

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU  
Historical Services Branch

**Interview NGB-01**

INTERVIEW OF

LTC FRANK CANDIANO  
Commander  
1st Battalion, 258th Field Artillery

CONDUCTED BY

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National Guard Bureau

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TAPE TRANSCRIPTION

Note: LTC Candiano reviewed this transcript and  
submitted corrections/revisions in August 2002

Comments and corrections are indicated in the text by  
the use of [*brackets and italic print*]

## 1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 **MAJ MELNYK:** This is MAJ Les' Melnyk, Army  
3 National Guard Historian at the National Guard Bureau.

4 I am interviewing LTC Frank Candiano. That's  
5 C-a-n-d-i-a-n-o. LTC Candiano is the commander of the  
6 1st Battalion, 258 Field Artillery, New York Army  
7 National Guard.

8 This interview is taking place at Battery  
9 Park, New York City, on the 18th of September 2001.

10 LTC Candiano, if we could start, briefly, by  
11 you telling us -- well, first off, the formality. You  
12 have signed the oral history access agreement and agree  
13 that nothing that you are going to speak needs to be  
14 withheld for any reason; is that correct?

15 **LTC CANDIANO:** Correct

16 **MAJ MELNYK:** Could you start sir, by telling  
17 us a little bit about your background, your unit, how  
18 long you've been in command.

19 **LTC CANDIANO:** I have been in command  
20 approximately two years of the 1st of the 258. I've  
21 also served previous assignments in the same battalion  
22 as an AGR [*Active Guard/Reserve*] officer, as an S-1, S-

1 2, Assistant S-3 - plans and Ops officer, left the  
2 battalion to take a tour as a recruiting officer, and  
3 then an XO of an organic battalion consisting of - a  
4 TDA battalion, consisting of MPs, and signal, and  
5 prepared the 105th MP Company from Buffalo, New York,  
6 to get them to ramp up and train for a tour in Bosnia.

7           Upon completion of my assignment there, I was  
8 assigned to take command of the 258.

9           As far as branches go, I'm branch qualified in  
10 signal, mech infantry, artillery, and MI.

11           **MAJ MELNYK:** If you could take us to the  
12 morning of September 11. Where were you when you  
13 learned of the attack? What were your first emotions  
14 and what were your first actions?

15           **LTC CANDIANO:** On the morning of - Tuesday  
16 morning a.m., I had gotten into work and --

17           **MAJ MELNYK:** Where is your armory located?

18           **LTC CANDIANO:** Jamaica Armory is on 168th  
19 Street, in Jamaica.

20           **MAJ MELNYK:** Jamaica, Queens.

21           **LTC CANDIANO:** Correct.

22           **LTC CANDIANO:** And we were discussing the

1 plans for an upcoming training event for one of my  
2 batteries that's preparing to do an NTC rotation, and  
3 we were discussing some live fire missions that were  
4 going to take place.

5           And I went up to discuss some of the training  
6 issues with my S-3, when everybody went into his office  
7 and the television was turned on to, I believe, Channel  
8 4, NBC News, and they had just said that there was an  
9 explosion at the World Trade Center. That's all that  
10 was said at the time.

11           Several minutes later, it seemed like, there  
12 was a second explosion, and at that point in time, the  
13 news had said we believe that a plane may have hit the  
14 World Trade Center. [*My Command Sergeant major and I*  
15 *went to the roof of the Jamaica armory and saw the*  
16 *smoke billowing out of the WTC tower]*

17           At the time of that incident, it just seemed  
18 like maybe something really got screwed up and a plane  
19 hit, you know, maybe there's some problem with controls  
20 or whatever.

21           But as soon as the second plane hit the World  
22 Trade Center, we kind of figured that it was too

1 perfect, there had to be more to it than meets the eye,  
2 and the odds of that happening are slim to none.

3 So at that point in time, the first thing I  
4 did was contact my higher headquarters to see if  
5 there's anything going on, and I believe we notified my  
6 brigade and they were not aware of the incident.

7 **MAJ MELNYK:** This is 3rd Brigade, 42nd  
8 Infantry Division.

9 **LTC CANDIANO:** 3rd Brigade and 42<sup>nd</sup> ID, right,  
10 in Buffalo, New York.

11 **MAJ MELNYK:** And who did you speak to, sir?

12

13 **LTC CANDIANO:** I believe I spoke to a MAJ  
14 Kevin Adler, and advised him that there's something  
15 going on and I don't know what it is.

16 At that point in time, I knew that somewhere,  
17 somehow, soon, this was going to be an all out call out  
18 for the National Guard for the State of New York. I  
19 didn't know it was going to be a limited response at  
20 first, based on what was going on. I just figured as  
21 soon as the Governor caught wind of this thing, we're  
22 all going somewhere to do something.

1           So I immediately grabbed my full-timers and I  
2   said "As far as I'm concerned, this is a terrorist  
3   activity, a terrorist threat, you know." I don't know  
4   what the outcome of this is going to be, but gather all  
5   the vehicles lined up on the drill floor, I broke  
6   everybody down into two crews.

7           I immediately tightened the security on the  
8   armory through our DESOPS. We have an SOP that we need  
9   to follow. Lock the building down, nobody in, nobody  
10  out, until we've kind of sorted through everything.

11           And at that point in time, had our vehicles  
12  lined up on the drill floor, had them all topped off.  
13  While that was going on, most of my -- I had the luxury  
14  of most of my full-time guys are first sergeants - so  
15  they immediately, after talking with them, went through  
16  the alert roster and started to notify everybody.

17           I called my battery commanders and said  
18  basically this is it, be prepared to come in, and --

19           **MAJ MELNYK:** You didn't order them in at that  
20  time. You told them to be prepared.

21           **LTC CANDIANO:** Be prepared to come in, because  
22  we didn't know what the story was at that point in

1 time.

2           Ironically enough, a lot of my enlisted  
3 soldiers, with no questions asked, once they heard it  
4 on the news and they found out that it was, in fact, a  
5 plane and then a second plane going into the towers, I  
6 had soldiers showing up at my gates, doors locked, with  
7 duffel bags, waiting to come in, no questions asked.

8           At the same time, I had the 105th Infantry,  
9 who happens to be in the building.

10           **MAJ MELNYK:** What element of it, sir?

11           **LTC CANDIANO:** They're Charlie Company of the  
12 105th Infantry. They are housed in my armory, as well.

13           We went under the concept of a Y2K configuration, and  
14 a Y2K configuration for state active duty, 53rd Troop  
15 Command, located in Valhalla, New York, was our MACOM  
16 and we report and we go through everything for, you  
17 know, whatever disasters might have taken place as a  
18 result of Y2K. We are OPCON'd to them.

19           I'm the task force commander for all of  
20 Queens, New York under the configuration. So after I  
21 reported in to Troop Command and I also reported in to  
22 my higher at the brigade, you know, I was in contact

1 with the 105th commander to discuss that he may want to  
2 check with his higher, which is the 27th Brigade, to  
3 find out what their requirements are going to be and  
4 see if he is going to be required to come in.

5 **MAJ MELNYK:** When you contacted the 27th Troop  
6 Command, what was their state of --

7 **LTC CANDIANO:** 53rd Troop Command.

8 **MAJ MELNYK:** I'm sorry. 53rd Troop Command,  
9 what was their state of preparation, what instructions  
10 did they give you? Did they assume command at that  
11 time?

12 **LTC CANDIANO:** The 53rd Troop Command was  
13 waiting for a response from the State of New York and  
14 they said right now there is going to be some sort of a  
15 call out, get your alert lists ready and implement on  
16 order, and pretty much so.

