203 Corps	1.8%
205 Corps	2.0%
207 Corps	2.6%
209 Corps	2.1%
215 Corps	4.1%
111 Div	1.2%
SOF	0.9%
EAC****	0.7%
ANA Total	1.8%

* ANA attrition decreased slightly from 3.3 percent (Feb) to 1.8 percent (Mar) in Solar Month March 14.

****EAC - Echelon Above Corps includes a number of organizations: MP Guard Brigade; HSSB; Army Support Command (ASC); Logistics Command (Log Cmd); ANATC; ANAREC; Medical Command; ANDU; Ministry of Defense; General Staff; Ground Forces Command; and Mobile Strike Force. EAC figures do not include the TTHS (Training, Transient, Holding, Students) element.

The main causes of attrition are assessed as high operational tempo, sustained risk, soldier care/quality of life, and leave issues. Afghan casualties increased since the ANSF took the lead for security last June. Although combat losses comprise a relatively small percentage of total ANSF attrition numbers, reducing ANSF casualties remains both a top moral and operational priority for ISAF and ANSF leaders.

Several factors in addition to enemy action contributed to casualties in the 2013 fighting season, such as shortfalls in medical care and casualty evacuation. ISAF and the ANSF are aggressively addressing these shortfalls in several ways: the introduction of combat lifesaver skills and medical kits so soldiers can give self-aid and buddy-aid at the point of injury; the use of Mi-17 helicopters for casualty evacuation; and improved Afghan medical capabilities and long-term care. Reducing casualties also depends on the ANSF's warfighting capability, which ranges from a commander's competency to a unit's ability to integrate combined arms. ANSF leaders are working hard to improve these areas.

Although the overall attrition rate is higher than optimal, this is not directly affecting operations in the short-term, as the ANSF remains sustainable numerically due to robust recruitment. However, if the current attrition rate persists, it could have an adverse effect on the long-term quality of the ANSF. This is particularly relevant to non-commissioned officer (NCO) attrition, given the loss of key military experience this represents.

Urgent action is therefore being taken to address the root causes of attrition beyond combat casualties and to develop a culture of leadership accountability in the ANSF. Attrition management focused on balancing the force at *Tashkil* authorization levels for the targeted mix of officers, NCOs, and soldiers in authorized Military Occupational Specialties. In particular, ANSF senior leadership established a Joint Attrition Working Group (JAWG).

JAWG reviews attrition figures and issues within the ANA and proposes courses of action to the Attrition General Officer Steering Committee for ratification prior to presentation to CoGS for approval. This cycle is repeated on a 75-day basis and ensures senior leadership is informed and responsive to issues that contribute to high attrition rates. Another significant area of progress in combating high attrition rates was the development of the MOD Attrition Review Cycle and ownership of the issue by the senior MOD leadership. The Vice Chief of General Staff, as lead for ANA attrition issues, developed the Attrition Review Cycle with MOD MAG assistance.

Figure 11: ANA Strength, Recruiting, Retention, and Attrition




Figure 12: ANA Ethnicity, as of February 2014

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	41.4%	39.6%	8.0%	4.5%	6.5%
Officer Delta	-2.6%	14.6%	-2.0%	-3.5%	-6.5%
NCO	38.3%	31.8%	12.5%	9.9%	7.5%
Soldier	38.8%	30.9%	10.1%	12.5%	7.8%
Total Force	39.0%	32.4%	10.7%	10.4%	7.5%
Delta	-5.0%	7.4%	0.7%	2.4%	-5.5%
ANA Ethnic Breakout Goal	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%

Logistics and Sustainment

The ANP presently lacks an organic maintenance capacity and instead receives vehicle maintenance via contracted support. Although their vehicle readiness and repair times are manageable now, the ANP needs to build an organic vehicle maintenance capability for future sustainability. Key sustainment areas of concern are highlighted as enduring risks to mission success: logistics and maintenance management, medical capability including CASEVAC, and the Operational Deployment Cycle (ODC).

The MOD General Staff G4 recently fielded a Mobile Training Team to provide instruction on preventive maintenance procedures to each corps, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this initiative.

As of February 2014, 19 of 23 (83 percent) assessed brigades are capable or fully capable of sustaining combat operations for 48 hours or more, a decrease of one brigade from the previous quarter. Of these, five brigades (22 percent) are capable of sustaining combat operations for 96 hours or more, compared to seven the previous quarter. Sustainment issues on the brigade level continue to revolve around the lack of effective command maintenance programs, inappropriate use of trained personnel, mechanics, and the lack of requirement forecasting.

The MSF are currently unable to sustain operations exceeding 24 hours effectively. Upon initial fielding, the MSF *Kandaks* are sustained through a nine-month maintenance contract, but the ANA assumes responsibility for MSF maintenance requirements when the contracts expire. This will likely be problematic for the ANA, as it currently has a shortfall in trained mechanics. Additionally, some MSF units were not issued their allocation of recovery vehicles, cargo trucks, and fuel/water trucks.

ANA equipping is divided into three categories: shoot, move, and communicate:

- **SHOOT** – Overall, the ANA was fielded to 95 percent of its total weapons authorizations in accordance with Tashkil 1391v2. M16 rifles, M240B machine guns, and M203 rifle-mounted grenade launchers still have pending Security Assistance Office (SAO) due-ins into theater. All other equipment was fielded to the ANA. Shortages will be filled by cross-leveling overall excesses across Commands.
- **MOVE** – Overall, the ANA fielded 85 percent of its total vehicles authorizations in accordance with Tashkil 1391v2. Light Tactical Vehicles, Up-Armored MTVs, and HMMWV Gun Trucks still have pending SAO due-ins into theater. All other equipment was fielded to the ANA. Shortages will be filled by cross-leveling overall excesses across Commands.
- **COMMUNICATE** – Overall, the ANA was fielded at 106 percent of its total communications authorizations in accordance with Tashkil 1391v2. VHF Vehicle-Mounted radios have pending SAO due-ins into theater. All other equipment was fielded to the ANA. Shortages will be filled by cross-leveling overall excesses across Commands.

Figure 13: ANA Equipment Roll Up

ANA Weapon: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
NATO Individual Weapons	221,072	1,788	212,492	(10,368)	202,205	11,147	(9,508)
NATO Crew Served Weapons	12,667	493	10,563	(2,597)	10,488	441	(2,231)
NATO Indirect Fire Weapons	140	921	1,168	107	1,168	20	127
Non-NATO Standard Weapons	7,453	13	54,518	47,052	54,518	57,975	105,027
TOTAL	241,332	3,215	278,741	34,194	268,379	69,583	93,415

ANA Vehicles: Status Summary											
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered			LOCATION OF VEHICLES DELIVERED			
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)	US PORT READY TO BE CALLED FWD	JAX PORT	IN TRANSIT	AUTL
Light Tactical Vehicle	17,834	70	18,781	877	17,463	(369)	(810)	0	0	1318	336
Mobile Strike Force Vehicles	0	623	623	0	476	0	(147)	57	0	97	0
Medium Tactical Vehicle	6,310	218	7,447	919	7,288	(326)	434	62	62	71	63
HMMWV Variants	9,021	270	11,191	1,900	9,854	(407)	156	1260	1260	401	67
Heavy Vehicles & Fire Equipment	894	1	869	(26)	869	40	14	0	0	0	15
Engineer Equipment	1,424	150	1,783	209	1,293	(2)	(283)	0	0	241	2
Trailers	5,301	25	6,065	739	6,021	(74)	621	0	0	181	28
Material Handling Equipment	819	2	859	38	757	39	(25)	0	0	0	29
People Haulers	1,184	4	1,351	163	918	142	(128)	0	0	377	11
Other	1,161	45	2,175	969	1,743	(830)	(293)	1	1	1	46
TOTAL	43,948	1,408	51,144	5,788	46,682	(1,787)	(461)	1380	1380	2687	597

ANA Comm: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
HF Radios	11,615	2,334	12,268	(1,681)	12,101	9	(1,839)
VHF Radios	72,082	121	71,538	(665)	71,337	1,567	701
VHF/UHF Radios	2,231	250	3,318	837	3,318	0	837
Night Vision Device	9,896	443	12,497	2,158	10,830	252	743
Other Comm	269	12	283	2	283	0	2
TOTAL	96,093	3,160	99,904	651	97,869	1,828	444
ANA EOD: Status Summary							
ANA EOD Item	Total Required	Total Acquired		Total Delivered			
		Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Binoculars	15,430	0	15,430	0	15,430	0	0
Blasting Machine M34	373	0	470	97	470	0	97
EOD Bomb Suit (SM + MED) w/Helmet	528	0	676	148	669	0	141
Firing Cable & Reel	543	0	2,631	2,088	2,631	0	2,088
M2 Crimper	268	0	298	30	237	0	(31)
Mine Detector (Vallon & CEIA)	5,748	552	6,300	0	6,300	0	0
Pigstick w/ Stand	528	0	696	168	634	0	106
MMP-30 Robot	528	0	707	179	503	0	(25)
Symphony Jammer	1,286	0	1,261	(25)	1,261	0	(25)
Test Set, M51 Blasting Cap	378	0	635	257	333	0	(45)
Hook & Line Kit PT 1&2	264	0	400	136	400	0	136
EOD Tripod	264	0	343	79	318	0	54
PIPPERS	7,202	0	7,202	0	7,202	0	0
Mine Rollers	526	0	526	0	526	0	0
TOTAL	33,866	552	37,575	3,157	36,914	0	2,496

ANA Comm: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
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TOTAL	33,866	552	37,575	3,157	36,914	0	2,496

Special Operations Forces

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) units – specifically, the Special Operations *Kandaks* (SOKs) – progressed significantly during the reporting period. However, while they are tactically proficient units, they continued to operate closely with NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) partners to conduct missions.

Afghans lead 99 percent of all Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations in Afghanistan. The ANASOC has only two *Kandaks* not fully fielded and at initial operating capability (IOC), with the entire Military Intelligence *Kandak* scheduled to be fully fielded in September 2014 if not earlier. During the reporting period, Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) companies finished fielding, with one MSFV company per ANA Special Operation Brigade and two MSFV companies attached to the 6th Special Operations *Kandak*.

NSOCC-A measures operational effectiveness through mentor assessments of the units and through the extent to which Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) participate in operations.

These show that the overall capability of the ASSF is improving and that they are taking on an increasingly large role in operations. ASSF's capability ratings are shown in Figure 14.

Although most components achieved a solid or very solid level of tactical proficiency, efforts are not as far along in other areas. Fielding of the SMW in particular was delayed. Designed to establish C2 relationships between MOD and MOI for the SMWE, MOD-MOI Air Charter implementation has been problematic and there was little progress during the reporting period. NSOCC-A is working to execute a fielding plan that will bring SMW to its planned size by 2016.

Command and control is improving slowly, although leadership and training made greater strides. Integration with ANSF partners and Afghan Local Police (ALP) improved for MOD ASSF units, though less so for MOI units. Logistics and sustainment remain challenging for the ASSF.

Figure 14: Special Operations Forces RASR ratings, as of February, 2014

ANASOC RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)	HQs	Units		Total Units & HQs
	DIV/BDEs	KDKs	SPT Units	
Fully Capable	0	0	0	0
Capable	0	4	2	6
Partially Capable	3	5	5	13
Developing	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	0	0	0
Totals	3	9	7	19

Source: NSOCC-A Assessment Cycle (February 2014).

Figure 15: Special Operations Forces Operation, as of February 2014

Operational Category	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14
ISAF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)	5	12	5	1	0	4
GDPSU & ANASF/CDO Unilateral Ops (Total)	126	111	219	228	211	249
ISAF Advised Ops (with ANSF in lead)	163	93	136	70	50	82
ANSF- Led ISAF Enabled Ops	199	185	244	217	253	133
ISAF - Led Partnered Ops	3	1	2	19	27	0
Total Partnered, Enabled, or Advised SOF Ops (Total)	365	279	382	306	330	215
Total Ops	496	402	606	535	541	468
Total ISAF Led Ops	8	13	7	20	27	4
Total ANSF Led Ops	488	389	599	515	514	464
% of Total Ops Led by ISAF	2%	3%	1%	4%	5%	1%
% of Total Ops Led by ANSF	98%	97%	99%	96%	95%	99%

Note: Special operations recorded above include operations carried out by ISAF SOF, GDPSU, and ANASF/CDO units, but do not include operations conducted by TF 94-7.1 Effective May 2013 ANA SF CDO ops were added to this table. Previously, only ISAF SOF and GDPSU ops were included. Effective June 2013, National Directorate of Police Security (NDS) were added into this table.

NDS = National Directorate of Security; GDPSU = General Directorate of Police Special Units; CDO = commandos; Ktah Khas = specialized Afghan commandos in the ANASF.

Color scheme: Combined is purple, ANSF is green, coalition is blue, summary statistics are orange.

Afghan Air Force

The AAF improved their operational mission capabilities. The AAF increasingly executes CASEVAC, recovery of human remains, and other missions. The AAF successfully executed resupply operations in support of 201st Corps, moving 1,300 kilograms of cargo, passengers, and two CASEVAC patients. As in the initial assault, AAF Mi-35s provided continuous aerial escort and armed over-watch for these missions, remaining on standby to provide additional presence patrols as requested. During the first quarter of 2014, the AAF improved their mission effectiveness by 12 percent in passenger transport, 13 percent in cargo, 35 percent in CASEVAC, and 43 percent in human remains movement. Organic CASEVAC capability grew as the AAF and SMW continued to field aircraft and the ground forces fielded and integrated ambulance kits.

The AAF demonstrated an increased C2 and operational flexibility, as shown by scrambling two Mi-17s to provide local flood relief for civilians stranded near the river on the north side of Jalalabad. The AAF executed 11 airlifts to rescue 234 Afghan civilians to higher ground when a sudden storm flooded area roadways and *wadis*. This successful mission demonstrated improved AAF C2 capabilities to re-task assets dynamically with increased effectiveness. AAF operations during the reporting period highlighted the AAF's capability to train, fight, sustain aircraft operations, and have the flexibility to respond to natural disasters when tasked.


Although the AAF demonstrated an ability to execute operational missions and support disaster relief, its ability to generate Mi-17s for missions is balanced against maintenance requirements. Challenges with spare parts and airframes reaching the end of their programmed use, remain significant. Mi-17 fleets are simple to operate but require intensive maintenance by design. High operational use caused Mi-17 inspection backlogs, decreasing Mi-17 availability. Advisors are assisting the AAF to develop staggered maintenance cycles to ease future backlogged maintenance in order for the AAF to maintain aircraft availability.

Improving AAF maintenance management is critical for the AAF to become independent and self-sustainable. The AAF made strides in reducing future contracting cost through a four-day Logistics Shura where they developed a plan of action to train logistics personnel, as well as began the development of a ready and sustainable logistics system for the four major airfields. A sustainable AAF maintenance program was a SFA focus area during the reporting period, resulting in a growth from 1 to 438 qualified maintenance personnel.

The AAF received shipments of 12 new Mi-17s from Russia in September and October 2013. The AAF's fleet of 48 Mi-17s, distributed among the Air Wings, is well suited for Afghanistan's environment. The number of Mi-17s accounts for all operational helicopters (including 10 on loan to the SMW) and does not take into account previously procured Mi-17s that either have been retired or are no longer flyable. The number of Mi-35s was adjusted from 11 to 6 based on operational capability. The current inventory of Mi-35s remains at 11. However, four are set to be retired and one was cannibalized to support the remaining six operational aircraft. To maximize the Mi-17's 25-year service life, adherence to robust inspection and maintenance cycles will ensure fleet availability and sustainability for future operational and training missions.

The AAF also had problems recruiting qualified candidates to meet tactical requirements. A lack of qualified recruits is the main factor in their lack of growth over the reporting period.

Figure 16: AAF Strength, Recruiting, Retention, and Attrition



Special Mission Wing

The SMW provides rotary-wing (Mi-17) air mobility and fixed wing (PC-12) ISR capability to support CT and counternarcotics (CN) operations critical to targeting and disrupting the enemies of Afghanistan. Specifically, the SMW provides day and night tactical aviation support to the ANASOC, MOI's National Mission Units (NMU), and vetted counternarcotics units to target drug trafficking organizations and insurgent networks operating in geographically remote areas. The SMW represents the ANSF's only night-vision goggle qualified (NVG) air assault and fixed-wing ISR capability.

The SMW is the only air mobility asset in Afghanistan capable of projecting power at night with the precision required to support the high-risk CN/CT missions critical to Afghan and U.S. security interests. Due to the topography and security environment of Afghanistan, aviation support is a key enabler of interdiction and CT operations that deny insurgents' freedom of action in remote areas. The air mobility provided by SMW allows Afghan counternarcotics and special operations forces to conduct their operations with a greater degree of effectiveness and safety, in areas where it would be impractical to infiltrate by other means. To date, the SMW conducted eight Afghan independent air assaults, more than 100 Afghan independent missions, and proven its ability to provide organic ISR over-watch during the infiltration and exfiltration of SMW Mi-17s and ground personnel. The continued

development of the SMW will facilitate the transition of critical enabler support from ISAF to the ANSF, consistent with the campaign and U.S. national security objectives.

When it reaches Full Operational Capability in 2017, the SMW will have 30 new Mi-17v5s and 18 PC-12s. These aircraft and crews will be organized into four squadrons stationed in Kabul International Airport (KAIA), Kandahar Airfield, and Mezar-e-Sharif. Currently, the SMW program has 17 Mi-17s and 5 PC-12s on hand at KAIA.

Fielding

Assuming no delays in delivery, all 30 Mi-17v5s will be operational by December 2014. Of the 17 Mi-17s on hand, 6 are newly fielded Mi-17v5s, 10 are "on loan" from the AAF, and 2 are overhauled Mi-17v1 airframes. The SMW is scheduled to receive six new Mi-17v5s in April and field three Mi-17v5s per month until achieving full strength by December 2014. In addition to the "on loan" and new aircraft, the SMW has 19 Mi-17v1s provided by several sources. Most of these older aircraft are at repair facilities undergoing overhaul/major repair or are non-flyable awaiting disposition. These aircraft will be retired or be reassigned once all 30 of the new Mi-17v5s are delivered to Afghanistan.

PC-12 deliveries began in September 2013 and there are currently five PC-12s in Afghanistan. Assuming no delays in deliveries, all PC-12s will be operational by the summer of 2015. One PC-12 delivery is scheduled for April 2014. Beginning in July 2014, PC-12 deliveries will continue at a rate of about one per month until all 18 are delivered by May 2015.

Operations

During the first half of FY 2014, the SMW supported 54 CN, CT, and general support (in-extremis CASEVAC, emergency resupply, etc.) missions. During this same time period, SMW supported seven MOD and MOI CT operations resulting in five detainees and the seizure of two large weapons caches. Since the first two quarters of the fiscal year represent the winter season in Afghanistan, commanders expect the operational tempo to increase significantly during the second half of FY 2014 in support of the summer "fighting season."

Eleven of the SMW operations addressed CN requirements in support of the MOI. These missions netted: 4,112 kilograms (kg) of hash; 24,700 kg of hash seed; 659 kg homemade explosives; 1178 kg opium; 700 kg morphine base; 10,997 liters of morphine solution; 13 kg processed heroin; two drug labs; and two heroin presses.

In addition to directly contributing to ASSF operations, the SMW also achieved three significant developmental milestones in the first half of FY 2014. First, in late December, SMW flew its first air assault mission in support of an MOD unit. This operation laid the foundation for increased SMW/MOD cooperation and demonstrated the value of the SMW to the MOD. Second, using U.S. pilots, SMW integrated its PC-12 capability into a combat operation in February 2014. Less than one month later, SMW flew the first partnered (U.S./Afghan mixed crew) PC-12 ISR flight in support of a combat operation, demonstrating the ability to incorporate SMWs ISR platforms into ANSF campaigns.

Training

The SMW continues to focus on generating its forces in support of operational requirements. Over the first two quarters of FY 2014, the SMW flew more than 759 Mi-17 and 580 PC-12 training hours. SMW's first class of PC-12 pilots and Mission System Operators will graduate in early April 2014, providing partnered crews in support of the ASSF during the 2014 election and fighting seasons. Training particularly focuses on the night air assault capability that makes the Wing unique. Crew qualification requires the progression of Mi-17 pilots and Mi-17 crew chiefs. SMW graduated two additional Mi-17 NVG crews during the first half of FY 2014.

Over the last six months, one of SMW's focus areas was to develop relationships with MOD SOF units to enhance interoperability and extend MOD SOF's operational reach. During the first half of FY 2014, SMW and ISAF advisors:

- developed and implemented a SMW-MOD SOF training concept;
- integrated SMW into MOD SOF training courses;
- developed and disseminated standards for air-ground integration; and,
- supported the execution of a MOD SOF CT operation under day and NVG conditions.

To facilitate air-ground integration further, the SMW advisors developed the SMW usage guide. Initially developed for coalition ground SOF advisors to assist their ASSF counterparts request and use SMW assets, the effort expanded to include ASSF ground elements. The document provides training/operational requirements to utilize SMW assets and to enhance Afghan air-ground integration.

Sustainment

Developing the foundation for sustainable Afghan systems is a critical task for ISAF during fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Maintenance is a particularly important area for SMW. On the Mi-17 side, SMW made progress over the last six months. Currently, SMW has a Mi-17 Technical Training Course in progress. Maintainers progressed from Level 3 (apprentice) to Level 2 (journeyman) and were set to graduate in April 2014. Afghan maintainers also progressed from one level to the next through on the job training. Since December 6, 2013, approximately 10-15 Afghan maintainers progressed to a higher level in areas such as basic engine/body maintainer, aviation life support equipment, and armament. On the PC-12 side, the program is still very early in the development process and maintenance is still conducted exclusively by contractors. The first PC-12 maintenance class is scheduled for Fall 2014.

Efforts to prepare the Afghans for the transition away from ISAF sustainment are receiving great emphasis. With respect to Mi-17 operations, Afghan maintenance leaders are currently running production control meetings. They assist with assigning aircraft for the flight schedule and aircraft phase schedule. Additionally, Afghan maintainers are conducting all unit level inspections on their own or with minimal contractor oversight. Transition to Afghan management of large- component, unscheduled maintenance is the most significant remaining milestone.

Additional Areas of Interest

SMW C2 proved to be an enduring problem. The SMW was designed to be a joint MOD/MOI unit and consist of both MOD and MOI personnel, but currently only MOI personnel are present. There is an effort underway to transition the entire unit into MOD and assess all MOI personnel into MOD. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the MOD and MOI to achieve this did not prove viable over the reporting period. A new initiative is in the works to produce a Presidential Decree to define the SMW's make-up and mission.

Following the loss of a Mi-17 during combat operations in November, the SMW's U.S.-trained safety officer conducted his first official safety investigation. It was done in accordance with U.S. standards and instilled confidence in SMW's safety program. Since that time, SMW implemented appropriate changes and there were zero Afghan-induced accidents.

2.7: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE DEVELOPMENT

As of March 2014, ANP end-strength was 152,678, or 96 percent of its 157,000 authorization. The ANP's average monthly attrition rate during the first quarter of 2014 was 1.6 percent, above the goal of 1.4 percent. The ANP completed fielding both units and equipment across its three major pillars: the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the ANCOP.

Emphasis on the systemic deficiencies within the ANP provincial headquarters and the Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs) fostered growth in cross-pillar coordination between the ANP and ANA. Additionally, the ANP increased the training of its personnel. Since July 2013, the ANP reduced the number of untrained police from approximately 19,000 to fewer than 7,766.

Several major challenges remain. The reorganization of ANP Zone HQs continues to affect the ANP negatively and low-density manning in critical technical positions (i.e., Trauma Assistance Patrolman) are not fully manned. Trauma Assistance Patrolman is manned at 27 percent.

Manning

Figure 17: ANP Attrition, as of January 2014

ANP Unit	Attrition[^]
AUP Kabul Central	0.42%
AUP Asmaye HQ (101)	0.41%
AUP Shamshad PHQ (202)	1.56%
AUP Pamir PHQ (303)	1.35%
AUP Maiwand PHQ (404)	2.97%
AUP Spinghar PHQ (505)	1.61%
AUP Ansar PHQ (606)	1.37%
AUP Lashkargah PHQ (707)	2.05%
ABP HQ	1.61%
ABP Quick Reaction Unit	1.37%
ABP Kabul Airport	2.05%
ABP Customs Unit	0.00%
Nangarhar ABP (Central) (1st)	2.33%
Gardez ABP (East) (2nd)	4.57%
Kandahar ABP (South) (3rd)	0.62%
Herat ABP (West) (4th)	2.53%
Balkh ABP (North) (5th)	1.60%
Helmand ABP (Southwest) (6th)	5.25%
ANCOP HQ	1.07%
ANCOP 1 st BDE (Kabul)	7.00%
ANCOP 2 nd BDE (Nangarhar)	6.10%
ANCOP 3 rd BDE (M-e-S)	5.48%
ANCOP 4 th BDE (Kandahar)	6.49%
ANCOP 5 th BDE (Gardez)	4.36%
ANCOP 6 th BDE (Herat)	4.64%
ANCOP 7 th BDE (Helmand)	4.18%
ANP Total*	1.81%

[^]The attrition rate uses the current month's attrition numbers divided by the previous month's strength numbers.

*ANP Total Attrition is calculated from all ANP units, including those not identified in this table.


Figure 18: ANP Ethnicity as Of January 2014

Rank	Pashtu	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	13%	15%	16%	7%	12%
NCO	26%	39%	36%	23%	27%
Patrolmen	61%	46%	48%	70%	61%
Total % of Force	41%	43%	5%	6%	5%
Ethnic Target	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%

Command and Control (C2)

ANP C2 continues to be a significant challenge. Progress issuing new policies regarding AUP headquarter structures (HQ), while slow and unevenly distributed, is being made. The transition from Zone to Type A/B/C headquarters continued to be a challenge for the ANP. The two main issues hindering this process were a lack of official documentation defining the command relationship and the lack of a clear policy on punitive measures taken against any commander failing in their duties. As a result, some Type A commanders do not take responsibility for their subordinate Type B/C headquarters. In turn, some Type B/C commanders feel they do not have to follow any guidance issued from their respective Type A headquarters. Consequently, the MOI issued several orders in October 2013 to better define the relationship between the Type A/B/C commanders. The orders have not been effective to date. To resolve this issue, Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoP) and SFAAT advisors requested a formal policy from MOI defining the roles/responsibilities of Type A commanders, as well as the command relationship among Type A, B and C HQs.

Figure 19: ANP Strength, Recruitment, Retention, and Attrition –



Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities

Eighty-nine percent of assessed ANP units are able to sustain themselves for at least 48 hours. However, the ANP still lacks an organic maintenance capacity and instead receives vehicle maintenance through a contract company. As of February 2014, 15 of 17 (88 percent) units are assessed as capable or fully capable of self-sustainment for at least 48 hours, in line with the previous quarter. The primary sustainment issues across the ANP include poor record keeping and reporting, and the lack of requirements forecasting. Further, unit-level maintenance suffers from poor command emphasis and educational knowledge.

Police Special Forces

The General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) fielded most of its subordinate units. The only GDPSU units still not fully fielded and at IOC are the new Provincial Response Companies (PRCs). The six PRCs that make up the first round of expansion (those going to Badakhshan, Badghis, Faryab, Khost, Nimruz, and Nuristan) were IOC in December 2013. However, at this stage only PRCs Khost and Badakhshan have a permanent location, with the remainder of the PRCs in temporary accommodation at this time. Dependent on the outcomes of *Tashkil* considerations, the planned future expansion in PRCs to a desired end state of one per province is likely to be a process extending into 2015 and 2016.

Afghan Border Police

Afghan Border Police (ABP), responsible for the security of the Afghan border in some of the most rugged and remote terrain in the world is a force consisting of 21,616 personnel. They control all of the entry control points (border crossings, railroad entry points, and airports) into and out of Afghanistan. Challenges in manpower, technology, and training are causing the ABP to improve slowly. Logistics, personnel management, and fundamental police skills are in place, but need to be better utilized. The ABP logistics section struggle to identify critical supply and equipment shortfalls before it becomes an operational issue. Major General Fazli was named the new Chief of the ABP in January 2014, and there are very capable senior leaders within the command structure.

Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

One of the most capable pillars within the MOI is the ANCOP, which consistently proved to be a viable and effective force during deployed operations. There are approximately 14,000 personnel currently assigned and their primary mission is the “clear” phase of counter-insurgency operations. They are capable of rapid deployment in support of their own mission or the missions of other ANSF units. The ANCOP are a regionally based, nationally deployable police pillar whose primary role is to maintain the rule of law and order utilizing armed capability and special tactics. Because its units are nationally deployable, ANCOP are less susceptible to local power brokering than other branches of the ANP, which contributes to their effectiveness.

Clearing missions conducted by ANCOP units are usually supported by the ANA forces or conducted jointly with the military. ANCOP National Headquarters reached a Capability Milestone rating of 1-A (autonomous operations) in June 2013, indicating the strength of command and control capabilities of the leadership.

The most significant area of concern for ANCOP is the incorrect utilization of forces. Due to political influences, ANCOP conducts missions that should be conducted by other branches of the ANSF or are deployed to locations where capability is not needed. In addition, ANCOP face some challenges in coordination and joint operations with the ANA and National Directorate of Security (NDS). Current requirements are also resulting in the deployment of the ANCOP Special Support *Kandaks* for combat missions, which removes the Brigade’s medical, engineering and transport capabilities.

2.8: AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE¹⁰

By the end of March 2014, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) had approximately 22,000 employees, out of a commercial requirement of approximately 23,162 employees to service 511 active security contracts. As of March 2014, the personnel on hand consist of 1611 officers, 2282 NCO’s, 18,509 guards, and 325 civilians. The APPF can execute their convoy mission, but are not sustainable as an entity without continued advisor assistance. The APPF still requires additional sustainment planning to replace lost vehicles, *Kandak* infrastructure, and fuel and ammunition sustainment. Three ISAF sites successfully transitioned from private security

¹⁰ This section is submitted in accordance with section 1531(d) of the NDAA for FY 2013.

companies to the APPF, and four additional sites are in the transition process. However, the APPF internal processes are not sufficiently robust to execute these transitions without advisor assistance and oversight.

Reorganization of the APPF

At a February 17, 2014 Cabinet meeting, President Karzai directed the state-owned enterprise (SOE) managing the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) be dissolved and its personnel and functions be incorporated into the MOI.

In response to this directive, Minister of Interior Daudzai provided a detailed briefing on the APPF transition in March 2014 to international representatives. He stressed that it is "business as usual" until the new arrangement is approved by President Karzai. He also stressed that every effort is being made to avoid a security gap for international projects and requested that the international representatives work with the MOI to design an acceptable way forward.

A Joint International – MOI Commission met in March for the first time, with representatives from the U.S. Embassy, USAID, ISAF, USFOR-A, the Canadian Embassy, along with representatives from MOI and the MOF participating. They provided the following information: there will be no gap in security provided to international projects or facilities; salaries will be paid during the transition without delays; certain Afghan domestic legal issues would be addressed at a future date; guard staff at individual facilities will not change, unless they do not meet ANP standards; Presidential Decree 62, which bans certain private security companies, except for diplomatic security, remains in effect; diplomatic security at the Embassy would not be affected; and, current contracts with the APPF would not be affected and would be extended during the transition period.

The four security areas affected by the APPF transition are national projects, private sector, convoy and road security, and international projects. The security of national projects is expected to transition from APPF to the ANP. For protection of private sector sites, the MOF is working out the details to determine the process for private customers to pay for security services. The convoy and road security is expected to shift from APPF to ANP. Finally, regarding security for international projects, a joint commission consisting of both international and MOI representatives are working together to develop a way forward taking into account that different countries and organizations have different procedures and legal restrictions.

There was some concern that these additional responsibilities would further burden the ANP without additional resources and with a strict personnel cap of 157,000.

As of the end of the reporting period, the APPF transition to the ANP was still underway, and several issues remained unresolved.

2.9: LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES

Afghan Local Police

The ALP is increasingly an integral part of the ANSF's layered security plan. The number of ALP Guardians deployed in transitioned ALP districts grew to 26,647 (as of March 2014). ALP Guardians deployed to 145 transitioned districts, where they operate under MOI direction.


The ALP is still the focus of insurgent attacks. In most cases, ALP Guardians stood their ground, protected their villages, and prevailed in firefights with insurgents. The ALP showed resiliency in the face of high-casualty attacks, with spikes in recruitment following such events.

The Village Stability Operations (VSO) program is undergoing transition from ISAF oversight to GIRoA. The VSO program initially had three primary components: local governance, development, and security. The ALP program, serving as the security component of VSO, is the only remaining portion and is still overseen by NSOCC-A in conjunction with the MOI.

Complete transition to GIRoA is the final stage in the evolution of an ALP district, following district validation, tactical overwatch by local U.S. SOF, and – in later stages of the program – provincial overwatch by nearby U.S. SOF. Once a district is completely transitioned to GIRoA, NSOCC-A no longer has any mentoring or supervisory role over ALP.

As of March 18, 2014, 87 of the 145 validated ALP completely transitioned to GIRoA, with the remainder on track to reach "Complete Transition to GIRoA" status by October 2014. Only two Village Stability Platforms (VSP) remain active, providing U.S. SOF teams with locations from which to mentor local ALP. One of these VSPs will complete its mission by 30 April 2014 and the other will complete its mission by July 1, 2014. Sixteen District Stability Platforms (DSPs) remain active, all of which will complete their missions by October 31, 2014.

Figure 20: ALP Development Status



ALP WEEKLY DISPOSITION		
District Categorization	Districts	ALP On Hand
District Oversight (Tier 1)	25	4,760
Provincial Oversight (Tier 2)	29	4,690
Completed Transition to GIRoA (Tier 3)	87	17,197
Unendorsed	0	0
Unvalidated	4	0 *
Totals	145	26,647
* - Category Pending		
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO		

Ongoing Challenges

Challenges for the ALP reside in two broad areas: administration and operational effectiveness. Administrative challenges include oversight, logistics, training, and pay processes. As the coalition footprint across Afghanistan decreases, ALP HQ must improve its ability to assess conditions in the ALP districts. Currently ALP HQ does not have representatives at the Provincial Police HQ advocating for ALP equities. NSOCC-A continues to advise ALP HQ and

MOI on assigning ALP representatives at the Provincial Police HQ to mitigate the projected reduction in coalition presence by the end of 2014.

In terms of logistics, training and pay, the MOI and ALP made incremental progress but still require assistance and mentoring from advisors. The logistics process for equipment is now completely Afghan owned. The regional logistics centers field logistics requirements via equipment request forms submitted by the provinces. In cases where the logistics system fails to function as designed, coalition advisors work with ALP HQ to take corrective actions.

The MOI assumed responsibility for the training of the ALP force. ANP instructors conduct most of the ALP training at the Provincial/Regional Training Centers. Provincial Chiefs of Police coordinate deviations in training locations with ALP HQ. ALP HQ still struggles to ensure that all ALP recruits go to a provincial training center (PTC)/regional training center (RTC) or attend training at an offsite location in accordance with the formal training curriculum.

ALP pay processes are functional but are susceptible to disruptions and corruption. Regular reviews of pay problems across the ALP show that pay issues are not systemic to any particular district. When pay problems do occur, coalition advisors discuss the issue with the ALP HQ Finance Officer for corrective actions. In cases of corruption, ALP HQ demonstrated the ability to address the allegations and take appropriate action. In an effort to lessen the probability of pay problems and corruption, a number of ALP guardians are paid via electronic funds transfer. Not all ALP can access this payment option as bank branches are found in a limited numbers of ALP districts. Overall, the Afghan processes for logistics, training, and pay are sustainable but continued engagement from advisors is needed to improve the reliability and efficiency of these systems.