17 And good, bad or indifferent, I understood  
18 what they were saying, but something like that is kind  
19 of critical and you need reaction time, because in many  
20 cases, soldiers in my neck of the woods have to take  
21 mass transportation and sometimes several trains to get  
22 in.



1           So I told them "Get the soldiers in."

2           **MAJ MELNYK:** You told --

3           **LTC CANDIANO:** I told my soldiers, at that  
4 point in time, let's start calling the troops in. I  
5 don't know what the outcome is going to be. I have a  
6 drill weekend coming up in September. In the worst  
7 scenario, my soldiers will SUTA and I'll take the hit  
8 on that. [*Clarification: LTC Candiano wanted his*  
9 *soldiers to report in immediately; if it subsequently*  
10 *turned out that NY State did not require them, LTC*  
11 *Candiano would then have compensated his soldiers for*  
12 *their time by granting them a SUTA - Substitute Unit*  
13 *Training Assembly - for that month, thus crediting his*  
14 *soldiers with having attended drill]*

15           **MAJ MELNYK:** But that was your own initiative.

16           **LTC CANDIANO:** That was my own initiative,  
17 because I thought better safe than sorry, and I think  
18 by 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, I had 339 troops on  
19 the drill floor ready to go.

20           **MAJ MELNYK:** Is your entire battalion located  
21 in that one armory?

22           **LTC CANDIANO:** No. I have troops located in

1 Bedford Avenue in Brooklyn and Kings Bridge Armory in  
2 the Bronx.

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** So it's three batteries in  
4 Jamaica.

5 **LTC CANDIANO:** I have three batteries in  
6 Jamaica, my Headquarters battery, my Alpha battery, and  
7 my Service battery.

8 **MAJ MELNYK:** Did the troops on the drill floor  
9 also include elements from Charlie 105th?

10 **LTC CANDIANO:** Not at that point in time.

11 [*Note: With the Y2K plan in effect as per 53<sup>rd</sup> Troop*  
12 *Command, C/105 Infantry was OPCON to the 258<sup>th</sup> Field*  
13 *Artillery*] Charlie 105th was falling out on their own.

14 But at the time of mobilization, what I did was -- or  
15 the preparation for mobilization, I contacted New York  
16 City buses just to find out what was going on, because  
17 I didn't have enough -- you know, with an artillery  
18 battalion we Tracks. We don't have a lot of Humvees, we  
19 don't have a lot of five tons, whatever the case might  
20 be.

21 So what I did was I put a call into New York  
22 City and I kind of coordinated through our headquarters

1 for me to say, "Listen, you know, we may be required.  
2 What is the feasibility of providing New York City  
3 buses to get my troops into New York City if I'm called  
4 upon to get in there."

5           No ifs, ands or buts, they said "If that  
6 happens, just call us. Give us a point of contact to  
7 talk to and we'll get you the buses." [*Note: NYC  
8 provided 6 buses to transport individuals from the  
9 Jamaica armory, to include those members of C/105<sup>th</sup>, who  
10 did not use organic transport assets*]

11           And again, while all this was taking place, I  
12 had some supply NCOs checking rations. I had water  
13 buffaloes topped off and tested to make sure that they  
14 met the drinking standards.

15           We had a lot of people coming in from other  
16 armories because the radio was putting out calls that  
17 all National Guardsmen should report at that point in  
18 time to their nearest Army National Guard armory.

19           So what I had them do was come into the  
20 building, contact their units to say that they're  
21 accounted for at this facility, and I put them to work  
22 starting to utilize alert rosters, so my guys could get

1 down on the drill floor and start working equipment.

2 That worked out to my benefit, my advantage.

3 Unfortunately, the lag in this thing was  
4 waiting to get the green light from Troop Command,  
5 because I think a lot of valuable time was wasted, and  
6 I think they should have some sort of -- if a battalion  
7 commander is making serious life and death situations  
8 in a combat zone anyway, he should be able to have that  
9 latitude to make a decision to say, okay, let's go,  
10 because I would have liked to have been on site before  
11 dark. [*Lag time from Troop Command was a result of*  
12 *problems with telephone lines, not response issues. In*  
13 *retrospect, I wish I had a backup communications plan*  
14 *working]*

15 **MAJ MELNYK:** What time did you feel you were  
16 ready to go and what time did you get the order to go?

17 **LTC CANDIANO:** I believe that we were combat  
18 loaded and ready to go probably by about 1600, 1630.  
19 And there were a lot of events still unfolding that we  
20 were watching on television, and it was really kind of  
21 hitting us rather hard from the standpoint that you  
22 could not believe that this happened again, although

1 lessons learned, because we saw it before.

2 But we anticipated more at that point in time.

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** You anticipated more attacks?

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** Attacks. Because I kind of  
5 felt that if they were so bold to go that far. You  
6 know, there had been scattered reports from time to  
7 time that bombs in vehicles were on bridges, bombs in  
8 vehicles in tunnels.

9 And we think of scenarios from the standpoint  
10 of in the event that we can't take a major route, how  
11 will we get into New York City if there were a problem?

12 Would we try to get to Staten Island and utilize  
13 ferries? Because that was an option, but then, again,  
14 with the bridge being out, we couldn't go that way.

15 You know, you've got the Third Avenue Bridge,  
16 59th Street Bridge, that kind of stuff, which you're  
17 familiar with.

18 **MAJ MELNYK:** Yes.

19 **LTC CANDIANO:** That you can get in, because  
20 that's not a primary bridge. I don't think they would  
21 waste their time and efforts on a secondary bridge.

22 So based on that, we got everybody ready and

1 full combat gear, minus the weapons, because I didn't  
2 have a green light as far as the weapons situation.

3           When I talked to Troop Command and I asked  
4 them specifically am I allowed to take sidearms, am I  
5 allowed to take weapons, they told me absolutely not.

6           That I think was wrong, because we didn't know  
7 what we were facing. And I certainly could have taken  
8 them, seeing how I was staging at an armory at 26th and  
9 Lex, I certainly could have taken the weapons out of my  
10 armory and brought them there and had them secured,  
11 even if it were with a guard on the drill shed floor.

12 *[LTC Candiano later commented: "I understand the*  
13 *concern that we don't want National Guardsmen running*  
14 *through the streets of NY Shooting up the town. It was*  
15 *just simply put: I was taking my battalion into a city*  
16 *that was for all intents and purposes under attack. I*  
17 *didn't know if buildings, the bridges and tunnels we*  
18 *went through would be blown at the first sign of a*  
19 *military presence. I would have been more at ease to*  
20 *have weapons. However, as it was, there were no*  
21 *provisions made for ammunition. Our mission at the*  
22 *time was still not defined as to the type of assistance*

1 *and support we would render]*

2 **MAJ MELNYK:** How is it you knew 26th and Lex,  
3 the 69th Regiment Armory, was your staging area?

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** Because I guess with me making  
5 a pain in the ass out of myself with the Troop Command  
6 TOC, they said that basically that's the closest armory  
7 to where ground zero is located, and at that point in  
8 time, muster there and await further instruction. [*LTC  
9 Candiano later commented: I had dispatched from Bn HQs  
10 some retired NYPD and NYFD personnel to try and get  
11 some actual data from the area and speak with personnel  
12 they had worked with. My thought at the time was to  
13 find out what type of support they would need, what  
14 type of equipment they required (if we had it) and how  
15 best to assist based on known intel. The information  
16 we got back, along with our consolidated briefings at  
17 the 69<sup>th</sup> Infantry armory clearly helped to define the  
18 mission I would take on that night with my battalion]*

19 **MAJ MELNYK:** When did they give you that  
20 order?

21 **LTC CANDIANO:** I'd say that was somewhere in  
22 the neighborhood, and if my time line is off, I'd say

1 it was somewhere around 6:00 o'clock or so, because we  
2 were pushing whatever buttons.

3 So once that came into play, we already  
4 committed our GSA buses and we also contacted the City  
5 of New York and they provided me four commercial buses  
6 for Jamaica, Queens, which also included taking the  
7 infantry on board, taking them, because there's no  
8 sense waiting to commit additional troops and wait for  
9 somebody to tell them they had to go.

10 I had the resources and the assets to move  
11 them. They were there, they were ready. The commander  
12 gave me the green light and we threw them on the bus.

13 **MAJ MELNYK:** At that time, you had no OPCON  
14 over them; no operational control.

15 They were just --

16 **LTC CANDIANO:** No. Just working under the  
17 premise that it was the Y2K plan for emergencies and  
18 disasters, and that's what I implemented.

19 So I contacted my two batteries in Brooklyn  
20 and the Bronx, got them the transportation they needed,  
21 and I had everybody, with all tactical vehicles and  
22 support vehicles, to meet us at 26th and Lex.



1           Upon arrival at 26th and Lex, the 69th had  
2 already gone through their briefing with their  
3 commanders and staff, and I sat down and I interfaced  
4 my staff and my commanders with their staff and their  
5 commanders.

6           And LTC Slack and I basically did an over-  
7 brief, one-over-the-world to both battalions.

8           **MAJ MELNYK:** And all the soldiers?

9           **LTC CANDIANO:** Just the commanders.

10          **MAJ MELNYK:** Just commanders.

11          **LTC CANDIANO:** I briefed my soldiers prior to  
12 coming out here real quick, but they got a briefing,  
13 because LTC Slack had checked out the area and  
14 basically told me what he saw, what he expected to see,  
15 and that was during the daylight.

16                 Going into a nighttime operation of that  
17 magnitude, not knowing what's up, what's down, what's  
18 working and what's not working, and who to report to  
19 and where are the -- the first thing I wanted to know  
20 was where are the command centers established, who's  
21 got charge of police, fire, and emergency services, and  
22 am I going to be required to establish a liaison or is

1 there a National Guard liaison on site already, and, if  
2 so, who is he and what are the rules of engagement for  
3 me to go out and secure the area.

4 At that point in time, while LTC Slack and I  
5 were meeting, I have a couple of NCOs that are -- well,  
6 I put feelers out for NCOs to tell me who are the best  
7 guys that I can send out in a scout capacity to see  
8 what routes are open for me to move through the streets  
9 and what looks like it's closed.

10 Concurrently, what I had done is contacted  
11 emergency services, which were pretty busy, and I just  
12 said to them "I'm colonel so-and-so of the New York  
13 Army National Guard, I'm the battalion commander of the  
14 artillery battalion, I have 339 troops at my disposal,  
15 and I'm here to provide the assistance, we're on of the  
16 first elements, where do you want my troops?"

17 And at that point in time, they said "get them  
18 somewhere here and we'll establish what you need to  
19 establish once you're on site."

20 And while that was going on, I had my scouts  
21 out really or COLT teams, if you will, as far as  
22 artillery goes.

1           And those are the guys that go out and poop  
2 and snoop and they came back to me and said this route  
3 is open, this is available. You know, there are a lot  
4 of police routes that were made available to us to  
5 transport the troops, buses, commercial buses, GSA  
6 buses and organic vehicles.

7           We all took off. But before that, I had MAJ  
8 Slack's three -- brief my commanders, myself and my  
9 three, with the one-over-the-world scenario as to what  
10 was going on.

11           We didn't know what to expect. I didn't know  
12 what to see. And, again, something like this you say  
13 you can plan for, you can prep for, but, Jesus, when it  
14 happens in your backyard, it's something different, and  
15 that's all I could say.

16           It was horrific. As we were coming into the  
17 city skyline, you could see the billowing smoke. You  
18 could smell the smoke. You could smell the death. You  
19 can see, as you got closer to the site itself, the  
20 flames, because there was a lot of stuff still burning.

21           Buildings across the street from ground zero,  
22 the impact area, were burning.

1           But let me back up a little bit by saying that  
2 after --

3           **MAJ MELNYK:** How did you get downtown  
4 actually? What route did you end up taking?

5           **LTC CANDIANO:** I think the way we worked it  
6 out is we got to the FDR Drive. I came down the FDR  
7 Drive to Battery Park and the police were at every  
8 intersection and entrance there to guide us all the way  
9 down.

10           Once we finished the briefings, I had a moment  
11 with my commanders, because to me this was going to  
12 battle. We were going to war with someone. I don't  
13 know who the enemy was. I don't know where the enemy  
14 was. All I know is that it was a terrorist activity  
15 and we were going to into a combat zone, because they  
16 could be anywhere around us.

17           Once we made liaison with the police in the  
18 police CP, which was located at -- I think we checked  
19 into -- I think it was South and Pike or South and  
20 Pine.

21           **MAJ MELNYK:** South and Pike is what --

22           **LTC CANDIANO:** South and Pike, it just seems

1 like a big blur. South and Pike is where the CP was  
2 established for NYPD.

3 The Army National Guard, what we had done, at  
4 that point in time, basically, again, three battalion  
5 commanders working together, we established our CP  
6 right next to theirs.

7 **MAJ MELNYK:** Your communication with the 101,  
8 what was that like? Had you spoken at all with them?

9 **LTC CANDIANO:** Yes. With the 101 CAV, they  
10 weren't on site yet and they were coming in later on.  
11 They were still mobilizing at the battalion. LTC Slack  
12 and I both spoke with LTC Costagliola on the phone and  
13 basically we established the rules of engagement, that  
14 I had decent numbers on the ground to start to go in,  
15 I'll establish liaison, get a perimeter set up, and  
16 hold the perimeter and secure it 'til first light, and  
17 while that was being done, LTC Slack was making contact  
18 and communications with some of the city agencies and  
19 established liaison with me and, at the same token, we  
20 had a liaison officer from -- I think assigned to us  
21 from the 107th group, did some coordination.

22 And I know that MAJ Henry Gim and CPT Lynch

1 became available to us somewhere down the road.

2 **MAJ MELNYK:** MAJ Gim?

3 **LTC CANDIANO:** Henry Gim.

4 **MAJ MELNYK:** How do you spell that, sir?

5 **LTC CANDIANO:** G-i-m. And he came over, I  
6 think, a couple of days into the exercise, but in the  
7 beginning, it was a little sketchy as far as the battle  
8 handoff as to who was doing what.

9 But essentially and initially, it was three  
10 battalions from the 3rd Brigade, kind of, for lack of a  
11 better word, immediately took charge of whatever the  
12 situation was downtown.

13 **MAJ MELNYK:** I know it's sketchy, but about  
14 what time Tuesday evening did you have this  
15 conversation with your fellow battalion commanders and  
16 decide that it was going to be the 258 that would go  
17 down first?

18 **LTC CANDIANO:** I would like to say that it was  
19 somewhere between eight and ten.

20 So at that point in time, we contacted Troop  
21 Command, who was initially the MACOM in charge, and we  
22 got the green light to prep to go in and they

1 established who we need to talk to and who we link up  
2 with on liaison.

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** And who was that, sir?

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** It might have been LTC Joe  
5 Likar from the 53rd Troop Command. He was the acting  
6 G-3.

7 So what I had done at that time is, again,  
8 talked to the battalion commander of the 69th face to  
9 face and TELECON with 101 CAV commander on the box, and  
10 we basically said that, you know, seeing how I have the  
11 strength posture on the ground, my troops are here  
12 ready to go, I'd be first guy into the box, because  
13 they were still in the process of gathering equipment  
14 out of supply rooms and whatever and getting set up to  
15 move.