ALP operational effectiveness varies across districts. Factors that affect the operational capabilities of the ALP include the competence, commitment, and integrity of leadership; the capability and capacity of the layered ANSF supporting the ALP; and the extent to which the VSO methodology was employed. As the village-level, community-focused component of the layered security apparatus, ALP rely on district and provincial AUP leadership for sustainment, direction, and support. Poor or weak leaders can be more susceptible to co-opting by powerbrokers, in some cases delegitimizing the program and undermining its effectiveness. In most districts, other ANSF forces serve as both a quick reaction force and a partnered force for the ALP. The extent to which these layered security forces interact varies widely depending on the region. Additional emphasis from MOI, deliberate collaboration at the ministerial level with MOD, and emplacement of competent AUP Officers of the requisite rank (O5+) representing ALP equities at Provincial Police HQ could reinforce the ALP ability to provide security at the district and village level.

There are three districts out of 145 where the current ALP force consists of personnel from outside the village, district, or (rarely) province. NSOCC-A is striving to help the Afghans correct this challenging situation while being mindful of second-order effects such as destabilization that could occur with the removal of “out-of-area” ALP. An Afghan presidential decree directs that all ALP must be from the village or district where they work. Afghan strategic planners reinforce this decree by including language in their “ALP Two-Year Plan” prohibiting any “out-of-area ALP.” Out-of-area ALP refers to those ALP personnel, who work in a district or

province that is not their home, and who were not approved by the local elders and village leadership. Because local approval and endorsement processes are a fundamental tenets and are critical to the credibility of the ALP program, out-of-area ALP can negatively affect the program's legitimacy.

The ALP record on human rights and the ALP HQ ability to respond promptly and effectively to accusations of human rights violations are ongoing challenges. NSOCC-A and their ALP Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) collaborate regularly with the Human Rights Unit at the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the ALP HQ Directorate to identify, discuss, and take corrective action to eliminate human rights issues. ALP HQ and MOI showed signs of an increased commitment to addressing human rights by sending investigative teams to specific districts with abuse allegations against the ALP, and by holding those respective districts and provinces accountable for condoning or tacitly accepting misconduct. In an attempt to address human rights awareness from the bottom up, the new ALP training curriculum was expanded from 3 to 4 weeks. The new curriculum provides ALP recruits instruction on ethics, morals and values, rule of law, and 14 hours of training on human rights. Additionally, MOI recently approved the reduction of authorized ALP *Tashkil* in two ALP districts (Qaisar, Faryab, and Darqad, Takhar), specifically because those districts were not cooperative in taking deliberate actions to confront allegations of human rights abuses by ALP. Both districts will be monitored closely by MOI, ALP HQ, and NSOCC-A advisors in the coming months to determine whether additional action is warranted.

Through focused key leader engagements and enhanced professionalization and education of the ALP force, NSOCC-A and the ALP HQ are committed to eliminating human rights violations within the ALP formation.

2.10: ANSF ASSESSMENT/ SECTION 1221 BENCHMARK REQUIREMENT

Since 2002, ISAF and its predecessor headquarters, going as far back as the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan have trained and assisted Afghan security forces. Since 2010, ISAF employed a centralized system of unit assessments to evaluate these ANSF units over time. The latest iteration of this assessment system is the Regional Command (RC) ANSF Status Report (RASR), which is better adapted to Security Force Assistance Team (SFAAT) resource constraints as well as the growing need for focused cross-pillar assessments of corps unit clusters. The RASR focuses on assessing 85 key Afghan National Army (ANA) and ANP headquarters and units. The input is collected by SFAATs and then staffed and verified by the Regional Commanders. The SFAATs/RCs assess and rates the key ANA and ANP unit capabilities utilizing a unit-specific set of Rating Definition Levels (RDLs). See Annex A for more detail on the RDLs used to assess various ANSF units. The March 2014 RASR assessed 61 of these 85 key headquarters and units as either fully capable or capable, the two highest definition levels; an increase of four from the previous quarter.

The reduction of SFAAT coverage that occurred throughout the reporting period will continue through 2014 as the coalition draws down. Less than half of the ANA Infantry Brigades will be covered with an SFAAT by July 2014. By October 2014, the number will reach 10 percent coverage. This reduction in coverage leads to reduced visibility on ANSF units at the lower levels (i.e., ANA Brigade-level) as the coalition focuses its presence at the regional level (i.e.

ANA Corps-level) as the primary point of entry for the TAA effort as well as for collecting data from ANSF.

Figure 21: ANSF RASR Ratings, as of March 2014

Rating Definition Levels (RDLs)	Corps/ Div HQ	IN Bde	Corps ENG KDK	Corps SIG KDK	Corps/ DIV MI KDK	OCC-R	AUP Type-A HQ	ABP Zone HQ	ANCOP Bde HQ	MSF KDK*	Total RASR Assessed Units
Fully Capable	1	10	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	17
Capable	6	13	3	2	2	6	3	5	2	2	44
Partially Capable	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	9
Developing	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Established	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	10
Awaiting Fielding	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	7	24	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	85

RASR = RC ANSF Status Report; OCC-R = Operational Coordination Center - Regional; MSF = Mobile Strike Force; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police.

* IJC RASR assigns "Awaiting Fielding" status to units who have completed CFC but have not yet graduated from ABS, thus have 3 MSF KDKs waiting. ISAF defines fielding IAW Tashkil 1392 as all units who completed CFC, thus assigns only 2 MSF KDKs "Awaiting Fielding" status.

Figure 22: ANA RASR Ratings Map





Figure 23: ANP RASR Ratings Map



2.11: ANSF PARTNERING AND OPERATIONS

As seen in Figure 24, the ANSF continue to conduct the vast majority of operations unilaterally. As of March 2014, 99 percent of conventional operations and 99 percent of special operations were ANSF-led, with unilateral operations increasing from the previous quarter as well. The only unilateral operations that ISAF now conducts are for ISAF security, route clearance to maintain freedom of movement, and redeployment. The remaining conventional and special operations that were not led by the ANSF were either combined operations (which included ANSF forces, but were ISAF led), or ISAF unilateral operations necessary to secure ISAF bases and redeploying forces.

Figure 24: Partnering Status of ANSF Operations – As of February 2014

Operational Category	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14*
ISAF Unilateral Military Ops	1,458	1,341	1,122	654	496	261
ISAF Unilateral Police Ops	0	0	0	0	0	0
ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)	1,458	1,341	1,122	654	496	261
ANA Unilateral	28,006	22,167	34,606	29,446	35,458	29,707
ANP Unilateral	20,496	19,375	18,868	22,209	19,691	12,834
ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)	48,502	41,542	53,474	51,655	55,149	42,541
ISAF Led Partnered (ANA)	75	70	87	80	97	39
ISAF Led Partnered (ANP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
ISAF Led Partnered Ops (Total)	75	70	87	80	97	39
ANA Led Partnered	189	182	153	12	9	22
ANA Led Enabled	274	490	121	40	64	88
<i>ANA Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</i>	<i>463</i>	<i>672</i>	<i>274</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>110</i>
ANP Led Partnered	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANP Led Enabled	67	220	93	38	38	0
<i>ANP Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>93</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>0</i>
ANSF Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)	530	892	367	90	111	110
Total Ops	50,565	43,845	55,050	52,479	55,853	42,951
Total ISAF Led Ops	1,533	1,411	1,209	734	593	300
Total ANSF Led Ops	49,032	42,434	53,841	51,745	55,260	42,651
% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led	3%	3%	2%	1%	1%	1%
% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led	97%	97%	98%	99%	99%	99%
	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14*

ANSF Self-Assessment

Although the ANSF self-assessment system made progress during the reporting period, it is not yet a solid alternative to coalition reporting, particularly for ANP. Afghan self-assessment (readiness reporting) is ongoing in all pillars of the ANSF; however, there is a large variety in the systems and metrics used, and the systems are unevenly matured. ANSF readiness reports are forwarded on a monthly basis (with a couple of months lag time) through the chain of command and compiled at the ministerial level providing the coalition visibility through the MOI- and MOD MAG.

The ANA readiness reports contain aggregated data and assessment on personnel, equipment and training and in addition a simplified commander's assessment of the overall capability. Afghan reporting is not based on a specific set of Rating Definition Levels (RDL), as used by the

coalition, and is thus more subjective in nature. The ANP reporting contains only data on personnel and equipment and no operational capability assessment.

During the reporting period, reporting systems were modified and improved in order to provide a more effective assessment tool that better reflects specific unit's characteristics. ANA, AAF and ASSF reporting is being improved by the MOD General Staff Readiness Directorate, supported by ISAF. The revised ANP reporting is currently being developed by the International Police Coordination Board supported by CSTC-A (MOI MAG) through courses in Turkey. The revised system for the ANP will include a capability assessment. The coalition has limited influence on the format and speed of the implementation of ANP assessment reform.

As Afghan reporting increases in quality the coalition will take steps to move gradually from conditions-based coalition reporting (e.g., the RASR) to Afghan reporting as the primary data source for understanding ANSF capabilities. Coalition advisory coverage will be reduced significantly through 2014, leading to reduced visibility. As a result, the coalition will likely shift its focus regarding assessments, from a campaign and readiness perspective to a focus on cross-echelon functional (5-pillar) assessment.

2.12: BUDGET

In 2013, USFOR-A developed a five-step process to increase checks and balances and improve the planning, execution, and oversight of resources. This process mandates a continuous and rigorous review of all requirements (e.g., the Afghanistan Security Force Funds, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, and Commander's Emergency Response Program) based on changes in the mission and operating environment. Requirements are scrutinized and subsequently validated, de-obligated, or re-scoped based on input from relevant stakeholders. This process was designed to help reduce future funding requests and continue the progress toward an ANSF that is affordable and sustainable to the GIRoA.

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)

The coalition nearly completed the ANSF capital investments and remains focused on helping Afghanistan develop enduring and self-sustaining capabilities and capacities to sustain its forces. The coalition's effort is now on SFA – to train, advise, and assist. The ASFF provided the resources to train, equip, and sustain 352,000 ANSF personnel and 30,000 ALP. For FY 2014, Congress appropriated \$4.7 billion for ASFF, a decrease of \$3.0 billion from the President's budget request of \$7.7 billion. The Consolidated Appropriations Act specifies cuts to the funding request for Mi-17s (\$365 million). The additional \$2.635 billion was not distributed and based solely on under execution.

International Community Funding

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) executes the NATO ANA Trust Fund, which is crucial for support and sustainment of the ANA. Twenty-three nations contributed more than \$855 million over the life of the fund. The United States continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage Allies and partners to continue providing assistance for the sustainment of ANSF. At the Chicago NATO Summit in

2012, international donors resolved to preserve the progress made during the past decade and help Afghanistan sustain the ANSF with an estimated annual budget of \$4.1 billion per year.

The Chicago Summit declaration also stated that as the Afghan economy and revenues grow, Afghanistan's yearly share will progressively increase from at least \$500 million in 2015 with the aim that Afghanistan assumes full financial responsibility for its security by 2024. International donors pledged \$1.3 billion per year from 2015 to 2017. However, projected Afghan revenue generation trends indicate that Afghanistan will be unable to generate sufficient revenue to sustain current spending and will be heavily reliant on foreign aid for its social and security requirements.

International Donations

Figure 25: NATO ANA Trust Fund Donations (Oct 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014)

Donor Country	Date	Donation (USD)
Norway	21 Nov 13	\$26,570
Sweden	06 Dec 13	\$1,852,700
Norway	10 Dec 13	\$392,940
Netherlands	11 Dec 13	\$12,382,200
Germany	12 Dec 13	\$50,215,970
Norway	12 Dec 13	\$9,999,941
Norway	17 Dec 13	\$9,999,941
Czechoslovakia	17 Dec 13	\$41,425
Estonia	17 Dec 13	\$148,955
Sweden	17 Dec 13	\$2,031,750
Finland	20 Dec 13	\$1,780,723
Denmark	05 Feb 14	\$2,680,000
Luxemburg	18 Feb 14	\$4,824,000
Total: (Oct 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014)		\$96,377,115

Direct Contributions to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior

CSTC-A made great strides in the oversight of direct contributions to the MOI and MOD. First, CSTC-A implemented an extremely comprehensive bilateral financial agreement. This Bilateral Financial Agreement, known as the Commitment Letter, stipulates how the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior will allocate funding for the fiscal year, identifies various legal constraints (such as the Berry Amendment), and instructs the Afghans on the use of the automated accounting systems at the 5-digit accounting level in order to advance their management of the funding.

During the reporting period, CSTC-A signed three separate commitment letters with the MOD, the MOI and the United Nations Development Program's Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). Each of these bilateral financial arrangements defined CSTC-A's commitment to develop ministerial capabilities and capacities while supplementing the GIRoA's Fiscal Year 1393 security budgets. Disbursements are provided to the MOF and later allocated to the respective security ministry as required based on, but not limited to, actual expenditure rates, procurement plans, and estimated expenditure forecasts.

During the reporting period, CSTC-A disbursed: \$198 million in direct contributions to the MOD for the ANA; \$42 million in direct contributions to MOI, primarily for the ALP and Senior Leader Protection program, and \$154 million in direct contributions to LOTFA for salaries for the various Afghan police forces. CSTC-A cooperates with its Afghan partners to monitor the related internal systems closely, with liaison personnel embedded in Afghan ministries to help build enduring sustainment capabilities in planning, budgeting, and acquisition. During this reporting period, CSTC-A stood up its own audit division to perform independent assessments and audits, placing greater scrutiny over the Afghan financial process. Reinforcing these efforts, CSTC-A instituted an “Audit Throttle” process on direct contributions that incrementally incentivizes the Security Ministries to correct audit findings and address all audit recommendations. This process will help mitigate vulnerabilities in the direct contributions process while enabling Afghan partners to achieve increasing levels of transparency and accountability.

2.13: ANSF INFRASTRUCTURE

Figures 26 through 30 summarize ANA and ANP infrastructure spending from 2005 through the end of the reporting period.

Figure 26: ANA Infrastructure spending, FY 2005 – FY 2014




Figure 27: Status of ANA Infrastructure projects

Force	Complete	In Progress	Acquisition	Planned	TOTAL
111	11	10	0	0	21
201	13	2	0	0	15
203	13	7	0	0	20
205	14	6	0	1	21
207	13	2	0	0	15
209	24	4	0	1	29
215	11	4	0	0	15
AAF	21	10	0	1	32
Ministry	2	1	0	1	4
SOF	20	13	2	0	35
Support	102	6	0	2	110
Training	37	13	1	5	56
Feb (SM)	281	78	3	11	373
Jan (SM)	268	99	5	2	374

Figure 28: Infrastructure spending, FY 2005 – FY 2014




Figure 29: Status of ANA Infrastructure projects

Facilities	Complete	In Progress	Acquisition	Planned	Total
AUP	392	55	3	0	450
ABP	100	30	0	0	130
ANCOP	26	7	1	0	34
AACP	21	9	0	0	30
I&S	41	13	2	0	56
Ministry	7	2	2	0	11
Agents	35	0	3	0	38
Feb (SM)	622	116	11	0	749
Jan (SM)	614	124	6	0	744

2.14: WOMEN IN THE ANSF

DoD maintains a robust program dedicated to improving the recruitment, retention, and treatment of women in the ANSF, and to improving the status of Afghan women in general. The implementation of a gender policy within Afghanistan's armed forces and police is a complex and long-term project, but slow progress occurred during the reporting period. Figure 30 details the total number of women in the ANSF.

Barriers to recruiting women include a lack of facilities and programs to support women, including a lack of child care centers/programs, latrines, and dormitories; a lack of adequate career paths for women; a lack of training that will provide females with skills equal to their male colleagues to accomplish their daily tasks as police personnel; lack of education at all levels address the culture change of females in the force; and a lack of training that will provide an understanding of the need for acceptance of females in the force.

As part of the FY 2014 NDAA, Congress set aside \$25 million for programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF. The NDAA was passed in December 2013, and as of the end of the reporting period, DOD had yet to finalize its plan for allocating and expending these funds. However, initial discussions among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, USFOR-A, and CSTC-A focused upon expanding and upgrading the facilities for women (e.g. secure bathing facilities, female-only fitness centers, training facilities) in the ANSF.

On November 25, 2013, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women was observed throughout Afghanistan. This day also marked the beginning of a 16 day campaign against gender-based violence. This campaign is heavily supported and funded by the

U.S. Embassy. It is a positive sign that these events are acknowledged by the Afghan government at both the national and local levels. In a small, but concrete sign of progress, on two occasions, Afghan police intervened in cases of violence against women. In Kunduz, police who had received INL funded gender justice training rescued a woman from stoning by the Taliban, and in Herat ANP issued an arrest warrant for a man who mutilated his wife.

Figure 30: Women in the ANSF

	Total Authorized (352K)	Total Strength	Total Females	Total in Training	Females in Training	Monthly Attrition
ANA	187,000	182,777	691	17,446	67	2.6%
ANP	157,000	153,269	1,743	6,742	50	1.9%
AAF	8,000	7,418	51	561	6	0.4%

Ministry of Defense

The ANA and AAF staffing goal for women is 10 percent of their combined *Tashkil*. However, as in many militaries, women are not eligible for many combat positions. At the end of the reporting period, there were 691 female soldiers in the ANA and 51 female airmen in the AAF, a small increase over the last report. Women make up around 0.4 percent of total ANA forces and 0.8 percent of the AAF, far below the established goal but evidence of minor progress over the reporting period.

MOD leadership states that institutional barriers to the recruitment of women stems from traditional and cultural biases. Additionally, they claim that many families do not want their daughters to join the ANA because of concerns for their security. They also stated that the uncertainty surrounding the BSA decreased willingness to join ANSF.

MOD advisors continually work with senior MOD leadership to develop a strategy that will meet the Afghan Constitution's intentions for full female participation in society and address local conservative cultural norms. Lack of female-specific facilities, transport, and uniforms remains a hindrance to women joining the ANA.

The MOD embarked on a three-part plan to both increase the numbers of females in the ANA and to provide better facilities for female personnel. The policy seeks to reinforce the Afghan Constitution while addressing practical cultural concerns, to identify non-combat Military Occupational Specialties for women, and to provide females the opportunity to select a geographical location so that they may live with their families.

The three components of the plan are:

- 1) Prepare and submit detailed facilities and recruiting requirements to be funded by the \$25 million in the FY 2014 NDAA set aside to support women in the ANSF. To further this

goal during the reporting period, the First Deputy Minister chaired a group, which served to validate and finalize the detailed facilities and recruiting requirements for further validation and approval at ISAF. The facilities improvement program focused on providing additional and safer working environments for the larger number of females entering the ANA, particularly in Kabul, Herat, Mezar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar.

- 2) Issue an MOD order stating females requiring assignment have priority to fill an identified 19,500 positions open to women on the *Tashkil*. Such an order will assist in meeting the MOD's stated goal of a 10 percent female force in the ANA.
- 3) Create a comprehensive annual recruiting/training plan that specifies the dates of classes at all of the ANA's female training facilities so as to maximize female throughput at each of those facilities throughout the year, and issue a Minister of Defense order mandating continuous recruitment of females to fill those training classes. A Minister of Defense order is expected to be approved and issued by early April that will direct the formation of a working group led by Major General Jumna Nasser, Human Rights and Gender Integration Director, that will be specifically tasked with satisfying components two and three of the plan.

The MOD Human Rights and Gender Integration (HR&GI) Directorate itself continued to make slow progress over the reporting period. With little expertise and resources, the HR&GI Directorate worked with external organizations in order to garner support for training and education for the ANA on human rights and gender integration issues. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and representatives of Afghan Women's Network (AWN) offered gender training to the ANA. The training includes special emphasis on training ANA men to understand women's rights and how to reduce violence against women.

The ANA Officer Academy at Camp Martha will accept the first round of women in their class in June. The selection period revealed there are no fixed processes or routines in place for ANA female officer recruitment. According to staff officers at the ANA Officer Academy, female courses only take place when significant pressure is applied by senior advisors or on an individual ad hoc basis where women applicants are placed in the first available courses.

Ministry of Interior

Under the leadership of Minister of Interior Daudzai, the Afghan MOI showed significant support for women in the MOI and is taking steps to protect and empower female police and female MOI staff. The MOI announced on January 6 that the number of female police officers serving in the ANP would reach 5,000 recruits by the end of the year and 10,000 by the end of next year. This is an ambitious goal considering progress in recruiting women to date, but one that ISAF fully supports. Progress in expanding the number of women in the MOI was slowed, to some extent, by the MOI's wider focus on securing the election and on hiring and training enough female searchers by Election Day.

Shortly after taking office, Minister Daudzai promoted COL Hemet Shah, Director of the Gender, Human Rights, and Children's Rights Directorate (GHRCR), to Brigadier General and

enhanced the status of GHRCR by moving it from an Office to a Directorate. Minister Daudzai routinely seeks Brigadier General Hemet's input on all gender-related matters and delegated full responsibility to her for conducting the recent MOI Women's Solidarity Day Celebration. In late 2013, the GHRCR Directorate and the Strategy and Policy Directorate developed a strategy for integrating females into the ANP. Although implementation of the strategy is in the infancy stages, its creation demonstrates that the MOI, BG Hemet Shah, and the GHRCR are supportive of female integration in the ANP and gender rights across Afghanistan.

Plans to promote female officers to station chiefs were announced at the same time. On January 14, 2014 the first female police chief was appointed – Col Jamila Bayan at Police District #1 in a high population area of Kabul. This shows firm leadership in MOI and that the message from the international community about the need for more women in the ANSF is getting through.

The MOI Gender Strategy was signed off by Minister Daudzai January 6, a major step forward in institutionalizing the place of women in the MOI. Unfortunately, the provisions on accountability and oversight mechanisms with regard to harassment and the assault of female police were removed. Despite the deletion of these provisions, the definitional overview of harassment remained in the text.

The MOI Gender Strategy was a collaborative effort between the GHRCR Directorate and the Acting Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy. A separate plan was submitted through EUPOL because of a collaborative effort among gender advisors from the UN and NGOs. A gender-advising group will work to merge the two plans, which will then be submitted to the MOI as a sustainable plan for females in the ANP.

Since 2011, ANP Legal Development/Special Staff Legal Advisors and Contract Afghan Attorneys have developed a highly sophisticated ANP Legal Training Program that includes legal training on Gender, Human Rights, and Children's Rights. Currently, there are 109 Legal Affairs Advisors throughout country. Legal Affairs has held specialized legal training seminars two or three times a year.

More broadly, courses on the following gender-related topics are offered to ANP:

Crimes Against Women;

Aggravated Assault;

Sexual Assault/Rape;

Challenges for Female Officers in Working Environment (BSC-300), including:

- The role of women in the workplace
- Issues for female officers in the workplace
- Strategies to prevent and response to sexual assaults
- Women networking and defending women's rights
- Diversity awareness
- Dealing with cultural differences

Domestic Violence (ADV-580), including:

- Definition of domestic violence
- The role of police in domestic violence

- Types of domestic violence
- Effects of domestic violence
- Dealing with violence against women
- Tips for dealing with domestic violence victims
- Referral agencies for victims
- Case studies, group exercises

Election Support and Women

A major focus of the ANSF during the reporting period was on securing and supporting the elections, and in particular on providing security for Afghanistan's millions of registered female voters. To encourage female voter participation, and to provide a secure and culturally sensitive environment for women voters, the ANSF identified the need for 13,000 female searchers at polling stations. As this far exceeds the number of women in the ANSF, the MOI oversaw the Afghanistan Election's Female Searcher Program (FSP) to train and recruit women as searchers. ISAF advisors concentrated their advising efforts towards strengthening Ministerial support and assistance to the PCoPs, as they have the lead in training and distributing female searchers. The FSP program got off to a slow start, but eventually 16,910 women volunteered, 13,680 were authorized, and by mid-March, 7,991 women had been trained. As of the end of the reporting period, MOI was continuing to train female searchers at a rapid pace.

SECTION 3 – GOVERNANCE

3.1: ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Afghanistan's national institutions continue to improve their ability to provide constitutional, stable, effective, and responsive governance, but still face sizeable challenges. The significant gains in education, health, access to electricity, and rural development made over the past decade continued during this reporting period. The Afghan government is slowly increasing its technical capacity to govern through civil service reforms and the entry of a more educated population into the workforce.

Corruption, ineffective program monitoring, budget shortfalls at all levels, inability to generate revenue, and limited public financial management capacity continue to plague the national government. Weak cooperation between national and sub-national levels of the government hampers significant long-term sustainability and limits access to public goods. At the sub-national level, official government services are largely restricted to provincial and district centers despite efforts to improve capacity and extend government services to rural areas.

Among the three branches of the Afghan government, the executive branch wields the most power and often directs legislative and judicial action. However, there is increased collaboration across the branches to address important governance issues. For example, the passage of the national budget demonstrated cooperation between the executive and legislative branches to work toward a common goal. The judicial branch, with the assistance of the international community, is making incremental progress in the training and staffing of sub-national judicial positions. However, even while rule of law expands, security concerns impede freedom of movement, especially at the district level. Lengthy periods required for formal dispute resolution through the government feeds perceptions that the government is ineffective and inaccessible to many rural Afghans.

Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Milestones

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) remains the main framework of the relations between donors and GIRoA. The sustained funding of Afghanistan through TMAF is essential to the transition of security, governance, and the establishment of a safe and secure environment in which the Afghan people can prosper. During this reporting period, development partners reaffirmed the value of the TMAF process as a whole and reaffirmed their commitment to stay engaged with GIRoA in the TMAF process.

Declining revenues put into question GIRoA's ability to meet its Chicago NATO Summit commitments, specifically to provide \$500 million per year by 2015 (1394), and continue to pay for an increased percentage of the overall security budget until 2024, when the Afghan government will be responsible for 100 percent of its own security costs. After strong growth of 14.4 percent in 2012, uncertainty surrounding the transition led to a considerable slowdown of growth in the Afghan economy, to 3.1 percent in 2013, and could further dampen growth prospects in 2014.

On January 29, 2014, donors and GIRoA held a TMAF review meeting to assess progress. With elections on track, the international community focused on anti-corruption, the appointment process of commissioners to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the publication of GIRoA's report on the implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) legislation. The international community also examined GIRoA's ability to generate revenue and to establish economic growth.

GIRoA made limited improvements in achieving the milestones associated with the TMAF. Trends suggest positive progress in the areas of accountability and stewardship, underpinning ISAF's support of security and political transition. However, Afghanistan has not fulfilled the TMAF conditions on Gender and Human Rights, with little progress during the reporting period. Of particular note is the lack of progress on the implementation of the EVAW legislation, lack of anti-money laundering legislation, and failure to pass a mining law. GIRoA's failure to meet these three "hard deliverables" under TMAF substantially increases the risk to donor willingness to support Afghanistan's future sustainability.

Corruption

Transparency International's 2013 report placed Afghanistan among 18 nations in Band E, denoting a "very high" corruption risk. As a whole, GIRoA demonstrates little political will to implement strict measures to fight corruption and continues to struggle with increasing transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. The international community is increasingly worried about the risk of donor funds being lost to corruption and GIRoA's failure to meet TMAF standards addressing corruption. Some donors discussed reducing their pledged TMAF commitments, based on GIRoA's unwillingness to address corruption.

Corruption continues to dampen Afghan economic growth. Investors are reluctant to risk their money without assurances their rights will be protected. The Afghan banking system's ability to interact with the broader international financial community will be limited without a strong anti-money laundering law. Patronage structures along political and ethnic lines continue to facilitate corruption. Anti-corruption bodies, such as the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, can collect evidence, but have no prosecutorial authority or the independence to act against corrupt individuals or officials. Finally, public perceptions of corruption within the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have a negative effect on Afghan governance.¹¹

¹¹ ISAF ANQAR survey, Wave 22, December 2013; 86 percent of Afghans surveyed believe corruption is a serious problem in the government.

3.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

GIRoA's structure remains highly centralized, with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and other central ministries in Kabul controlling budgeting and spending authority. Line directorates implement service delivery in the provinces, with little input from provincial councils or governors. Vacancies in key sub-national government positions, marginalization of civil society, and poor communication between Kabul and local authorities constrain the execution of sub-national governance objectives. Therefore, the effectiveness of sub-national authorities varies significantly.

At the national level, a homogenous legal and institutional framework regulates local governance. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development set administrative and legal guidance for sub-national governance activities. Members of Parliament represent their districts in Kabul, while governors, appointed by the central government, are chief administrators of the provinces. Members of local councils, including provincial councils, are elected at the sub-national level and serve their terms among their constituents, but have ill-defined responsibilities and powers. The full discretion of the executive branch to appoint provincial and district governors from Kabul adversely affects local governance.

Sub-national authorities differ widely in the ability to deliver services to the population. The effectiveness of governors, parliamentary representatives, and provincial council members often depends on their access to key decision-makers in Kabul and their ability to publicize efforts to secure funding for local areas. However, sub-national authorities worked together constructively to address crises and national disasters, such as during the recent floods in the Balkh province.

Budget preparations are made most often in Kabul, with little consideration for the sparse input of provincial governments or their requirements. This lack of coordination causes problems when preparing provincial budgets, resulting in compromised central government legitimacy outside Kabul. The MOF developed a new Provincial Budget Policy in the reporting period.

Sub-national governance was boosted by the passage of the District Coordination Council (DCC) Policy in December 2013. The aim of the DCC Policy is to consolidate all councils/community groups working at the district level, improving coordination of governance and development activities at the district level. Several district level community groups currently exist – some created through donors and others through GIRoA ministries. These include District Development Authorities, Education Councils, and Community Councils.

3.3: REVENUE GENERATION AND BUDGET EXECUTION

The MOF announced on January 10, 2014, that GIRoA missed its FY 1392 (2013) revenue target of 114 billion Afghani (AFN) (\$2.03 billion) by 5 percent, generating 109 billion AFN (\$1.94 billion) or about 9.5 percent in GDP. This shortfall was caused by continuous economic slowdown in the rate of growth, as well as leakages and weaknesses of revenue collection – particularly at customs – which contribute more than 50 percent to the total generated revenue. This decline is in line with projected future trends that Afghanistan will be unable to generate

sufficient revenue to sustain current spending and will be heavily reliant on foreign aid for its social and security requirements. Key legislative measures, such as the mining, the value added tax, and customs laws, are projected to be Afghanistan's greatest revenue generators.

Increasing domestic revenues is an imperative for GIRoA, as the country's financial needs will increasingly outstrip resources, as international assistance declines after 2014. This widening "fiscal gap" requires Afghanistan to absorb additional expenditures for security, health and education services, and operational and maintenance costs. The World Bank estimates the gap will reach 25 percent of GDP in 2018 and remain at 20 percent of GDP until at least 2025.

According to the World Bank, foreign aid financed more than 50 percent of Afghanistan's \$5.4 billion in budget expenditures in 2013, with domestic revenue financing \$2 billion and grants financing the balance. The World Bank also cautions that increasing fiscal pressures and the need for greater spending in security risk crowding out non-security spending. Security expenditures increased to 11.5 percent of GDP in 2013 from 10.4 percent in 2012. Operating expenditures increased to 19 percent of GDP. The development budget declined slightly to seven percent of GDP.

Customs revenues on cross-border trade in Afghanistan increased steadily since 2002 and are viewed as a steady source of funds for the government. USAID assistance to GIRoA on customs reform helped customs revenue increase by nearly 400 percent since 2006. Customs revenue made up 26 percent of total revenue in 2013. However, uncertainty around the transition negatively affected customs revenue, decreasing from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2012 to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2013. Substantial progress is required to counter fraud and corruption in customs collection at ports of entry.

The sectors with the most promise of revenue generations include trade, information communication technology, extractives, and agriculture. The extraction and hydrocarbon industries have the potential to add revenue of two to three percent of GDP annually. As economic and infrastructure development and an improved business environment enables all manner of private sector industries to grow, a stable tax base will provide an opportunity for the Afghan government to become increasingly self-supporting.

Despite some progress in revenue generation, Afghanistan had one of the world's lowest fiscal sustainability ratios over the previous year and will be under increasing pressure in the future.¹² Its fiscal sustainability ratio is expected to drop to 56.7 percent for 2013, continuing the declining trend from 72.7 percent in 2010. The fragility of the overall revenue and expenditure relationship in Afghanistan is expected to improve slowly as operating efficiencies are realized by the government. Additional efficiencies are expected to produce cost-savings in contracting, financial systems management, increased budget planning, formulation, implementation, and monitoring, as well as improved spending priorities.

¹² Fiscal sustainability in Afghanistan is presently defined in terms of the measure of domestic revenues to operating expenses. This limits any ability to provide for discretionary services, which is not a desired financial state; however, collected revenues, as a percent of operating expenses, is a major financial benchmark presently being evaluated.

Budget execution continues to fall short of donor expectations. The Afghan government executed 93 percent of its operating budget in 2013, while the execution rate for the development budget rose to about 52 percent in 2013. Under TMAF, GIRoA is expected to improve its budget execution rate to 75 percent by 2017. The noted budget execution goal for the Afghan government could prove challenging. GIRoA cites capacity constraints at the national and sub-national levels; weak planning and budget formulation; donor earmarking of funds and funding delays; and communication challenges across ministries, donors, and sub-national entities as key challenges.

Infrastructure

USAID and DoD, in coordination with GIRoA, continue to focus on existing, high-priority infrastructure projects and building the capacity of GIRoA to maintain donor-built infrastructure after completion. Its ability to provide essential services – including reliable, sustainable power – is critical for Afghanistan’s economic growth and long-term stability.

DoD continued to implement several priority energy-sector projects with the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, including the rehabilitation and expansion of Afghanistan’s Northeast and Southeast Power Systems. USAID and DoD continue to work with Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat, Afghanistan’s power utility, to improve its capacity to operate, sustain, and manage the power sector. In December 2013, the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) signed a \$37 million contract with the Turkish National Petroleum Company to drill natural gas wells in the Juma and Bashikurd gas fields. USAID finances the project, but MoMP manages and oversees the contract. In transportation, USAID is funding short-term operations and maintenance (O&M) projects to maintain Afghanistan’s roads. USAID is working with other donors to establish a program to increase the Ministry of Public Works’ capacity and capability to conduct O&M and maintain a growing network of improved roads.

During the performance period, CSTC-A turned over four Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) projects to ANSF worth \$1.68 million.

3.4: RULE OF LAW

The Department of State (DOS) serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. Rule of Law (RoL) efforts in Afghanistan, working with several U.S. government stakeholders, including the Department of Defense, USAID, and the Department of Justice. DOS and USAID RoL programs continue to support the informal and formal justice sector at national and sub-national levels. State continues to fund projects focused on six lines of effort: formal justice sector capacity building; corrections reform; major crimes; legal education; civil society and access to justice; and gender justice. Related projects are designed to train and build the capacity of Afghan justice officials, including judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, criminal investigators, and prison staff. DOS funding assists juvenile justice, anti-corruption efforts, and the case management system. USAID’s RoL program has three main components: building the capacity of the formal justice and traditional dispute-resolution systems; promoting governmental and

civil society anti-corruption measures; and promoting human rights. The RoL portfolio has both national and sub-national effects and promotes RoL institutionally and at the grassroots level.