16 [*LTC Candiano later commented: Once we arrived on*  
17 *sight, I had no further communications with 107<sup>th</sup> CSG or*  
18 *higher HQs until the following day. The night of the*  
19 *11<sup>th</sup>, my battalion, along with the assets of the 105<sup>th</sup>*  
20 *OPCON'd to me is what I had to work with]*

21 So the closer we got in towards the city, the  
22 more eerie it got, and it looked almost as if, as we

1 were coming into portions of the city, almost like an  
2 eerie fog. That's the only way I can describe it.

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** So this is coming down the FDR  
4 Drive.

5 **LTC CANDIANO:** Coming down the FDR Drive,  
6 coming towards Battery Park. We got off at -- I forgot  
7 the name of the street that we got off at prior to  
8 getting to Pike, and the battalion was behind us,  
9 because I got down to do liaison first as the commander  
10 of the troops, with the police liaison.

11 I got our rules of engagement from the chief,  
12 what kind of assistance he was looking for, what does  
13 he need from me. I gave him my strength posture, told  
14 him what I had on the ground to work with.

15 I asked him if there was any critical areas  
16 that he was concerned with, is there anything that he  
17 needs us to do, is there anything as far as an Intell  
18 brief for me, real quick, down and dirty, were there  
19 any concerns in the geographic area that I was going  
20 into.

21 At that point in time, he told me that he  
22 needed our assistance in a lot of the areas that were



1 basically blacked out, a lot of the areas that still  
2 had a lot of falling debris, because there were a lot  
3 of aftershocks, there were a lot of things still  
4 dropping.

5           Plate glass to me that seemed like it was  
6 three and four inches thick dropping 50-60 floors makes  
7 a hell of a weapon.

8           And just to keep those areas clear and  
9 establish a perimeter defense around the areas that the  
10 police felt that they need support with.

11           **MAJ MELNYK:** Do you recall the name of the  
12 chief who gave you these directions?

13           **LTC CANDIANO:** Chief Hoel [*unsure of spelling*]

14           **MAJ MELNYK:** He was the man in charge down  
15 there.

16           **LTC CANDIANO:** He was in charge at Pike and  
17 South in the command post. And, again, everything was  
18 happening so fast, so fluid, that that was the best we  
19 could do under the circumstances.

20           **MAJ MELNYK:** And you talked about ROE, rules  
21 of engagement.

22           **LTC CANDIANO:** Check. Correct.

1           **MAJ MELNYK:** He gave you guidance on that in  
2 terms of how to deal with other people?

3           **LTC CANDIANO:** Yes. And, again, because this  
4 was a unique situation that I don't think anyone  
5 prepares for and I didn't know what to expect.

6           I mean, maybe there was a THREATCON that he  
7 was more up to date on. Seeing how my headquarters was  
8 so far out of the box, I didn't want to take a chance,  
9 and I also knew that I had to protect the safety of my  
10 troops at the same time, because we did not have  
11 weapons. That was not the mission and the intent. And  
12 I got a VOCO not to bring weapons, period, which I felt  
13 was a mistake, because had something developed which  
14 was more of a serious attack of some sort, by virtue of  
15 the fact that we had weapons on site, even though we  
16 don't have ammo, the PD would more or less provide  
17 ammo, because they've got AR-15s. So I don't think  
18 that that might have been too much of an issue. [*LTC  
19 Candiano later commented: This reflects my personal  
20 feelings at the time, and is not meant to question the  
21 judgment of higher HQs. In retrospect, I understand  
22 the rationale and intent behind this order*]

1           I would have preferred, you know, in a  
2 situation like that, to bring my equipment downtown and  
3 to store it in that armory at 26th and Lex, based on  
4 the outcome, because it's a lot easier to have  
5 preparation and a plan there to implement with weapons  
6 systems as opposed to driving through a tunnel or a  
7 bridge which may not be there in another hour or two.

8           So to me, that was a force multiplier to have  
9 that equipment there, but I was basically told "no  
10 weapons."

11           So anyway, we got down, got the directions. I  
12 got on the radio. I told my S-3, my exec, and all my  
13 commanders listening in that, yes, there was a definite  
14 bombing, yes, for all intents and purposes, you're in a  
15 state of war until somebody says otherwise, and the  
16 threat is very real, so be prepared to expect anything  
17 and make sure that you protect your troops as best you  
18 can.

19           Prior to that, I met with -- obviously, you  
20 can't meet with all the soldiers, because it's total  
21 chaos on the drill floor when you have another  
22 battalion prepping up, ramping up, and you're there

1 with your troops, and my vehicles were lined up outside  
2 the building.

3 We just basically took all of Lexington  
4 Avenue, a good chunk of Lexington Avenue with my  
5 vehicles lined up, and both commercial and GSA buses.

6 So I took all the leadership at the one room  
7 and I just said, you know, "Guys, you know, this is it.

8 You know, we're under attack. This is in our turf.  
9 Now this is going to be by our rules and this is the  
10 way we're going to do business."

11 The bottom line is that somebody punched us in  
12 the face and they made us bleed. For all you know  
13 right now, you might have a sister, you might have a  
14 brother, you might have somebody there, we don't know,  
15 we don't know what the status is.

16 But after the buildings came down, that  
17 finally was the icing on the cake. And I said the  
18 gloves are now off.

19 People were asking me about weapons and I  
20 basically said we cannot use weapons. That's not the  
21 mission we're under right now. We're there to assist  
22 and help in the confusion going on.

1 (Tape change.)

2 **MAJ MELNYK:** This is a continuation of the  
3 interview with LTC Candiano.

4 Sir, you were about to head downtown.

5 **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah. As we got the briefing  
6 from the chief, a lot of police, a lot of fire showing  
7 up, and, obviously, there were no planes in the sky  
8 outside of military air flying around, just checking  
9 out, making sure everything was still good to go.

10 And I seem to remember that vividly, that as  
11 the World Trade Center was burning, I saw the aircraft  
12 in the sky and I knew that they weren't there just on a  
13 training mission.

14 They were there to shoot something down, and  
15 it was just -- it was just -- you know, it was just too  
16 much to think about.

17 You know, and at the same token, you think  
18 about what's going on, you think about your family, but  
19 that was secondary. You know, I hope my family is  
20 okay, and I know that was in the minds of the firemen  
21 and that was in the minds of the policemen; you know,  
22 yeah, I've got family, but I'm here to help somebody

1 else.

2           And that was premise. We just took off and  
3 did what we had to do.

4           But when we were getting downtown, the closer  
5 we got to ground zero, the impact area, the darker it  
6 was. I mean, there were a lot of emergency lights on  
7 right at the impact center. Things were on fire,  
8 buildings were on fire, glass was coming down, debris,  
9 and we looked at the map that the PD showed us. We  
10 transposed all the information to our maps to say these  
11 are the critical areas and based on the strength --

12           **MAJ MELNYK:** What maps did you have, sir?

13           **LTC CANDIANO:** We had, believe it or not, I  
14 had a good old Hagstrom map of New York City in our S-3  
15 shop and we got to the page of lower Manhattan, xeroxed  
16 about 50 or 75 copies or a 100 copies, and basically  
17 looked at what routes we could possibly get into the  
18 city, and enlarged those maps.

19           And everybody had those and that's what we  
20 used and we just married those maps up to what the PD  
21 had, and that's what I had to work with, because we had  
22 to improvise. There's no way you're going to get a map

1 of New York City right there under those circumstances.

2 So luckily we had it and that's what we did.

3 So once we got the zones and everything that the police  
4 were concerned with, we started to establish the  
5 perimeter and set up a route in which we were going to  
6 get into the area.

7 And once I got the rules of engagement, what  
8 they were concerned with, what to look for, looting, at  
9 that point in time, believe it or not, was not an  
10 issue.