During this reporting period, there were significant developments with regard to the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission-Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A) and the Rule of Law Field Force-Afghanistan (ROLFF-A). ROLFF-A ceased support to NROLFSM-A on August 31, 2013. Currently, ROLFF-A's sole mission is the operation of the Justice Center in Parwan. NROLFSM-A deactivated on September 30, 2013. Despite improvements in building the capacity of justice officials, RoL continues to be one of GIROA's weakest areas. Pervasive corruption remains a challenge and substantial progress is necessary to prompt visible changes in establishing rule of law across the country. Of particular note is the failure of the Afghanistan Attorney General to prosecute cases that affect the patronage of high-level officials that have been forwarded by investigative organizations.

Justice sector security remains a critical vulnerability, with many Afghan justice officials forced to rely upon ad-hoc security arrangements at the provincial and district levels. Judicial officials and prosecutors face continuing attacks and insurgents are aggressively targeting justice sector employees. The lack of security affects the number of judges and prosecutors willing to work in more rural and less secure provinces and districts.

No appreciable change was apparent in Afghan popular preference for either the formal or informal justice systems during the reporting period. According to the Asia Foundation's 2012 survey, more Afghans were using the formal justice system than the informal justice system for the first time. The populace prefers either option to Taliban processes, but fell back on the Taliban's system of justice when formal courts were absent or perceived to be corrupt. Human rights concerns continued to surface in some informal justice cases. Targeted assassinations of justice sector personnel, general threats to physical safety, and the lack of personal security while traveling or in courthouses were continuing challenges.

Detention Operations

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and GIROA signed on March 25, 2013, along with a President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (PIROA) Decree Number 5, led to the establishment of the Afghan Review Board (ARB). This board was envisioned as an administrative body to screen the cases of Afghan detainees transferred to GIROA custody in accordance with the MOU. According to the MOU, the ARB was to review each case to determine the disposition of all Afghan detainees under Afghan law, and recommend either prosecution, continued confinement for investigation, or release. The ARB was expected to refer appropriate cases to prosecution when evidence warranted criminal prosecution and recommend release when insufficient evidence existed. The ARB has the option of recommending further investigation for those Afghans with investigable leads associated with a crime in their files.

After the signing of the March 25, 2013 MOU, the ARB reviewed 760 of the 894 Afghan detainee files under its jurisdiction, recommending prosecution in 135 cases and release in the remaining 625 cases. ISAF disputed 93 of the ARB's initial release decisions. After further

review, the ARB changed five cases to prosecution recommendations. ISAF continued to object to the remaining 88 release decisions, eventually elevating the issue to the President of Afghanistan. President Karzai publically expressed his desire to close the Afghan National Detention Facility in Parwan (ANDF-P) and release the 88 detainees, noting that Afghan judicial authorities had reviewed their cases and did not believe there was sufficient evidence to prosecute them in the Afghan court system.

ISAF took the position that there was adequate evidence to pursue prosecutions and that the release of any of these 88 individuals would undermine rule of law in Afghanistan because it would prevent the Afghan people from getting their day in court. Many of the crimes committed by these individuals affected not only coalition and Afghan National Security Forces, but Afghan civilians as well.

On February 9, 2014, the dispute appeared to be resolved when the President Karzai referred the 88 disputed ARB cases to the Attorney General for disposition. However, less than 48 hours after the referral, the Attorney General ordered the release of 65 of the 88 detainees, making it clear the cases were given, at best, a cursory review. Despite vehement protest, the 65 detainees were released from the ANDF-P on February 13, 2014. The Attorney General ordered the remaining 23 cases be prosecuted at the Justice Center in Parwan. The cases had not been prosecuted as of March 31, 2014.

On March 19, 2014, Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force–Afghanistan (CJIATF) 435 learned the ANA was expediting an additional 55 ARB releases. Thirty-nine of these cases were originally UK captures and the remaining 16 were former U.S. captures. Despite U.S. and UK attempts to engage the Attorney General’s Office and the ARB, the ARB released the 55 detainees on March 20, 2014. The ARB and GIRoA did not provide adequate time for the U.S. and UK to analyze the releases or exchange views in a dispute process. The United Kingdom stated the release also violated an existing UK-Afghanistan agreement. Following the release, the U.S. Ambassador engaged senior GIRoA officials on this issue.

ISAF has pursued all available means to inform, educate, and strengthen Afghanistan's ability to investigate and prosecute these detainees. Specifically, ISAF met with senior Afghan officials to express U.S. concerns with ARB release recommendations where investigable leads existed; requested reconsideration of ARB release decisions where there was attributable evidence of a crime or crimes; insisted on engagement between Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the Minister of Defense, in accordance with the March 2013 MOU, before release of those cases where attributable evidence exists; and, finally, made additional classified evidence and investigative leads releasable and available to Afghan investigative bodies.

A President of Afghanistan (PIRoA) Decree, issued on February 23, 2014, announced the dissolution of the ARB after it renders decisions on its 134 remaining cases, including 41 categorized as Enduring Security Threats (ESTs). Under the March 2013 MOU, GIRoA committed specifically to the continued detention of these 41 ESTs. Any ARB review process for these detainees would be strongly opposed by ISAF because of their categorization of enduring security threats.

The PIROA Decree further announced the transfer of the “Ministry of Defense (MOD) detention facility at Bagram,” known to coalition forces as the ANDF-P, to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Although no official transfer date was announced, ISAF will work with MOD and MOI during the transition, and during the Resolute Support (RS) mission.

Despite the dispute and disagreements at the political level, the Afghans made steady progress in managing detainees since the transfer of detention operations to them. During the ministerial transition, ISAF intends to provide continued assistance with facility operations, security, and sustainment planning in order to maintain acceptable standards of secure and humane treatment of detainees.

DoD continued to hold approximately 50 third-country nationals (TCN) in a portion of the ANDF-P. DoD continued to evaluate disposition options for the TCNs, including repatriation, resettlement, transfer to Afghanistan for prosecution, or prosecution in the United States.

Prior to any transfer, the U. reviews all available intelligence information and negotiates humane treatment assurances and robust security assurances with a receiving country to mitigate any risk that transferred detainees will reengage in terrorist activities.

The Justice Sector

Strengthening rule of law in Afghanistan is an important part of efforts to ensure that country’s long-term stability. ISAF continues to assist the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), and the Supreme Court. ISAF supported the development of GIRoA’s National Priority Program 5, Law and Justice for All, which outlines GIRoA’s justice sector priorities over the next three years, and will now work to support its implementation. A new Afghan criminal procedure code received legislative and presidential approval and is in the process of being published. The Criminal Law Reform Working Group continues its rewrite of the Afghan criminal penal code. Once the code is complete, the procedure code and penal code will support ANSF law enforcement efforts.

Until Afghanistan is able to develop a functioning Rule of Law, where properly investigated cases are successfully prosecuted, they will not be able to sustain a secure environment. The criminal justice process must function from investigation through prosecution in order to address the destabilizing corrupt elements, which are so pervasive in Afghanistan.

ISAF continues to promote a good working relationship between ANSF and AGO prosecutors in their efforts to approach security threats through a criminal framework. The ISAF team now chairs the Kabul Evidence Based Operations (EvBO) Working Group, which promotes ISAF security interests through the international community’s efforts to implement EvBO. ISAF and the international community are changing methods and operations to account for Afghanistan’s treatment of battle space detainees as criminals. The progress made to date on EvBO and the use of forensic evidence in the judicial process will likely remain limited to major population centers.

The Afghans continue to make considerable progress at the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP). The JCIP is an Afghan court with Afghan judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. It was created to try Afghans that had been detained by U.S. forces on a law of war basis and then transferred to Afghanistan. The court tried more than 6,300 cases with a 74 percent conviction rate. The United States continues to engage the Afghans in establishing a central national security court for Afghanistan. The current JCIP jurisdiction only includes former U.S. detainees, but should the Afghans decide to establish a central national security court, they could initiate legal changes that allow the prosecution of detainees captured by Afghan forces.

3.5: PARLIAMENT

Afghanistan's Parliament demonstrated slowly increasing capacity during this reporting period. Although the legislative branch remains weaker than the executive branch, members of Parliament appear to be strengthening their position. Nevertheless, staffing issues, corruption, and inadequate experience continue to challenge the Parliament's effectiveness.

During the performance period, highlights include passage in January of the 2014 national budget and passage of the criminal procedure code. USAID's Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan project continued to work toward the four key programmatic objectives of: strengthening the legislative process; improving legislative oversight; increasing outreach capacity; and, increasing institutional development of the National Assembly.

Parliament debated and voted on more than a dozen pieces of legislation and passed an additional four international cooperation agreements during the reporting period. Among the most influential of these laws was the Population Registration Law, passed by both Houses of Parliament and signed into law by the President. Among other provisions, this law establishes the basis for the e-tazkera, an electronic national ID card.

3.6: BANKING AND FINANCE

The pace of financial reform slowed in the first quarter of 2014, as electoral politics and the ongoing dispute over the BSA consumed the attention of government and political class. Afghanistan was unable to meet conditions to complete another review of its International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, missing several structural benchmarks and failing to meet domestic revenue targets. The IMF is unlikely to complete another review of Afghanistan prior to the expiration of the current Extended Credit Facility program in November 2014.

No proposal for a new Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Funding of Terrorism (AML/CFT) law was submitted or enacted. As a result, the Financial Action Task Force (an intergovernmental AML/CFT standard-setting body) downgraded Afghanistan to its "dark grey" list in February 2014 and could downgrade Afghanistan to its "black list" by summer 2014. This downgrade would make it extremely difficult for Afghan banks to maintain correspondent relationships with international banks, which would interfere with trade finance. Some Afghan banks already lost correspondent accounts.

Kabul Bank

According to DOJ officials closely following this issue, efforts to recover Kabul Bank assets continue. Recovery of cash assets stalled at approximately \$150.5 million and is unlikely to increase without embezzlement or money laundering convictions sufficient to trigger confiscation mechanisms for cash held in foreign accounts. GIRoA claims title to non-cash assets that may push the recovery amount as high as \$225 million, but there is reason to doubt GIRoA's evaluation, its methods for conversion, as well as its ability to liquidate the assets (particularly those located in Dubai) without challenge by other claimants.

The criminal case remains pending before the Kabul Appellate Court. The court held several hearings in October and November 2013, but has not rendered a verdict on the criminal charges. On November 26, 2013, the court ordered the AGO to convene a meeting between the two primary defendants, the uncharged shareholders, and the Kabul Bank Receivership (KBR). The objective was to resolve discrepancies in loss and recovery amounts cited by the indictment, versus amounts reported by the KBR and amounts claimed by the two main defendants. While GIRoA made one attempt to comply with the order, it had difficulty contacting uncharged shareholders, most of whom departed Afghanistan.

Although the order delayed the proceedings, it declares that the uncharged shareholders, including Mahmood Karzai, brother to President Hamid Karzai, and Haseen Fahim, brother to the late First Vice President Mohammad Qasim Fahim, share equal culpability as the two charged shareholders. Despite the appellate court's directive, the GIRoA has yet to take substantial steps towards charging other shareholders.

3.7: COUNTER-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY

The vast majority of Afghans (79 percent) report that corruption is a serious problem in the government. Corruption within the ANSF ranges from Afghan Uniformed Police and Afghan Local Police extortion at illegal checkpoints to higher-level corruption in the MOD and MOI (e.g., pay-for-position schemes, taking bribes from contractors, and "land grabbing"). All these activities hurt the reputation and efficiency of security ministries. The Ministers of Defense and Interior are vocal about the need to address corruption challenges in the ANSF.

The Attorney General failed to pursue prosecutions against several politically connected officials implicated in corruption related to the National Military Hospital and the AAF. Afghan workplace culture tolerates some levels of corruption, an indicator of which is that there were few corruption allegations made to the MOD Inspector General (IG) in the last two years.

The formation of the *Shafafiyat* Committees at the MOI Provincial Chief of Police Headquarters as well as the Transparency and Accountability Committees at the MOD ANA Corps and Division Headquarters, overseen by their respective IG departments, continue to help raise awareness, implement reform, and combat corruption issues across the country. ISAF continues to provide assistance, capacity building, and mentoring in the MOD and MOI IG offices to ensure continued implementation of the various Afghan Transparency Committee initiatives to combat corruption and improve accountability. Assistance will also be provided to the security

ministries' procurement departments to establish oversight and vendor vetting mechanisms and to ensure continued international funding for the ANSF post-2014. ISAF will also encourage Afghan security ministries to connect with elements of civil society in a long-term effort to generate social pressure for reform and to contribute to the Afghan narrative on corruption reform.

In the current reporting period, the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), a specialized and vetted law enforcement unit of the MOI, significantly increased the number of cases against corrupt government officials and transnational organized crime members. The cases included prosecutions against corrupt provincial governance, corrupt parliamentarians, human trafficking, kidnapping, and transnational organized crime. In early December 2013, GIRoA dedicated a part-time prosecution team from the AGO to the MCTF to ensure that cases are properly prepared for prosecution and tracked through the criminal justice system. This has yet to translate into charges being filed against high-level or well-connected corrupt actors.

3.8: COUNTERNARCOTICS

Narcotics continued to play an integral role in financing the insurgency, creating instability and enabling corruption. The Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics collaborated with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to publish the 2013 *Afghanistan Opium Survey* in November 2013.¹³ The survey reported a record 209,000 hectares cultivated in 2013, a 36 percent increase over 2012. The number of poppy-free provinces decreased from 17 to 15, while eradication declined by 24 percent.

The narcotics trade in Afghanistan remains large, and insurgent penetration of that market is extensive and expanding. Successful CN interdiction operations in one region or area may be offset by insurgents increasing revenues by other means, such as kidnapping for ransom or through donations, which are difficult to affect. GIRoA regularly collaborates with U.S. and international organizations to target narcotics traffickers and facilities. As part of the ISAF counternarcotics (CN) campaign plan, ISAF coordinates with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other U.S. government departments and agencies to reduce the ability of the insurgency to draw support from the narcotics industry. Afghan forces conducted 157 operations from October 1, 2013 to March 14, 2014 resulting in seizures of 13,686 kg of opium, 1,202 kg of heroin, 7,921 kg of hash, 182 kg of morphine and 9,208 kg of precursor chemicals as well as detention of 206 individuals. The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while the DEA provided mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. U.S. intelligence organizations provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to coalition mentors.

The number of operations by the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNP-A) and other Afghan CN agencies declined during the reporting period because of the loss of ISAF supported enablers, the reduced number of ISAF partnered operations, and security concerns in some contested southern provinces with increased poppy cultivation. During the second half of the

¹³ *Afghanistan Opium Survey*, Summary findings, November 2013.

reporting period, most interdiction activities occurred in RC-E and RC-C. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in RC-S and RC-SW where the majority of opiates are grown, processed and smuggled out of Afghanistan. This shift is likely a result of the coalition drawdown as the threat to interdiction forces in RC-E and RC-C is generally less than the threat in the South and Southwest.

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units

The CNP-A is the ANP component responsible for CN operations throughout Afghanistan. CNP-A headquarters is located in Kabul, and the CNP-A has officers stationed in all 34 provinces, including four forward operating bases located throughout Afghanistan. DoD supports the CNP-A through capacity building to establish an Afghan institution that can capably counter the narcotics trade and resist corruption.

The CNP-A Development Unit, funded by DoD but implemented by the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, continued to assist the CNP-A in preparing for transition.

DEA's CN efforts concentrated on building and sustaining the capability and capacity of specialized vetted units (National Interdiction Unit (NIU), Special Investigation Unit, and Technical Investigation Unit) of the CNP-A to address the illicit drug trade. These vetted units are essential to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. DoD, State, and DEA capacity-building efforts included training, provision of equipment and infrastructure, and mentorship by DEA enforcement, intelligence, and training personnel. A significant example of the results of these efforts was a joint operation that targeted heroin conversion laboratories in Badakhshan Province in which the NIU dismantled a large heroin laboratory and seized approximately 700 kilograms of opium and other products.

The CJIATF-Nexus made substantial progress in assisting the ANSF with investigating the targeting both individuals and networks at the nexus of insurgency, counternarcotics, and criminal patronage. The task force developed targeting packets and illustrative intelligence products, which are releasable to GIRoA. These tools have been used to provide security force assistance to ANSF organizations to further operational activities and tactical success.

Afghan Special Missions Wing Support to Counternarcotics

During the reporting period, the SMW received six new Mi-17s and five new PC-12s. The PC-12s will primarily be used to provide ISR support to operations. In addition to its mission responsibilities to support CT and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), the Special Missions Wing (SMW) continues to provide aviation support to the DEA and Afghan CN law enforcement organizations. DEA liaison officers with the SMW and coalition Special Operations Forces ensure DEA aviation requirements are considered and appropriately supported in the special operations allocation and tasking process. The unit conducted several Afghan-planned, led, and fully executed tactical missions in support of CN and CT objectives including seven NVG and one-day multi-aircraft tactical missions. SMW missions resulted in the destruction or seizure of 100 kilograms (kg) of heroin, 900 kg opium, 4,112 kg hashish, 4,000 liters of morphine solution, 150 kg morphine, 24,700 kg of poppy seeds, and two drug labs were destroyed.

Border Management

DoD's partnership with the U.S. Embassy Kabul Border Management Task Force (BMTF) is an essential element in the professionalization of Afghan border and customs police officials. BMTF mentors taught a number of classes at the Kabul International Airport to improve airport security. Border mentors provide training and mentorship to Afghan border officials at key border crossing points. This support will continue to reduce U.S. military forces pull back from border locations.

Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell

Led by the DEA, the Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) identified and disrupted sources of insurgent and terrorist funding in Afghanistan since 2008. The ATFC includes DoD deputies and staff comprised of personnel from DoD, Treasury, and law enforcement agencies. During the reporting period, ATFC assisted with Treasury designations of key threat finance targets and continued working with U.S. and Afghan law enforcement partners on vital investigations. ATFC's law enforcement arm also began a training program focused on advising district and provincial Afghan police on how to disrupt illicit finance networks, such as those operated by unlicensed money service providers.

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SECTION 4 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

4.1: OVERVIEW

As the International Security Assistance Force mission draws to a close, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul will continue to realign civilian programs and proceed toward a more regular diplomatic mission structure. As a result, some activities in which coalition military forces played a significant role will now come under Chief of Mission activities. This will reduce the scale and scope of some military engagement in economic development and technical assistance programs.

Afghanistan's development largely depends on donor support and is likely to through 2024. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) guides assistance priorities in Afghanistan for the international donor community through the 2014 economic, political and security transitions and into the upcoming "transformation decade." Under the TMAF, the United States and other international partners agreed to provide \$16 billion in assistance through 2015 and to sustain support at or near levels of the past decade through 2017. Donors pledged to move 50 percent of development assistance on-budget. For its part, Afghanistan committed to improve governance, emphasize human development and sustainable growth, ensure credible and transparent elections, protect human rights, guarantee access to justice for all citizens, and improve the integrity of public financial management and banking sectors.

Transition poses significant challenges for Afghanistan's economy. Some challenges relate directly to the security environment as the handover of responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) proceeds. Other challenges result from business and regulatory structures, which are not fully developed. In some cases, the challenges of transition will be the result of moving from a conflict or post-conflict reconstruction environment to a traditional development footing.

The United States is working closely with implementing partners other donor countries, and the Afghan government to adapt internal processes and to address these challenges. The U.S. strategy aims to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on international assistance to levels consistent with other less developed nations. Further, the strategy aims to consolidate peace and stability in Afghan communities through effective development, improved delivery of government services, and the promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights. The strategy supports sustainable economic growth, targets economic and agricultural programming, and attempts to foster linkages between the GIRoA and the Afghan people to reinforce systems of governance. Due to declining international assistance, increased focus will be directed to strengthening the government's capacity to generate and collect revenue.

4.2: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT¹⁴

¹⁴Much of the data derived for this section is from the World Bank. They assert "...collecting reliable data on Afghanistan is extremely difficult. Moreover, much of the information that is available is subject to large margins of uncertainty, as well as often problems of incompleteness, incomparability, etc." *World Bank*, "Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014," May 2012.

Afghanistan's GDP has grown rapidly since 2001, recording average GDP growth of 9-10 percent annually. In 2012, Afghanistan's GDP was approximately \$20.5 billion. Growth, however, is largely dependent on the growth of the services sector; this in turn, was driven by demand for goods and services from the international community and favorable weather conditions that support agriculture. Agriculture is responsible for nearly 25 percent of Afghanistan's GDP and employs 60-80 percent of Afghans. Afghanistan imports most consumer goods and nearly 75 percent of its fuel and electricity. Afghanistan primarily exports raw materials (ores, minerals) and carpets. Afghanistan suffers from a lack of skilled labor, stemming in part from a literacy rate of 28 percent. Further, 36 percent of the population lives on less than \$25 a month.

With economic, political, and security transitions underway, economic growth will depend on a variety of factors, including the security environment, political stability, improvements in the business climate, and the trajectory of international assistance. Extractive industries provide a potential source for Afghan revenue generation, but it remains to be seen if the mining sector can overcome the challenges facing Afghanistan's economy. Geographic isolation and a poor transportation infrastructure make it difficult to get products to market. A limited banking sector and relative lack of indigenous energy production also constrain growth. Private sector investment will be critical to Afghanistan's long-term economic potential, but concerns over ongoing security and political transitions dampened investor interest over the last 12 months (April 2013 – March 2014).

Afghan Governance and Development

Effective governance, improved rule of law, and sustainable economic development are all necessary for long-term stability in Afghanistan, but multiple factors continue to hinder progress. These factors include widespread corruption, limited education and skill levels, and security concerns limiting access to rural areas. At the political level, limiting factors include lack of coordination between the central government and the provinces and districts, and uneven and evolving distribution of power among the judicial, legislative and executive branches.

Afghan government capacity to provide stable and responsive governance continues to develop although progress is slow and uneven. Revenue generation, including tax collection at the municipal level, significantly improved over the last decade but declined slightly since 2011. Furthermore, execution of the development budget remains slow. The Afghan government is highly centralized, with revenue, budgeting, spending, and service delivery authority residing with the central ministries in Kabul. This centralized authority affects the development of effective service delivery at the provincial and district levels. Decentralization initiatives are slowed by limited human capital.

The July 2012 Tokyo Conference recognized many of these issues, and the resulting Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) included specific commitments by GIRA to address some of the major weaknesses in sub-national governance. However, GIRA's mixed progress in meeting its TMAF commitments and implementing required structural reforms remains a concern, as discussed at the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting in January 2014.

Economic growth and development in Afghanistan will continue to be influenced by agricultural yields and growth in the services sector, which are significantly linked to donor and ISAF spending. The full economic effect of the reduction in ISAF personnel during the previous reporting period remains unclear. Although economic growth remained strong in 2011 and 2012, the World Bank estimates that growth slowed to 3.6 percent in 2013.¹⁵

Donor funding commitments made in Tokyo provided an important signal from the international community that there will be continued funding post-2014 to support the Afghan economy's development and mitigate the effects of transition. However, investor fears about political risk and the security situation make it particularly important for Afghanistan to show progress in regulatory and policy reforms. According to the World Bank's Doing Business index, Afghanistan rose in country rankings from 170 in 2012 to 164 in 2013. However, private sector levels of investment continue to proceed slowly.

Mining accounts for a marginal share of Afghanistan's GDP, but has the potential to expand. However, delays in pending legislation to modernize the rules and regulations governing this sector and a decline in commodity prices discourage international investors. The Cabinet of Ministers submitted a draft mining law for Parliamentary approval in June 2013. Although President Karzai and the new Minister of Mines and Petroleum expressed support for the law, it was not passed during the reporting period.

Challenges in governance and sustainable economic development slow the reinforcement of security gains. As noted in the section on corruption, the government's failure to address corruption effectively hampers long-term economic growth. Likewise, ongoing insurgent operations and influence continue to inhibit economic development and improvements in governance.

The government continued to manage the macro economy effectively, notwithstanding a few issues. Foreign exchange reserves peaked at \$7.1 billion in December 2012, declined to \$6.7 billion in March 2013, and plateaued at \$6.9 billion. The exchange rate depreciated by 8 percent in 2012, reflecting increased business and security uncertainty. However, the government kept core inflation within the International Monetary Fund targets. Inflation decreased to 6.4 percent in 2012/13, down from 10.2 percent in the previous year (World Bank).

Economic growth was strong over the last decade, averaging 9.4 percent a year from 2003 to 2012. Future economic growth will likely be lower, projected by the World Bank to a more modest and sustainable range of five to seven percent per year as Afghanistan transitions. Economic growth prospects will depend on a number of factors, including: the security environment, improvements in the business climate, the performance of the agriculture and mining sectors, and the trajectory of international assistance. According to the World Bank, real GDP growth for Afghanistan in 2013 dropped to 3.6 percent, significantly lower than the 14.4 percent in 2012. Growth is expected to remain low in 2014, at approximately 3.5 percent, as

¹⁵ World Bank, April 9, 2014.

investor concerns with Afghanistan's political and security transitions affect investment decisions.

The World Bank estimates that less than 30 percent of international assistance is actually spent in Afghanistan. However, the high level of international funding used for local services – such as transportation, logistics, and labor costs – is a major, indirect driver of economic growth. This is especially true when it covers Afghan civil service or ANSF labor costs. The Afghan economy could be adversely affected if donor funding were significantly reduced in a short period of time. These factors place increased pressure on the Afghan government to identify alternative areas for growth and revenue generation.

Despite rapid economic growth and per capita income increasing from \$186 in 2002 to \$688 in 2012, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. According to GIRoA's recently released 2012 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, the number of Afghans living in poverty remains at 36 percent, unchanged since 2008. Reasons for the stalled poverty rate include growing consumption inequality between groups and the inability of poor, illiterate households to take advantage of growth opportunities.

With a sizable youth population and increased public expectations for public service delivery, GIRoA must provide a suitable enabling business environment, not only to gain the confidence of Afghans and investors, but also to develop a tax base that will foster additional revenues. Fifty-two percent of development budget was executed (\$1.04 billion of the \$2 billion in FY 2012 funds carried on the government's books). The FY 2013 national budget was \$6.8 billion, with the development budget approximately \$3.2 billion (adding \$2.2 billion to the development portion of the national budget). This will pose a significant challenge in planning, prioritization, contracting, program management, and overall financial management.

Progress was made in many areas. However, service delivery remains low. Donors collectively provided funding and technical expertise in significant areas, advancing Afghanistan's overall level of capacity. Programs and projects undertaken in several fundamental areas include building governmental capacity; jump-starting and growing the economic base; developing infrastructure; building a self-sustaining security force; laying a foundation for the rule of law; and placing additional attention on local governance processes.

The challenges noted above are compounded by the responsibility of ANSF to maintain security, a fundamental requirement and a necessary condition for economic growth. GIRoA and the ANSF must provide a secure environment for services to be rendered and the private sector to engage and make investments. Only the private sector can sustain job creation and the necessary capital investment to maintain and build on previous infrastructure development; especially power, roads, communications, water, and rail.

Joint efforts by USAID and the World Bank with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) and other GIRoA partners over the last two years to improve key "Doing Business" indicators resulted in Afghanistan's improved index ranking to 164 in 2014, as mentioned previously. Despite this achievement, investor fears stemming from political and security transitions continue to dampen private sector investment.

Agriculture

Roughly 75 percent of Afghanistan's labor force is dependent on agriculture, making the sector both a significant target area for U.S. and international assistance and a priority for stabilization efforts. To promote economic growth and increase food security for a rapidly growing population, Afghanistan requires adequate and consistent agriculture production. The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) formulates agriculture policy that is aligned with the country's overall economic strategy.

Afghanistan's agriculture policy, as articulated in the Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster of the National Priority Programs (NPP), focuses on boosting agriculture production, increasing private sector agribusinesses, expanding irrigated land, and improving water management. The U.S. Government's agricultural assistance strategy and program portfolio supports these NPP goals, mainly through USAID and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs. The strategy is grounded in partnership with MAIL with an emphasis on self-reliance and building ministry capacity to deliver services to farmers and promoting private-sector agribusiness to strengthen food security and economic growth. The USAID portfolio focuses on building relationships between farmers, agribusinesses, and MAIL to increase the adoption of new technologies and practices to increase productivity, create farm and off-farm employment, increase incomes, and strengthen Afghans' confidence in their government. Investments target regional economic zones to maximize geographic impact. Alternative development remains a priority and is focused on promotion of licit agricultural value chains as one part of a holistic counternarcotics policy. Activities are implemented in coordination with USDA, which has programs designed to strengthen MAIL and also complement the DOS International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's counternarcotic efforts.

U.S. Government agricultural programming contributed substantially to macro level changes in Afghanistan. In the decade between 2003 and 2012, Afghanistan's total wheat production averaged 3.8 million metric tons annually, from an area of 2.3 million hectares. The production increase of 76 percent over the prior decade can be attributed to factors including improved seed, availability of fertilizer, and improved access to water, markets, and credit.

This growing season, there is some concern about rain-fed wheat producing areas in northern Afghanistan due to the lack of precipitation during the planting season. Wheat is the dominant winter grain and, in most years, Afghan production falls short of total demand by nearly two million metric tons. On May 9, 2014, USDA will publish the first World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, which will include Afghanistan winter grain production.

In Afghanistan, U.S. Government programs targeted 322,000 hectares of alternative crops under cultivation, and increased private sector employment by 270,000 full-time equivalent jobs. These programs include:

- USAID's Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives in the North, East and West program, which focuses on high-value crop development;
- USAID's Agricultural Development Fund and Agricultural Credit Enhancement, and;

- USDA's Afghanistan Agricultural Extension Project.

Mining

The extractive industries (both hydrocarbon and mining) are projected to be a significant source of economic growth and development for Afghanistan. Under the World Bank's "Natural Resource Corridor" development model, activities surrounding a cluster of mines and/or hydrocarbon fields would jumpstart economic activity, locally and nationally, up and down the corridors where the extraction occurs. The sector would also provide the government revenues in the form of royalties and business taxes from the growing private sector.

Until Parliament passes appropriate mining legislation, GIRA will be unable to attract the levels of investment necessary to make the mining sector sustainable. Mining legislation is a requirement of the TMAF.

The Afghan hydrocarbon industry continues to mature. In December 2013, the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) signed a \$12 billion, 12 year contract for Afghan-Tajik basin oil and gas extraction with the Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC), Dubai-based Drago Oil, and the Ghanzanfar Group of Afghanistan. The fields are estimated to contain 514 million barrels of oil and 91 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Extraction from the two oil fields is expected to begin in three to five years, and the project is expected to generate up to 12,000 jobs.

Trade and Exports

Increased trade and regional economic integration will be important for sustaining Afghanistan's economic development beyond 2014. Over the last decade, Afghanistan persistently ran a large current-account deficit (about 40 percent of GDP) which was offset by external funding. Official exports totaled approximately \$500 million in 2013, while official imports were \$9.3 million. These estimates are based on unreliable statistics.

Afghanistan focused on rehabilitating and building new cross-border transportation facilities to connect with Central Asian countries, better harmonizing border systems, and bringing into line trade agreements with regional standards to take advantage of improved security. The Five Year Plan for improving and expanding custom facilities and practices at major border crossings for \$200 million is at a mid-point. This expansion should facilitate and expand trade, and encourage travel/transit through Afghanistan to other locations.

Pakistan remains the single largest trading partner and most convenient source of goods and transit routes for Afghanistan. The Afghan and Pakistani Governments continue to discuss ways to complete implementation of the 2011 Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement, most recently at their Joint Economic Commission meeting February 22-23, 2014 in Kabul. USAID trade programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been working with both governments to overcome technical, administrative, and legal issues.

4.3: INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

USAID and DoD, in coordination with the GIRoA, continue to focus on existing, high-priority infrastructure projects and building the capacity of GIRoA to maintain donor-built infrastructure after completion. GIRoA's ability to provide essential services – including reliable, sustainable power – is critical for Afghanistan's economic growth and long-term stability.

DoD continues to implement several priority energy sector projects with the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund, including the rehabilitation and expansion of Afghanistan's Northeast and Southeast Power Systems. USAID's priority projects include the installation of Turbine 2 at Kajaki Dam, the Gardez-Khost Highway, the Power Transmission and Connectivity (PTEC) project, and Sheberghan Gas Development. USAID's emphasis over the reporting period continued to shift toward providing GIRoA the technical assistance required to ensure the sustainability of U.S. Government investments made to date.

USAID and DoD continue to work with Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Afghanistan's power utility, to improve its capacity to operate and manage the power sector. With USAID's support, DABS engaged a firm to provide technical assistance to accelerate DABS' path toward commercial viability. In addition, in December 2013, USAID helped DABS award a contract for the management of the installation of Turbine 2 at Kajaki Dam, and is supporting DABS' effort to contract for the various components of PTEC.

In December 2013, MoMP signed a \$37 million contract with the Turkish National Petroleum Company to drill natural gas wells in the Juma and Bashikurd gas fields. While USAID is financing this project, the Ministry is managing and overseeing the contract. USAID continues to provide technical assistance to the Ministry to strengthen its capacity to manage the gas sector.

In transportation, USAID released a solicitation to a technical assistance project to assist the Ministry of Public Works (MOPW) in creating a Road Authority/Road Fund for Afghanistan. USAID is also funding short-term operations and maintenance (O&M) projects to help maintain Afghanistan's roads and is working with other donors to establish a program to increase the MOPW's capacity and capability to conduct O&M and maintain its growing network of improved roads.

4.4: HEALTH

U.S. Government health programs in Afghanistan directly support the joint U.S.-Afghan goal of achieving national health targets as outlined in the Afghanistan National Health and Nutrition Sector Strategy, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and National Priority Program No. 5, "Health for All Afghanistan." The Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) are the cornerstones of the strategy for the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and all donors. USAID strengthens MoPH leadership and management capabilities, along with that of its Provincial Public Health Offices, to support the delivery of BPHS and EPHS services in 13 of the country's 34 provinces, primarily through non-governmental organization service providers. This effort gives half the Afghan population

essential medicines and contraceptives and provides health services to more than 1 million Afghans per month, 75 percent of whom are women and children.

USAID strengthens the MoPH disease-surveillance systems, such as the Disease Early Warning System and the Acute Flaccid Paralysis surveillance system, as well as improves health data collection, analysis, and management at all tiers of the system and in facilities and communities where services are delivered. It also supports hospital financial and procurement accountability and responsibility, pharmaceutical management systems, and staff capacity.

The Asia Foundation's surveys,¹⁶ administered in 2011-2012, showed that the government's provision of health care is viewed positively by two-thirds of Afghans. Public health, along with education, is often the most visible form of government services, especially in rural and remote communities. USAID successes in health services delivery are critical for both U.S. Government and GIRA long-term development objectives, underpinning education and economic growth gains, and building and solidifying Afghan citizens' trust in their government.

4.5: EDUCATION

Education is an important foundation for progress for the people of Afghanistan. Since 2002, the Afghan populace experienced a dramatic increase in access to basic education. The Ministry of Education (MoEd) is projecting to provide access to basic education to more than 77 percent of the school age population by 2015.