11 And I was amazed that it wasn't an issue,  
12 because you know when there's a blackout, the riots in  
13 New York City during the great blackout that we had  
14 years and years ago, it was murder and mayhem.

15 But this was a different type of situation and  
16 it seemed like people were more concerned with trying  
17 to help as opposed to trying to destroy, and to me that  
18 was the great thing about New Yorkers.

19 People that might not get along with each  
20 other during the course of a day, but they all got  
21 together for this and they were behind each other.

22 So once we knew where we were going and what

1 we had to do, I broke down the batteries by sectors. I  
2 broke down the sectors by battery and basically said  
3 you guys are going to Zone 1, Zone 2, Zone 3, Zone 4,  
4 and it was that large perimeter, I don't know if you've  
5 got it on your map here, that we worked off of.

6 **MAJ MELNYK:** So you were working off of the  
7 police zones that you had gotten from the police  
8 headquarters at the base of Brooklyn Bridge.

9 **LTC CANDIANO:** Correct. Correct. And from  
10 this map here, which married up to pretty much the map  
11 that we had, we followed the route to establish an  
12 outside quarter and a perimeter. Then we started to  
13 work in.

14 We stayed away from the hot zone, which was  
15 Zone 1, because that's where all the debris, the fire,  
16 police, emergency services were all headed to Zone 1.

17 We just made sure that there were main routes  
18 of entry to assist the PD and to assist fire and  
19 emergency services to get into those routes to keep the  
20 intersections clear.

21 **MAJ MELNYK:** So the battalion initially  
22 followed a route down the FDR Drive, got back on the



1 FDR Drive.

2 **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah.

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** And then up to Battery Park.

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** Right.

5 **MAJ MELNYK:** And then --

6 **LTC CANDIANO:** And then from Battery Park  
7 north.

8 **MAJ MELNYK:** And the battalion split up at  
9 that point?

10 **LTC CANDIANO:** Right. We split up at that  
11 point and once we went into zones and sectors, we  
12 dismounted. Okay.

13 **MAJ MELNYK:** So the dismount point was?

14 **LTC CANDIANO:** Again, in looking at the map  
15 here, without having my glasses on with this thing --  
16 let me get the other map.

17 **MAJ MELNYK:** All right, sir.

18 **LTC CANDIANO:** This is where age kicks in.  
19 Part of our concern was the financial center. So some  
20 of us broke off and headed towards Wall Street, Rector  
21 Street, and we went up West Street, past the World  
22 Trade Center, which was pretty much the streets were

1 blocked off with PD anyway.

2 But what we found en route looked like Mount  
3 St. Helen's had been through.

4 **MAJ MELNYK:** So you actually drove up West  
5 Street right past the World Trade Center. That was not  
6 closed off at that time.

7 **LTC CANDIANO:** West Street was partially  
8 closed off. It had to be opened enough to let  
9 emergency vehicles in and out.

10 And emergency vehicles were coming all the way  
11 across, but West Street was primarily fire trucks,  
12 police, emergency services, and we got by.

13 **MAJ MELNYK:** Could you describe what you saw  
14 as you first laid eyes on the site?

15 **LTC CANDIANO:** Well, we didn't directly look  
16 at what was going on inside the site. We kind of  
17 focused on the southern area at first, to make sure  
18 that this was secured, and as we headed up, especially  
19 around Cedar and Liberty, right up around this area  
20 here, that's when it kind of hit home as to what was  
21 going on with the smell, the gray snow, the debris.

22 And we were, with boots on, over the top of

1 the boot in just gray dust and powder.

2 **MAJ MELNYK:** And was there any kind of -- you  
3 didn't have any kind of masks or other protection?

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** No. We didn't have anything at  
5 all at the time. We didn't have our chemical masks  
6 with us, because as I seem to recall, they were still  
7 in the supply truck and they were following us up.

8 But we never got to use them, because we were  
9 told at that point in time, when we were set up to go  
10 in, that it's not a situation where it's going to be a  
11 chemical hazard, it's not going to be a biological  
12 hazard, to the best that they knew.

13 And, again, it was to help them do a search  
14 and rescue at that point in time, and that's what it  
15 seemed like. Whatever the city agencies needed us to  
16 do when we started to get established, that's what we  
17 had to do.

18 But in establishing the perimeter, all  
19 agencies were involved heading toward the World Trade  
20 Center, you know, and it seemed like the cops couldn't  
21 take care of security, take care of roads, when they  
22 all wanted to be at the center of the blast.

1           So we assumed responsibility and control of  
2 the zone of operation. And basically what I did at  
3 that point in time was we dismounted troops, had troops  
4 park around Battery Park, because around Battery Park  
5 was the best place to park deuce and a halves.

6           We dismounted and started to walk up. This  
7 whole zone here in Zone 3.

8           **MAJ MELNYK:** Which is Battery Park City.

9           **LTC CANDIANO:** Right. Was black, was out, was  
10 dark.

11          **MAJ MELNYK:** No power.

12          **LTC CANDIANO:** No power. And what we did was  
13 we started to walk up West Street in formation and  
14 start to break off in teams to see what we needed to do  
15 to support.

16          By the same token, my headquarters battery  
17 traveled the north route, along with my B battery, and  
18 my Charlie battery and my service battery came in from  
19 the east side and started to work their way across.

20          So we all tried to get so far in to a certain  
21 point here to see if any assistance was needed.

22          Everything was secure around the lower part of

1 the city at this time, either by roving patrol or by  
2 foot, and we stayed in communication.

3 We augmented the police as best we could and  
4 at that concern -- at that point in time, my concern  
5 was "is there anybody alive in the outskirts or what's  
6 going on, because everything was focused here in the  
7 World Trade Center area, but there was not too much  
8 going on out here at first, because everybody was  
9 working in."

10 So - go ahead.

11 **MAJ MELNYK:** Your men then were looking for  
12 injured people, were looking for stragglers? What were  
13 their instructions to deal with civilian personnel on  
14 the streets?

15 **LTC CANDIANO:** To me, it was a situation, you  
16 know, keep your radios on, if you find somebody that  
17 dazed that needs aid - I asked the chief "where are  
18 your areas established that you have triage set up?,  
19 where are your major medical areas that might have?"  
20 Pace University was one of them.

21 My medics, I brought my ambulance along with  
22 me, so I could take care of whatever needed to be taken

1 care of as far as the troops go. And I thought about  
2 troops at first, because, again, I was thinking about a  
3 hostile environment.

4 But then the troops, which many of them were  
5 emergency service workers, were well prepared for what  
6 they saw.

7 In addition to that, in the battalion, I had  
8 20 combat lifesavers that were trained in the various  
9 batteries to support emergencies.

10 So I felt comfortable that the kit bags were  
11 full and they could provide support.

12 So as we found somebody that was dazed or  
13 injured, the medics tried to take care of whatever had  
14 to be taken care of, and we transported to either the  
15 hospital that was set up, the triage center, or turned  
16 them over to the PD or the fire department ambulances  
17 that were in the area.

18 All along these routes, ambulances were lined  
19 up. All along West, the major thoroughfares, there  
20 were medical support all along the area.

21 What kind of got gruesome for us, because a  
22 lot of the areas were not lit up, we started to into

1 areas to try to secure it and make sure that no looting  
2 was going, because the PD did not know that at the  
3 time. The PD did not know what the extent was out  
4 here, because everybody was focusing toward center.

5 So when the 258 arrived on site, we broke  
6 everybody down by battery going into areas, and then  
7 the battery commanders took charge as far as securing  
8 perimeters by zone and sector, and then walking the  
9 roadways to see what was going on.

10 **MAJ MELNYK:** Was there any effort to secure  
11 the lower end of Manhattan from curiosity seekers from  
12 the north? Had you been given that mission?