In early 2014 President Karzai and the Minister of Education released statements highlighting the significant gains in education that Afghanistan experienced over the past 12 years. They reported 11.5 million children attending schools across the country, more than 10 times the number who attended school in 2001. Of those 11.5 million students, 4.7 million were female. However, the exact number of students who are enrolled, or who are actually attending school, is unknown because the MoEd does not have the infrastructure or organizational capacity to collect data that are sufficiently reliable. Schools are staffed by more than 180,000 teachers trained to Afghan government standards and there are more than 52,617 candidates enrolled in Afghan teacher training programs. In this reporting period, MoEd, USAID, and the Global Partnership for Education coordinated to launch 100 new community-based pilot education courses in southwestern rural communities and there are plans for further expansion, pending budget approvals. Although the quality of instruction and facilities are not adequate, the education level of girls and women in the southern and eastern segments of the country increased. The education system expanded to provide vocational training to young adults and literacy training to Afghans of all ages. More than 27,000 students are currently enrolled at 62 Afghan government technical and vocational education and training schools, which is an increase of approximately 11,000 students and 14 schools from the prior school year.

¹⁶ *Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People*, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation), November 14, 2012 and *Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People*, (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation), December 4, 2012.

The Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) faces a shortage of classroom space, laboratory equipment, technology, and qualified instructors. USAID works across 17 provinces and in general instruction is of poor quality and programs are not well aligned with employer demand. There is a significant need to increase the number of instructors with graduate degrees from accredited institutions and to align courses with workforce demands more effectively.

4.6: WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN¹⁷

Overall, circumstances for Afghan women and girls improved significantly since 2001; gains remain tenuous, however, and civil society organizations are concerned that progress will be reversed. Many Afghan women view a possible reconciliation process with the Taliban skeptically and have legitimate concerns as to what peace talks might mean for the progress they made over the last 13 years. The U.S. Government takes these concerns seriously and recognizes that promoting security for Afghan women and girls must remain a priority.

Women face entrenched societal discrimination and limits to their freedom. Violence against women is widespread, but underreported. Recent ISAF efforts to get Afghan authorities to respond to complaints by women resulted in an increase in reporting of such violence.

During the reporting period, the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was passed by both houses and forwarded to President Karzai for signature. The CPC included a prohibition on family members from testifying against one another. The provision would have had serious ramifications for the prosecution of domestic abuse. After strong lobbying by civil society, President Karzai returned the CPC to the Ministry of Justice for revision with input from civil society and it was subsequently passed by Presidential Decree on February 23, 2014. The law's interpretation and implementation will be a work in progress.

A string of targeted attacks last fall on high profile women, and efforts by some Members of Parliament to weaken the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) legislation sent a reminder of the fragility of the hard won gains made by Afghan women. EVAW legislation implementation remains slow. Violence against women and girls remains prevalent. The Department of State, primarily through INL, continues to play a key role in supporting access to justice for victims of gender-based violence. INL supports training and mentoring for the eight existing Violence Against Women prosecution units, in addition to thirteen women's shelters throughout Afghanistan.

The TMAF includes several indicators on the rights of women, including the implementation of the EVAW legislation and the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA). As of the January 2014 JCMB, Afghanistan had not yet produced the report on implementation of the EVAW legislation and did not qualify for \$15 million in incentive funds, which the U.S. Government had set aside to reward progress on human and women's rights. The Ministry of Women's Affairs did release the implementation report in March 2014. This does fulfill Afghanistan's commitment under the TMAF. The international community is working with

¹⁷ This section, along with the *Women in the ANSF* section, is submitted consistent with section 1223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

GIRoA to determine the assistance required to implement the report recommendations and develop baseline data for measuring progress on implementation.

Reports of violence against women in many provinces in Afghanistan increased during the reporting period. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that the number of cases of violence against women in 2013 rose by 28 percent compared with 2012. It remains very difficult at this point to draw any conclusions from this rise in reported violence. Although reports increased, it is not clear if this is the result of an actual increase reporting or in violence against women. Afghan women may be better informed about their rights under the legislation and, therefore, more willing to report incidents of abuse. If this is the case, it implies that educational and outreach programs are working. There are several different operating call centers, which offer support and counselling to women.

On August 5, 2013, the Ministry of Women's Affairs submitted to the IEC a document concerning women's representation in elections. The document called for the registration of women voters, a door-to-door awareness campaign, distribution of voter cards in remote parts through mobile teams, and the opening of polling centers close to homes. It also requested that at least 30 percent of appointed elections officials be female. The IEC Gender Unit's objective was 50 percent female staffing of polling stations.

The Interagency Gender Working Group is the main U.S. Embassy body responsible for interagency coordination and monitoring of gender-related issues. The Working Group brings together representatives from the Embassy's Political, Political-Military, Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, Rule of Law, INL, Public Affairs, Interagency Provincial Affairs, and Refugees and Economic sections with representatives from USAID, the U.S. military, and other interagency partners, as well as representatives from ISAF and NTM-A. In September 2012, the U.S. Ambassador approved the Embassy's Gender Strategy, which serves as the basis for policy and programmatic engagement on gender issues. The Gender Strategy strongly supports the priorities of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. Access to justice and security and promotion of economic development for women are among the strategy's five core goals. The Gender Strategy also highlights the need for U.S. Government agencies to continue to mainstream gender issues into all policies and programs, so decreases in U.S. funding and presence in Afghanistan do not disproportionately affect women during the transition.

USAID plays a leading role in implementing the U.S. Government's civilian strategy for assistance to women in Afghanistan. These include assistance in the areas of health, education, economic development, access to justice, and political empowerment. The USAID Gender Equality and Female Empowerment policy requires programs undergo gender analysis to attribute primary and secondary benefits to gender. USAID completed more than 40 gender analyses to date; these provide the basis for gender integration of project design, management, and implementation, resulting in greater and more meaningful participation of women and men throughout USAID's programming.



Although the Department of State and USAID administer the majority of women's initiatives, DoD also oversees several programs focusing on women. These programs include assistance to



the Department of Women's Affairs in Kandahar and the District Development Assembly for Women's Affairs in Parwan District. Additionally, coalition forces continue to incorporate Female Engagement Teams with general purpose forces on patrol, in order to engage women and children of local communities in open communication. This facilitates civil-military interaction and builds trust, cooperation, and security. Similarly, U.S. special operations forces employ U.S. Cultural Support Teams (CST) that provide an enduring female engagement capability in support of special operations, village stability operations, and ALP expansion.

The U.S. Government is committed to removing constraints on women's potential and views their contributions to Afghan society as essential. U.S. policy supports the principles of equality for men and women, as encapsulated in the Afghan constitution, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and the NAPWA. Furthermore, the U.S. government supports GIRoA's implementation of the Bonn Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and the EVAW law. Despite advances, the challenges of poverty, illiteracy, weak security, and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately, and solutions will require a long-term, sustained effort.

Figure 31 below shows female responses to several security-related survey questions. ISAF has conducted the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research survey quarterly since September 2008. All four charts show improvements in perceptions of security over time.

Figure 31: Perceptions of Security among Afghan Women





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SECTION 5 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

5.1: PAKISTAN

The United States continues to seek a constructive relationship with Pakistan that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests. Under a newly-elected government, Pakistan's relationship with the United States remains constructive, and both nations continue to acknowledge the importance of maintaining bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual concern. Taliban attacks in Afghanistan launched from sanctuaries in Pakistan remain a serious problem. These sanctuaries exist primarily in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan.

Pakistan shows a willingness to cooperate on some key U.S. goals, including publicly committing to playing a positive role in a genuine Afghan-led reconciliation process and providing essential support to U.S. retrograde operations from Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan continues to cooperate on some CT activities. The Pakistani military made limited gains against Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other anti-Pakistan militant groups in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which led TTP to engage in negotiations with the government. However, Pakistan did not take significant action against Afghan or India-focused militant groups.

Pakistan's government sought to increase engagement with Afghanistan, including direct meetings between President Karzai and Prime Minister Sharif. However, suspicion continues to surround the relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. While Pakistan values stability in Afghanistan, it also seeks sufficient Pashtun representation in GIROA to prevent Pashtun discontent along the Afghan-Pakistan border and to limit India's influence. As a result, Pakistan has not targeted Afghan-focused insurgent groups and provides occasional support to them. Pakistan made some progress on interdicting and disrupting the production of IED components, but still falls short in spite of greater engagement and recent cooperation. A significant portion of the materials which perpetuate the conflict continue to emanate from or transit through Pakistan. Cross-border incidents and lingering mistrust remain points of tension in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Both countries continue to question each other's commitment to advancing a political settlement in Afghanistan.

5.2: INDIA

The Indian government continues to support GIROA, believing a secure and stable Afghanistan will benefit the region and facilitate economic corridors into Central Asia. India and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership declaration in 2011, which formalized cooperation on governance, economics, commerce, education, public administration, and security/law enforcement. Subsequent engagements are reinforcing the positive relationship between Afghanistan and India.

India supports a variety of high-visibility projects and initiatives in Afghanistan. These ventures are primarily focused on major infrastructure projects, including electricity generation and transmission, road construction, and mining.

India is showing increased interest in Afghan security assistance, though activities in this area remain limited. India currently offers India-based training to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) personnel across a number of specialties, and the Indian government committed to expand this program. India does not provide direct military support or training in Afghanistan.

5.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES¹⁸

The Central Asian states host portions of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistics network that utilizes multiple ground and air transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial carriers and U.S. military aircraft. Maintaining the NDN lines of communication is key to ongoing operations in Afghanistan and will be used to support ISAF's withdrawal. Agreements for airfield access and defense cooperation with Kyrgyzstan were terminated by the Kyrgyz government and transit is not guaranteed after July 11, 2014.

Separate from the NDN, the Central Asian states contributed to the development of Afghanistan's infrastructure and economy. As Afghan infrastructure continued to develop, expanded road, rail, electrical power, and air networks could serve to facilitate increased commercial activity between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. However, systemic corruption and a lack of regional cooperation are challenges to real progress.

Narcotics, arms trafficking, and smuggling are transnational threats in the region. These activities threaten regional stability, legitimate commerce, and the flow of strategic resources. Central Asian states' concerns about Afghanistan post-2014 include a breakdown of stability in Afghanistan, which could lead to the migration of terrorist groups into Central Asia from the Afghanistan and Pakistan border region.

5.4: CHINA

DoD assesses that the People's Republic of China's (PRC) primary interests in Afghanistan are security and economic development. Beijing has given no indication of plans to commit security personnel in Afghanistan, although it does have a program to train Afghan police.

Chinese companies will likely continue investment in Afghanistan, most notably to develop Afghanistan's mines and infrastructure. The PRC began development of a section of the Amu Darya oilfield and is currently conducting a feasibility study for a rail system to support extraction efforts at the Aynak copper mine. However, Chinese development workers in Afghanistan faced increased threats; and narcotics trafficking into western China increased.

Diplomatic engagement between Afghanistan and China increased in recent months. As part of this effort, China will host the next Istanbul Process Ministerial conference. Beijing voiced its support for reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. Beijing supports regional diplomacy, most notably by involving President Karzai in regional economic support.

¹⁸ The Central Asian states include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

Although Afghan-Sino security cooperation remains limited and China has not engaged in security operations within Afghanistan, Beijing provided ANSF personnel a variety of PRC-based training. Training for the ANP conducted at People's Armed Police municipal training facilities covered policing skills, crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, and internal security duties. The PRC also offered basic, advanced, and senior military courses for ANSF officers at Peoples' Liberation Army military training colleges and universities.

5.5: RUSSIA

Russia seeks a stable Afghanistan to minimize the threat of terrorism and stem the flow of narcotics through Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus into Russia. Russia also supported Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts. Based on a commitment made at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia expanded the types of cargo shipped by rail and air via the NDN into and out of Afghanistan.

Russia recognizes terrorism as closely intertwined with narcotics trafficking and sees direct benefits from the NATO-Russia Council's (NRC) counternarcotics training project, which trains CN personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan. Training is conducted in Russia, Turkey, and via mobile training teams. Russia is interested in expanding CN cooperation and continued its participation in multilateral meetings and UNODC programs, calling for greater international support for CN efforts in Afghanistan.

Russia supported Afghanistan's bid for observer status within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This highlights the increasing emphasis Russia places on regional cooperation mechanisms for economic development and security in Afghanistan as ISAF draws down.

GIRoA increasingly looked to Russia for military support – particularly donations of military hardware – but Russia has thus far remained noncommittal.

Russia's occupation of Crimea resulted in the suspension of a significant amount of cooperation between the U.S. Government and Russia, as well as the suspension of NRC activities.

5.6: IRAN

Iran's goals in Afghanistan remain focused on maintaining friendly relations with the Afghan central government, preventing a Taliban return to power and minimizing western presence and influence. Tehran's strategy includes employing a soft-power campaign to promote a pro-Iranian and pro-Shia sentiment within Afghanistan through a \$1 billion donor aid program to upgrade infrastructure, provide humanitarian, cultural/religious support, and economic assistance. Concurrently, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF) provides calibrated lethal aid to the Taliban to attrite ISAF and expedite force withdrawal. Tehran is opposed to a U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement, which it fears will lead to the establishment of permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan. However, Iran fears a precipitous departure of NATO forces will increase instability on its border and perhaps lead to the return of

the Taliban. At a minimum, Iran seeks to ensure its security concerns are addressed by maintaining pressure on GIRoA officials and seeking its own security agreement with Kabul.

Since 2001, Iran pledged more than \$1 billion in aid to Afghanistan and actually paid out more than \$500 million. Iran's reconstruction and development efforts are largely concentrated in western Afghanistan. Iran intends to increase its influence among the local population in order to foster pro-Iranian sentiment. Iran also wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kabul. Iran maintains consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mezar-e-Sharif, and is considering opening additional consulates in Bamiyan and Nimroz Provinces. Iran participates in the regional Istanbul Process.

At the same time, Iran continued to provide lethal assistance, including light weapons and training, to elements of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Since 2007, coalition and Afghan forces interdicted several shipments of Iranian weapons.

Beyond economic and security issues, the protracted Afghan refugee situation continues to be a contentious issue between Iran and Afghanistan. Approximately one million registered Afghan refugees and at least 1.4 million Afghan migrants (non-refugees) currently reside in Iran. During this reporting period, Iran did not forcibly expel or return registered refugees. Iran continued to deport undocumented Afghans (non-refugees), although at a slightly reduced pace compared to previous years.

5.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES¹⁹

Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to provide support to Operation Enduring Freedom and are working to provide financial support in the interest of a stable Afghanistan. Private GCC state citizens remain a source of considerable funding for Taliban and other insurgent and terrorist groups operating in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

GCC states provide the United States key basing facilities and access in support of the mission. Many of the GCC countries provide important air bases and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan and logistical support of these operations. These bases and cooperation from GCC nations are especially critical as ISAF retrogrades equipment and withdraws forces from Afghanistan. GCC countries host U.S. Central Command's forward headquarters, the Combined Air Operations Center, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters, and U.S. Army Central Command Headquarters (Third Army). GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Further, GCC nations support humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, including establishing refugee camps in Pakistan, financial assistance, and aid for Afghan refugees. GCC countries are

¹⁹ GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

likely to continue support to Afghanistan after 2014. GCC nations are also supportive of various conflict resolution initiatives.

Gulf countries and their ongoing large-scale construction projects provide opportunities for migrant labor. Afghans participate in this labor force and could continue to be a major source of remittances, further contributing to the economic development of Afghanistan. A number of wealthy Afghan expatriates live in GCC states, deepening the economic, political, and familial ties between the countries.

ANNEX A: SECURITY METRICS AND ASSESSMENTS²⁰

ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (CSS)

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Combined Arms Integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enable combat forces to sustain operations • Understand commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations • Synchronize logistical support with operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has minor trouble enabling combat forces to sustain operations • Has minor trouble understanding the commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations • Has minor trouble synchronizing logistical support with operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has difficulty enabling combat forces to sustain operations • Has difficulty understanding the commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations • Has difficulty synchronizing logistical support with operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot enable combat forces to sustain operations • Does not understand the commanders intent in order to direct CSS operations • Cannot synchronize logistical support with operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintains support during all phases of operations • Can communicate with/ issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units • Process and Analyze reports from sub-units • Can communicate with and action orders from higher command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has minor trouble maintaining support during all phases of operations • Can usually communicate with/ issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units • Can usually process and Analyze reports from sub-units • Can usually communicate with and action orders from higher command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has difficulty maintaining support during all phases of operations • Has difficulty communicating with/ issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units • Has difficulty processing and analyzing reports from sub-units • Has difficulty communicating with and actioning orders from higher command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must be trained by CF on task • Cannot maintain support during all phases of operations • Cannot communicate with/ issue orders to/ receive reports from sub-units • Cannot process and analyze reports from sub-units • Cannot communicate with and action orders from higher command 	
Leadership	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Person, Division, Mission • Competent / Charismatic (use of ISAF/NA, IS) • Effective Mission / Accountability / Policies / Procedures • Clear, Precise and Standard report of Operations • Established / proven based on direct / indirect / feedback, work with all customers 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the very positive traits • Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership • Usually enforces materiel accountability, policies and procedures • Willingly works with most customers 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally capable • Corrupt or questionable loyalty • Lacking basic leadership potential • Lacks initiative to enforce materiel accountability, policies and procedures 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent / Marginal capable / Disruptive leader • Corrupt, selfish, disloyal leader • Unable to work with people that report from him • Does not enforce materiel accountability, policies and procedures • Lacking of basic leadership potential • Disrupts command 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Request, receipt, issue, store and manage all supplies • Schedule/ conduct cyclic inventory management • Schedule/ conduct maintenance operations • Schedule/ conduct distribution operations • Establish/ conduct accountability of equipment / supply discipline • Establish/ conduct demand history and reconciliation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintains stockage records • Has minor trouble forecasting requirements • Establishment of basic maintenance program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally maintains stockage records • Has basic understanding of forecasting requirements • Lacks initiative to develop basic maintenance program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of accountability of supplies and equipment • Does not understand the purpose of forecasting and planning • No maintenance program 	
Collective Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission Focused / "METL" Focused/ Standards Based • Has a literacy program • Scheduled continuation training and development within MOS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of continuation training • Has a literacy program 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No institutional training • Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training • Lacks literacy program 	

²⁰ Appendix A, along with section 2.12, is submitted in fulfillment of Section 1221 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Previous reports used metrics that focused on ANSF force generation. With the build-out of the forces largely complete, ISAF has shifted to developing ANSF sustainment and institutional capacity and has therefore revised the metrics it uses to reflect this shift.

ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (Infantry)

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Combined Arms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close w/ & Destroy EF • Fire and MAN; synch enablers • Operate as CA Team 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can close with and destroy enemy but can only synch some enablers or function independently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally effective at combined arms operations; cannot effectively synch enablers or operate in a team 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Controls Forces on the battlefield • Establishes and Maintains Situational Awareness/ Battle Tracking; COORD w/ ADJ units • Can Communicate and issue orders to and receive reports from subordinate units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can perform C2 functions reasonably well; lacks ability for 1 or more Fully Capable Criteria • Can perform with minimal CF assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can perform C2 functions marginally; lacks ability to establish or maintain C2 consistently • Can perform only with CF assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training 	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose, Direction Motivation • Competent / Character • Loyal to GIROA, CF • Enforces Standards • Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits • Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader • Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty • Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Toxic Leader • Corrupt or Disloyal • Lacking in basic leadership potential • Replace immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can sustain itself in combat for 96 hours • "36 MM +1" (CL III, V, XIII, IX) and CL I • Establish/ maintain accountability of equipment / supply discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can sustain itself in combat for 48-72 hours • Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies • Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can sustain itself in combat for >48 hours • Requires CF assistance for Sustainment • Requires CF assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues • Cannot function without CF sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission Focused / "METL" Focused/ Standards Based • Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed • Has literacy program • Exercises Operational Cycles (RED/AMBER/GREEN/GO) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lacks one or more of the IWA criteria • Has a literacy program • Lacks Operational Cycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training • Lacks literacy program • Lacks Operational Cycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF training to establish a training program; has no literacy program 	

ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (Corps)

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Combined Arms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plans, Coordinates, and Synchronizes all Combat Operations and ANSF activities within the Corps Battlespace • Integrates all available enabler support into Brigade Operations • Provides security and freedom of movement to Afghan Civilians and GIROA within the Corps Battlespace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can Plan and Coordinate Operations, but lacks ability to fully integrate all War Fighting Functions or ANSF Pillars into a cohesive, singular effort • Deficient in at least 1 Fully Capable Criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally effective at combined arms operations; cannot effectively synch enablers or all Pillars of ANSF within the Corps Battlespace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EOI SA within the Corps Battlespace • Controls and oversees all ANSF activity w/in BS ; synchronizes and integrates all available assets • Coordinates, Issues orders and receives reports from subordinate, adjacent, higher and other Pillars of the ANSF : GSG, MCO • Develops Campaign Plans and Operations in support of GIROA / MCO directives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can perform C2 functions reasonably well • Lacks ability for 1 or more Fully Capable Criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can perform C2 functions marginally; lacks ability to establish or maintain C2 consistently • Can perform only with CF assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training 	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose, Direction Motivation • Competent / Character • Loyal to GIROA, CF • Enforces Standards • Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits • Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader • Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty • Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Toxic Leader • Corrupt or Disloyal • Lacking in basic leadership potential • Replace immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Directs and prioritizes logistic assets and support throughout the Corps Battlespace • Coordinates directly with Regional Logistic Support Commands for fulfillment of supply requests • Ensures timely distribution of all classes of supply to the Brigades • Manages and distributes budgetary resources as required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reallocates assets across the Corps as required • Places command emphasis on resolving Sustainment issues • Lacks ability for 1 or more Fully Capable Criteria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot resolve Sustainment issues within the ANSF system • Requires CF assistance for Sustainment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues • Cannot function without CF sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides Training Guidance to Brigade Commanders • Establishes and maintains a professional development training program for Officers and NCOs • Has a literacy program • Exercises Operational Cycles (RED/AMBER/GREEN) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lacks one or more of the Fully Capable criteria • Has a literacy program • Lacks Operational Cycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training • Lacks literacy program • Lacks Operational Cycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF training to establish a training program; has no literacy program 	

ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (CEK)

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors		Developing Developing with Partners	Established
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • fully support the Corps operations construction Engineer effort • Capable of planning, forecasting, and prioritizing future construction ISO Corps requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has minor trouble in supporting the Corps operations with construction Engineer effort • Can plan and forecast construction, need help prioritizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • limited construction Engr capability in planning and support of Corps operations • Capable of planning construction, cannot forecast or prioritize 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Able to transmute engineer Corps needs in execution orders for Subordinate Coys. • Establishes and Maintains Situational Awareness/ Battle Tracking, coordinates with other enabler assets • Staff is capable of managing multiple projects simultaneously 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Able to process Report and Return from /to subordinate Coys • Can perform C2 with minimal CF assistance • Staff can manage one project independently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can perform C2 functions marginally; lacks ability to establish or maintain C2 consistently • Can perform C2 only with CF assistance • Staff needs coalition assistance with project management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training 	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose, Direction Motivation • Competent / Character • Loyal to G/ROA, CF • Enforces Standards • Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits • Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader • Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty • Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Toxic Leader • Corrupt or Disloyalty • Lacking in basic leadership potential • Replace Immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can sustain itself in combat for 72 hours • Maintain accountability of equipment / supply discipline • Schedule and perform maintenance for engineer equipment / vehicles • Capable of planning, forecasting, and requesting construction materials independently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can sustain itself in combat for 48 hours • Establish a basic maintenance program • Need coalition assistance forecasting construction material usage, can request independently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires CF assistance for Sustainment • Requires CF assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline • Needs CF assistance planning, forecasting, and requesting construction materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability • Cannot function without CF sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mission Focused - Standards Based • Independently plans, schedules, resources, and executes construction missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan, forecast, and schedule training • Need assistance planning, scheduling and resourcing construction, can execute independently 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training • Lacks initiative to develop basic engineer training • Need coalition support for all aspects of construction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF training to establish a training program; has no literacy program • Need coalition in the lead on all aspects of construction 	

ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (RCC)

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Combined Arms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully support the combat units with route clearance capability during the operation • Framework routes are cleared regularly 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • with some difficulty support the combat units with route clearance capability during the operation • Framework routes are planned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marginally support the combat units with route clearance capability during the operation • Only clear ISO named operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training • Unable to support with clearance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can process and issue orders • Maintain Route Clearance support during all phases of the operations • Leaders track movement from TOC and control movement on the ground • able to conduct R2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can perform C2 functions reasonably well with minimal CF advise • has minor trouble maintaining support during all phase of operations • Leaders control movement on ground, need assistance tracking from the TOC • limited R2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can perform C2 functions marginally; lacks ability to establish or maintain C2 consistently • Can perform only with CF assistance • Leaders unable to control or track movement without CF assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit is untrained or in training 	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose, Direction Motivation • Competent / Character • Loyal to G/ROA, CF • Enforces Standards • Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits • Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader • Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty • Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incompetent /Toxic Leader • Corrupt or Disloyalty • Lacking in basic leadership potential • Replace Immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can sustain itself in combat for 48 hours • maintain accountability of equipment and forecast maintenance for critical equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can sustain itself in combat for 24 hours • Has minimally functional accountability • Can forecast requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires CF assistance for Sustainment • Requires CF assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues • Cannot function without CF sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement the clearance skills with a deep process of lesson learned, • intelligence driven operations training/knowledge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a literacy program on Route Clearance Capability • establish a management system to monitor the IED threats • Can plan, forecast, and schedule training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training • Lacks literacy program • Lack of route Clearance knowledge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires significant CF training to establish a training program; has no literacy program 	

ANA Assessment and RDL Matrix (Signal)

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Establish a tactical information network and system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMD Post Data Support act. Conduct LAN/TI MGMT Activities Install operate voice radio network 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMD Post Data Support act. Conduct LAN/TI MGMT Activities w/minimal contractor support Install operate voice radio net 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CMD Post Data Support act. Conduct LAN/TI MGMT Activities w/high level of contractor support Install operate voice radio net 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unit is untrained or in training Install operate voice radio net 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Control Forces on the battlefield Execute tactical operations Conduct the Military Decision Making Process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can perform C2 functions reasonably well; lacks ability for 1 or more Fully Capable Criteria Can perform with minimal CF assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can perform C2 functions marginally; lacks ability to establish or maintain C2 consistently Can perform only with CF assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unit is untrained or in training 	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purpose, Direction Motivation Competent / Character Loyal to GIROA, CF Enforces Standards Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent /Toxic Leader Corrupt or Disloyalty Lacking in basic leadership potential Replace immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can coordinate maintenance/sustainment activities to support 96hrs of operations Conduct Communication System Maintenance activities Establish/maintain accountability of equipment / supply discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself in combat for 48-72 hours Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself in combat for >48 hours Requires CF assistance for Sustainment Requires CF assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues Cannot function without CF sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mission Focused / "METL" Focused/ Standards Based Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed Has literacy program Exercises Operational Cycles (RED/AMBER/GREEN/GO) Progressive Training Model (train the trainer) in place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lacks one or more of the IWA criteria Has a literacy program Lacks Operational Cycle Minimal advanced level trained personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant CF assistance / guidance to devise and conduct training Lacks literacy program Lacks Operational Cycle No progressive training model in place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant CF training to establish a training program; has no literacy program 	

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Assessment Matrix

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Complete Assigned Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide public services Respond to emergencies Secure & process evidence Complete Inv leading to arrest Ensure pop & infra security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can provide public services Can respond to emergencies Can ensure road safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can provide public services Can respond to emergencies 	Must be trained	Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish & operate CP Establish & maintain Situational Awareness & analyzes crime statistics Communicate & issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units Provide constructive feedback and orders to sub units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can operate Command Post, Controlling operations Can Communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units 	Can Communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units	Can only focus on a single task at a time	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purpose, Direction Motivation Competent / Character Loyal to Afghan people Enforces Standards Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent /Marginally capable/ disruptive leader Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent /Toxic Leader Corrupt or Disloyalty Lacking in basic leadership potential Replace immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself for 48+ hours Establish/ maintain/ issue accountability of equipment/ supply discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself for 24-48 hours Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself in operation for > 24 hours Requires assistance for Sustainment Requires assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues Cannot function without sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct operations training / in service trng ("METL" Focused/ Standards Based) Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) Exercises Operational Cycles (leave, training and duty cycle) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires assistant in training Scheduled/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant assistance/ guidance to devise and conduct training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant training Needs to establish a training program 	

ABP Assessment Matrix

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Complete Assigned Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stop criminal activity along rat lines and BXP Collect revenue at entry points Prevent prohibited materials/PAX from entering/ exiting the country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stop criminal activity along rat lines and BXP Collect revenue at entry points 	Collect revenue at entry points	Must be trained	Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish & operate CP Establish & maintain SA & analyze criminal activities Communicate, issue orders & receive reports from sub units Provide constructive feedback and orders to sub units Coordinate between ANSF for joint operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can Communicate and issue orders to and receive reports from subordinate/ supporting units 	Can Communicate and issue orders to and receive reports from subordinate/ supporting units	Can only focus on a single task at a time	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purpose, Direction Motivation Competent / Character Loyal to Afghan people Enforces Standards Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent / Marginally capable/ disruptive leader Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent / Toxic Leader Corrupt or Disloyalty Lacking in basic leadership potential Replace immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself for 72+ hours Establish/ maintain / Issue accountability of equipment/ supply discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself for 48-72 hours Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself in operation for > 48 hours Requires assistance for Sustainment Requires assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues Cannot function without sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct operations training / In service training ("METL" Focused/ Standards Based) Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) Exercises Operational Cycles (leave, training and duty cycle) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires assistance in training Scheduled/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) training Exercises Operational Cycles (leave, training and duty cycle) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant assistance/ guidance to devise and conduct training Lacks Operational Cycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant training Needs to establish a training program 	

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Assessment Matrix

	Fully Capable Independent with Advisors	Capable Effective with Advisors	Partially Capable Effective with Partners	Developing Developing with Partners	Established
Complete Assigned Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide intelligence information and police support to the ANA Conduct hostage rescues and counter-terrorism operations Checkpoint operations and mounted/ dismounted patrolling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can provide intelligence information and police support to the ANA Can conduct checkpoint operations and mounted/ dismounted patrolling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can conduct checkpoint operations and mounted/ dismounted patrolling Can conduct check points Can be a mobile police presence in high-threat areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can conduct check points Can be a mobile police presence in high-threat areas 	Unit is standing up; conducting initial fielding / training
Command and Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OPCON/TACON relationship establish between deployed units & regionally based Bde HQ Operate CP, control ops Establish & maintains SA/Battle Tracking Can issue orders, receive reports from sub units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can operate Command Post and control the operation Can communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units 	Can communicate and issue orders and receive reports from subordinate units	Can only focus on a single task at a time	
Leadership	RDL: Very Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Purpose, Direction Motivation Competent / Character Loyal to Afghan people Enforces Standards Instills the will to fight 	RDL: Positive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capable leader lacking in experience or one of the Very Positive traits Still requires CF assistance with some core functions of leadership 	RDL: Neutral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent / Marginally capable/ disruptive leader Corrupt or of Questionable Loyalty Lacking in basic leadership potential 	RDL: Negative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incompetent / Toxic Leader Corrupt or Disloyal Lacking in basic leadership potential Replace immediately 	
Sustainment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself for 72+ hours "35 MM +1" (CL III, V, XIII, IX) and CL I Establish/ maintain accountability of equipment/ supply discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself for 48-72 hours Can provide bare minimum of critical supplies Has minimally functional Accountability or Supply Discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can sustain itself in operation for > 48 hours Requires assistance for Sustainment Requires assistance to establish and maintain accountability or discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cannot sustain itself, or has significant accountability or corruption issues Cannot function without sustainment support 	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assigned Mission Focused "METL" based training Scheduled/ Resourced/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) Exercises Operational Cycles (RED/AMBER/GREEN) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires CF to assist in training Scheduled/ Rehearsed (GO/ No-Go) training Early stages of Operational Cycle (RED/AMBER/GREEN) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant assistance/ guidance to devise and conduct training Lacks Operational Cycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires significant training Needs to establish a training program 	

ANNEX B: ACRONYMS

Note: Acronyms for organizations, activities, or projects used only once are not included.

AAF	Afghan Air Force
ABP	Afghan Border Police
AFMIS	Afghanistan Financial Management Information System
AFN	Afghani (Afghan currency)
AGO	Attorney General's Office
ALP	Afghan Local Police
AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Funding of Terrorism
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANASOC	ANA Special Operations Command
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Policy
ANDF-P	Afghan National Defense Facility - Parwan
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANQAR	Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
APRP	Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program
AQ	al Qaeda
ARB	Afghan Review Board
ASI	Afghan Security Institutions
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ASSF	Afghan Special Security Forces
ATFC	Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
BMTF	Border Management Task Force
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
BSA	Bilateral Security Agreement
C2	Command and Control
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CEK	Corps Engineer <i>Kandak</i>
C-IED	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
CIVCAS	Civilian Casualty
CJIATF	Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force – Afghanistan
CJSOR	Combined Joint Status of Review
CN	Counternarcotics

CNP-A	Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan
CoGS	Chief of the General Staff
CPC	Criminal Procedure Code
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CT	Counterterrorism
DABS	Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat
DCC	District Coordination Council
DEA	U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
ECC	Electoral Complaints Commission
EIA	Enemy-Initiated Attack
EPHS	Essential Package of Hospital Services
EST	Enduring Security Threats
EU	European Union
EVAW	Elimination of Violence Against Women
EvBO	Evidence Based Operations
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FSP	Female Searcher Program
FY	Fiscal Year
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDPSU	General Directorate of Police Special Units
GHRCR	Gender, Human Rights, and Children's Rights Directorate
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HPA	High-Profile Attack
HQ	Headquarters
HR&GI	Human Rights and Gender Integration
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDF	Indirect Fire
IEC	Independent Election Commission
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IG	Inspector General
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IOC	Initial Operating Capacity
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCIP	Justice Center in Parwan
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
KBR	Kabul Bank Receivership
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MCTF	Major Crimes Task Force
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MoEd	Ministry of Education
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MoHE	Ministry of Higher Education
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MoMP	Ministry of Mines and Petroleum
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MOPW	Ministry of Public Works
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSFV	Mobile Strike Force Vehicle
NAPWA	National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan
NATO	North American Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDN	Northern Distribution Network
NDS	National Directorate for Security
NIU	National Interdiction Unit
NPP	National Priority Programs
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NROLFSM-A	NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission- Afghanistan
NSOCC-A	NATO Special Operations Component Command- Afghanistan
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan

O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OCC	Operational Coordination Centre
OCC-R	Operational Coordination Centre - Regional
ODC	Open Deployment Cycle
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCoP	Provincial Chiefs of Police
PNUW	Peace and National Unity Week
PNUW	Peace and National Unity Week
PIRoA	President of Afghanistan
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRCs	Provincial Response Companies
PTC	Provincial Training Curriculum
PTEC	Power Transmission and Connectivity (project)
RASR	Regional Command ANSF Status Report
RC (E, S, W, C, or N)	Regional Command (East, West, North, South, or Central)
RDL	Rating Definition Level
RoL	Rule of Law
ROLFF-A	Rule of Law Field Force- Afghanistan
RS	Resolute Support (Mission)
RTC	Regional Training Curriculum
SAO	Security Assistance Office
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAAT	Security Force Assistance Team
SGP	Small Grant Projects
SMW	Special Mission Wing
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
State	U.S. Department of State
TAA	Train, Advise, and Assist
TAC	Transparency and Accountability Committee
TAO	Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight
TCN	Third-Country National

TMAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
Treasury	U.S. Department of the Treasury
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission - Afghanistan
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces - Afghanistan
VSO	Village Stability Operations
VSP	Village Stability Platform