13 **LTC CANDIANO:** Yes.

14 **MAJ MELNYK:** Where was that cordon set up?

15 **LTC CANDIANO:** That mission to prevent people  
16 coming in was, I believe, originally around City Hall,  
17 this area. It was a little further. Here is City Hall  
18 here. It was back along -- Canal Street originally was  
19 the road. Here's Canal Street.

20 Originally, it was up to Canal Street.

21 **MAJ MELNYK:** And you had soldiers as far north  
22 as Canal Street.

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** Yes, we did. And then the  
2 boundaries were moved and I think at that point in  
3 time, we operated around -- NYPD solely took control of  
4 City Hall, en masse.

5           **MAJ MELNYK:** City hall is down here.

6           **LTC CANDIANO:** City hall is -- yeah. City  
7 hall is down here. And they took total control of City  
8 Hall.

9           So we basically worked all areas around City  
10 Hall going south and all areas above going north to the  
11 original Canal Street route.

12          **MAJ MELNYK:** Tuesday night, you had soldiers  
13 all the way up to Canal Street.

14          **LTC CANDIANO:** We had soldiers all the way up  
15 to the perimeter on Canal and because it was such a  
16 large area, we did a couple of patrols around with  
17 Humvees and then we dismounted, because we didn't want  
18 to add to additional traffic on the road while  
19 emergency vehicles were coming in.

20          **MAJ MELNYK:** Were you able, given that large  
21 area, to cover every intersection?

22          **LTC CANDIANO:** We broke everybody down into



1 twos and in many intersections, there were police out  
2 there, and in many intersections, there were police  
3 cadets from the academy.

4 But I didn't really think at the time that the  
5 amount of troops that we had would be enough, but by  
6 breaking them down in twos, it seemed to be okay.

7 We also had enough manpower whereas once we  
8 started to dismount and secure the areas that we  
9 thought we needed to, we were given the zone that was  
10 totally blacked out and the guidance there was "give us  
11 assistance to see if there's anybody hurt or injured"  
12 and in some cases, and I don't know where it was, but  
13 we found the nose wheel to one of the aircraft, one of  
14 the jetliners. [*The nose wheel had already been taped*  
15 *of as evidence - we personally did not discover it]*

16 We found a lot of people that just plain  
17 didn't make it. We found our fair share that I don't  
18 think anybody was prepared for.

19 **MAJ MELNYK:** What did you do in those  
20 instances? Were guardsmen handling the body parts?  
21 Were they marking them? Were they bypassing?

22 **LTC CANDIANO:** What we did was we basically --

1 in some cases, in the dark zones, you couldn't see  
2 bodies, because they were buried in debris and the  
3 dust, and the clay and the cement. [*Some soldiers*  
4 *assisted in moving body bags to a holding area. This*  
5 *was left mostly to medical personnel, to include the*  
6 *medical support platoon from the 1/101 Cavalry, which*  
7 *had arrived earlier in the day]*

8 I had another colonel walking with me [*LTC*  
9 *Carlos Rivera, a NY Army National Guard Selective*  
10 *Service officer, who stayed with me from early on Sept.*  
11 *11 until the battalion stood down]* to look at an area  
12 that I wanted to secure, that it was dark, with troops  
13 to maintain a position, and I believe we walked over  
14 two or three bodies just in one spot.

15 And we didn't know that there were bodies  
16 there until first light. The city, under these  
17 circumstances, again, when it's dark and with that  
18 smell and with the debris still falling and glass  
19 falling and explosions still going off, and fire in the  
20 buildings, it was just total chaos.

21 But the soldiers maintained control. If they  
22 found a body part, some cases, it might have been a

1 finger. Over in -- and I forgot which area it was,  
2 again, going up towards the promenade up here in  
3 Battery Park City, we found the antenna of the World  
4 Trade Center, or part of it. That's how far debris  
5 flew.

6           When we walked around the Trinity Church area,  
7 we found some bodies and, you know, just to see a leg  
8 sticking out of a window of a store, but just a leg.

9   *[This story was related to me by a soldier - I did not*  
10 *personally witness it]*

11           What was really weird, and I don't know if any  
12 of the other commanders talked about it and I don't  
13 know if they saw it, but there were shoes in the  
14 street, boots. People just ran out of their shoes. It  
15 was just unbelievable to see just shoes in the streets  
16 with no people.

17           It was just -- you know, we found one shoe  
18 that had part of a foot in it. We found a woman [*in*  
19 *shock*] that was laying up against a fence, one eye  
20 open, one eye closed, just laying there covered in gray  
21 debris. [*She was later assisted by EMTs*]

22           We saw a child. [*correction: we saw a small*

1 *child's carriage that was knocked over and crushed*  
2 *almost flat. Hopefully the child was okay]* We saw some  
3 dead animals along the side of the road, one of which  
4 was missing part of an ear. We saw death. And it's  
5 not something that you soon forget and, you know, it's  
6 a different perspective when you see it on television  
7 or in the movies and you see it for real.

8           But people in fixed positions that, you know,  
9 they looked like mannequins and the only thing you  
10 could do is tell a cop where they're located or you  
11 don't want to touch them because -- I made that quite  
12 clear to my soldiers that this was a crime scene and  
13 it's a federal -- it's a crime scene, but moreover,  
14 it's federal, and anybody touching anything is  
15 tampering with evidence, because I thought that this  
16 whole area, to me, was evidence, because there had to  
17 be something there which might help the authorities  
18 find who was responsible to do whatever, and that was  
19 the premise and that was part of my rules of engagement  
20 to my soldiers.

21           See something, try to tag it, identify it any  
22 which way, but don't move it, don't maim it, and don't

1 take it from its position.

2 And that's basically the way we worked it.

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** Looking at your soldiers, what  
4 did you see on their faces? What kind of reactions did  
5 they give you as you walked the line with them?

6 **LTC CANDIANO:** I saw some fear in the  
7 soldiers. I saw confusion with the soldiers. A lot of  
8 the soldiers asked why, when we weren't really out at  
9 the time, we weren't at war with anybody at the time,  
10 why would they want to do that to us.

11 But I saw, at the same token, I saw a resolve  
12 with the soldiers. I saw professionalism. I saw E-4s  
13 making decisions that officers and commanders would  
14 make on the situation. I was very proud of my men.

15 You train for certain things, but you train for  
16 war, you train to go after a soldier. You don't train  
17 enough, or any way, you don't train in any shape or  
18 form to do and deal with what we dealt with.

19 And, again, the only thing I can tell you is  
20 that it was one of the longest nights that I've ever  
21 had, but at the same token, it went real fast. And I  
22 don't expect you to understand that, outside the fact

1 that firemen, policemen were dazed and amazed that we  
2 saw things.

3           There was just one cause and that was to try  
4 to do whatever could be done, because we found out the  
5 carnage, not only the carnage, but the personal losses  
6 of most of the firemen, many of which we still don't  
7 know what the story is, because I have a lot of  
8 soldiers that have relatives and friends that are  
9 firemen that we don't know anything about.

10           But we saw the face of death. We smelled  
11 death. We still smell death today. And you find things  
12 and you think about things that no one could  
13 appreciate. I mean, to see body parts in abundance is  
14 amazing, that, you know, how you have a leg go through  
15 a window six or seven blocks later, just think of the  
16 impact. [*Again, I did not personally witness this*]

17           Was it from the plane? Was it from the  
18 building exploding? I don't know. But it's -- and  
19 especially when it's three floors, four floors up.  
20 It's kind of tough.

21           There were a lot of rats. There were a lot of  
22 rats running around because with windows broken and

1 vendor stands abandoned, food was in abundance, it  
2 really was.

3           We saw one rat basically gnawing on a bone  
4 *[this was related to me by a soldier - the bone may*  
5 *well have been food from one of the many abandoned*  
6 *concession stands]* and, unfortunately, it seemed like  
7 half the time something was going on, I was in the mix,  
8 because I had -- I walked the perimeter once or twice -  
9 -

10           **MAJ MELNYK:** Every night.

11           **LTC CANDIANO:** -- every night with my troops,  
12 because I want to see where they are and what they're  
13 doing. The first night was confusion and we held it,  
14 but I guess the relief effort really started and came  
15 into play at first light, there were a lot of things  
16 that were being uncovered and efforts started to focus  
17 with more of the area at ground zero.

18           But our mission at nighttime was to hold the  
19 line that was established and it was a handoff between  
20 the 69th and the 101, but at nighttime, it just was --  
21 it was just different. It was eerie. We still had to  
22 go into areas where no one wanted to go.

1           And in some cases, you'd have the request for  
2 assistance to move bodies. Use your vehicles, can you  
3 move soldiers, can you move firemen, can you move  
4 policemen, and then you had the mission that, you know,  
5 official, unofficial, "can you help us out, our truck  
6 isn't here, we need to move these bodies from point A  
7 to point B."

8           And in some cases, one of my guys found a  
9 spine. It was just a spine. And he is -- he works in  
10 a medical capacity. So it bothered him, but it didn't  
11 bother him that much. But for the average guy, it's a  
12 lot to swallow. [*LTC Candiano afterwards could not*  
13 *track down the individual who claimed to have seen a*  
14 *spine - it may have been a medic from the 101 Cavalry,*  
15 *since they arrived earlier on the 11<sup>th</sup>.*]

16           A fellow officer who was in the area not as a  
17 Guardsmen, but worked in the area and got out of there  
18 to put the suit on, had found a face, a skull, a face  
19 without a skull. It just looked like a Halloween mask  
20 on the ground.

21           That's the type of horror that was out there.  
22           And the soldiers reacted professionally. I can't say



1 -- you know, the National Guard gets a bad rap  
2 sometimes about things, but the National Guard also  
3 shows that they are very professional and it's been a  
4 turnaround with how the National Guard is treated as  
5 part of this overall operation.

6 And I have to tell you that soldiers got  
7 together, they're New Yorkers, and they all got  
8 together for one common cause, and that was to help  
9 whoever needed the help.

10 It didn't matter what the mission was. It  
11 didn't matter if it was moving bodies. It didn't  
12 matter. We were looking for things to do.

13 My soldiers were so infuriated with what was  
14 going on, that when they got off of their shift  
15 working, and we were on 24 hour OPS, but we were  
16 mandatorily bedded down for 12 hours, they wanted to  
17 spend their hours at the dig site. And we had to do  
18 whatever we had to do to get them crew rest so they  
19 could go back and do the job that they were required to  
20 do at night.

21 It was somewhat horrific. It was somewhat --  
22 it's something I'll never forget for the rest of my

1 life. But all I know is for us doing what we did, I  
2 was glad that a National Guard battalion or a National  
3 Guard unit was on site to do whatever we had to do, and  
4 for the history books, to say that an artillery  
5 battalion, my battalion, that I'm honored to command,  
6 was the first battalion in there to do something, to  
7 say what can I do for you, what do you need from me.

8           And I can't say enough about that. I want to  
9 tell you a story about the pigeon, because I thought  
10 that that was -- there was totally utter chaos going  
11 on. There were fire trucks.

12           One of the roads that we were walking down to  
13 secure had a lot of falling glass, and I can't even  
14 remember what building it was, but instead of having  
15 troops on both sides of the road go down this road, I  
16 went down this road with another colonel, who was  
17 working with us from Selective Service. He reported in  
18 to my unit. So he became more or less like my liaison,  
19 and his name was LTC Carlos Rivera.

20           And once we came on site down this road, I  
21 just looked over, and I think it was pretty close to  
22 Trinity Church, I'm not quite sure, because it was kind

1 of sketchy, but you could hear the sirens, you could  
2 hear the screams from people [*emergency workers calling*  
3 *out for assistance*], you can smell the diesel from the  
4 emergency vehicles that were trying to work  
5 construction, and people just running all over the  
6 place, while it was snowing this stuff.

7           And I say that everything was gray powder and  
8 snow, and it was horrible. I mean, to breath it was  
9 horrible. And we were told that the chemical masks  
10 wouldn't do anything, because the vision -- you needed  
11 more vision than what you had to work with, because we  
12 had the -17 series [*masks*].

13           Out of the clear blue, for some reason, I  
14 turned around and I looked off to the side, and the way  
15 the firemen work, they have these large six or eight  
16 inch hoses all over the place.

17           And that's the other thing that you saw. You  
18 saw fire hoses all over the place. Down any street,  
19 any street that had a fire hydrant had a hose.

20           And what they did to protect the hoses from a  
21 lot of the big trucks and equipment coming in is they  
22 had four by fours along the street on each side of the

1 hose to protect it from being smashed.

2 On one side of the four by four, on the hose  
3 itself, was a pigeon, and that pigeon had to be shell  
4 shocked, dazed, I don't know. You know, hit a window.

5 But the pigeon was standing there on this hose and  
6 nobody -- all those trucks running over this hose,  
7 never hit the pigeon.

8 And for one brief moment, everything just  
9 stopped and I don't know if that was my release point,  
10 but everything just stopped and that pigeon allowed me  
11 to pick it up and I put it off to the side of the road,  
12 because that was another life that I couldn't afford to  
13 see lost in that city.

14 It wasn't much and it might not be much and it  
15 might be that is kind of Mickey Mouse, but to me, that  
16 was something that at least, not a human --

17 (Change tape.)

18 **MAJ MELNYK:** This is MAJ Les Melnyk,  
19 continuing the interview with LTC Candiano, Commander  
20 of the 1st of the 258 Field Artillery.

21 Sir, you were talking the --

22 **LTC CANDIANO:** The illustrious pigeon.

1           **MAJ MELNYK:** The illustrious pigeon, the one  
2 life that you could actually influence at this time of  
3 death.

4           **LTC CANDIANO:** Yes. Like I was saying, to me,  
5 it was just a release point, because it was something  
6 that I needed, you know, to say that I was able to help  
7 something.

8           And I was bitter about what was going on and  
9 it was an unknown entity out there that we were dealing  
10 with, but in the midst of all this confusion and what  
11 was going on, with all the trucks running around, this  
12 one pigeon just sat on the hose, off to the side, and  
13 miraculously, it was not run over by anything, and I  
14 couldn't understand it.

15           To me, it meant that there was a reason why  
16 this thing needed to be alive, you know, and it was  
17 like it's life in the city, it goes on, and you  
18 survive, and you adapt.

19           And we are going to adapt. How we adapt, I  
20 don't know, because this is going to be new to us, but  
21 I think there is a resolve and there is something that  
22 we're going to do and we'll be better for doing it.

1           But this pigeon just -- I could not see a  
2 vehicle hitting this pigeon, and it was just there,  
3 with vehicles running over this thing, dead in the  
4 road, dead center in the road, not touched. And to me,  
5 that meant something.

6           So when the opportunity came up, I went over  
7 and I grabbed this pigeon because to me, it was a life,  
8 and that's all it was. It was a life. It was a life  
9 that we had control over.

10           And we're not a bad government, we're not bad  
11 guys. You know, we take human life seriously. We take  
12 life seriously.

13           And, again, you know, most of the soldiers  
14 that are M day soldiers have a lifetime and they know,  
15 they know what their life is outside and they know what  
16 they need to do, and they're citizen soldiers and they  
17 do their thing.

18           And they're not out there to take anybody's  
19 life. They're not out there to cause harm to anybody.

20           But the resolve is there that if you harm us, we'll go  
21 after you.

22           But this pigeon, the pigeon was there and it

1 was as if to say I'm a life, you know, I'm worth  
2 saving, and it allowed me to pick it up, dazed and all,  
3 and it felt -- it was quiet. Everything outside got  
4 quiet. There was no noise. I didn't hear a fire hose.  
5 For a few seconds, maybe that was my release point for  
6 me, because I couldn't believe the devastation and the  
7 death all around, and the body parts, if found, may or  
8 may not be there for a while, in my mind, but the  
9 pigeon allowed me to just pick it up and take it off to  
10 the side of the road, and that was just a life that I  
11 had an influence on and I was able to just save.

12 And, again, it wasn't a human life, but it was  
13 a life just the same, you know, and it made me feel  
14 good, because it just gave me some closure with what  
15 the hell was going on.

16 **MAJ MELNYK:** It creates a vivid picture, in my  
17 mind. That was a long night and your troops had a lot  
18 to cope with.

19 What happened when the morning came?

20 **LTC CANDIANO:** The way we planned it out with  
21 the battalion commanders is that we figured out, and,  
22 again, planning this in advance, based on our strength

1 posture, what we could cover in zones, and it was  
2 established between the two battalion commanders of the  
3 101 and the 69th that they could cover so much  
4 territory and so much zone.

5           And what we all agreed to is 0800, because  
6 that would give the troops enough time to muster and  
7 get into position, and 2000 hours as a handoff.

8           And the way we set it up is I am going to stay  
9 in place and provide security for my sector or my zone  
10 until relieved in place from your battalion, your  
11 company.

12           And that's the way we did it. We did it on a  
13 handoff squad by squad.

14           We had rally points assembled that we put  
15 together to have transportation meet us, you know, when  
16 we regressed out of the area, and we established  
17 checkpoints to make sure that all our people were  
18 accounted for.

19           And that's the way we did a battle handoff, if  
20 you will, during the day and the evening hours by  
21 setting up the same zones and the same sectors and we  
22 established a relationship with soldiers during the day



1 versus soldiers during the night.

2           And ironically enough, those soldiers that  
3 were working those shifts got to talk to each other to  
4 find out what they experienced in the area without the  
5 officers telling them to do that. That was very  
6 professional that they had enough wisdom and enough  
7 positive training for them to say, okay, give me a  
8 little assessment, what went on, what did you see, did  
9 you -- and in some cases, yeah, they bullshitted -- did  
10 you find anything? did you see anything? That's the  
11 common stuff that they talked about.

12           But they all knew, in a battle handoff, what  
13 happened in their area. I mean, there were things that  
14 my guys were involved with up to yesterday and is still  
15 ongoing.

16           Yesterday, as I set up my CP, we had a bomb  
17 scare in the building next to us. So a skyscraper had  
18 to be emptied yesterday because of bombs.

19           **MAJ MELNYK:** Where did you set up your CP and  
20 did it move during the operation?

21           **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah. My CP was moved twice.  
22 My CP originally, like I said, I established my CP,

1 because we didn't know what to expect and what was  
2 going on, we established a CP right at Pike and South,  
3 with the --

4 **MAJ MELNYK:** With the PD.

5 **LTC CANDIANO:** Co-located. This way, you  
6 know, if a hot spot came up, once the TOC was  
7 established, the CP was established, all the PD had to  
8 do is tell us where the problem was and where you  
9 wanted me to commit troops, whether it be to secure an  
10 area for a blast, or secure an area for crowd control,  
11 or to secure an area to give relief, and that's what we  
12 did.

13 So I kept -- in the process of this mission  
14 with the security and sector, I kept so many troops in  
15 reserve for a hot spot if it came out or developed.

16 And pretty much that's the way the other  
17 commanders ran their operation as well. So we were all  
18 in synch as far as how we wanted to do it.

19 But that night, like you said, was an  
20 extremely long night. It was short from the standpoint  
21 that you think about it and where did it go, but the  
22 night initially, no one had any concept of time.

1 Nobody had any concept except listening to the radio to  
2 see if everybody accounted for and secure the areas.

3           And again, those areas that the PD asked us to  
4 go in and look for things, you know, looters, whatever  
5 the case might be, we found no looting, which was  
6 amazing in itself, it really was. No looting. No  
7 looting was taking place.

8           And it could be because everybody thought that  
9 the police presence was so great, they didn't need to  
10 do that, but I'd like to think that it had to do with  
11 the fact that people needed to be doing other things.  
12 There were so many volunteers out there, thousands and  
13 thousands of volunteers to help the PD and fire try to  
14 get into ground zero and try to see whatever they could  
15 do to move debris, lift debris.

16           Some of the fire department guys asked us to  
17 use our Humvees to pull beams away from buildings. At  
18 the same token, some of the roads we walked, I found --  
19 I came across -- I mean, I may not have been the first  
20 one, maybe it was there, but some of my guys walking  
21 down a roadway, and I did, because I think we were the  
22 first ones in this particular roadway, down this road,

1 found a car up on the sidewalk with a steel beam from  
2 the World Trade Center on top of it, and it was a good  
3 six or seven blocks from the World Trade Center.

4           And inside was a body, crushed from the beam.  
5 [*LTC Candiano later commented: Evidently, he was found*  
6 *prior to our arrival but nothing could be done for him.*  
7 *The rescue efforts were focused on trying to find*  
8 *people in that area either dazed or buried alive. I*  
9 *was told he was extricated from the vehicle just as we*  
10 *were leaving the area. The only thing I do recall is*  
11 *seeing something inside the vehicle.. The top was*  
12 *crushed so badly that I couldn't tell if someone was in*  
13 *fact inside the vehicle]*

14 You know, and the only thing  
15 you could do is -- we weren't -- we were hoping to have  
16 something in case we identified a body, we can -- and I  
17 think for future events, for what it's worth, something  
18 like this, you know. If we're going to go out and  
19 secure an area or a sector, it's a lot easier to take a  
20 flag of some sort, an orange flag, something that's got  
21 a stake on it, stick it in the ground to secure it, and  
22 I think that was one of the recommendations that I had  
made, that if we do that, you need something where you

1 need support in a search and rescue, we'll do that.

2 We had missions, unofficial. A lot of what  
3 was done was unofficial, because it was ad hoc, on the  
4 spot. You can't wait to get a control number to get  
5 this thing accomplished. You need something done now.

6 **MAJ MELNYK:** Can you explain that, you need a  
7 control number?

8 **LTC CANDIANO:** Okay. A lot of the missions, I  
9 guess, to justify the existence of what's being done  
10 with the military, city agencies or state agencies, in  
11 times of crisis or emergency, would say, okay,  
12 emergency operations center at the state headquarters  
13 level, we need so many soldiers to transport firemen,  
14 we need so many soldiers to transport food, we need  
15 generator support, we need whatever support, and the  
16 state gives it a control number or a mission number.

17 Then they send it down to the MACOM or the  
18 unit that's overseeing it and they give it a number,  
19 get it approved, then it goes out to the unit to  
20 execute the mission.

21 This particular situation, you didn't have  
22 time to do that. If you have the luxury to make up the

1 number yourself to do something, but who the hell had  
2 time to do that, you know.

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** Communications?

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah. And we had no  
5 communications. Radios, you can't get in touch with  
6 anybody, and that's why I was saying I was so proud of  
7 my men because I had E-4s making decisions to react to  
8 a problem.

9 We used our Humvees to pull beams from  
10 roadways, to clear paths for emergency vehicles. We  
11 used our Humvees and deuce and a halves to transport  
12 firemen that were exhausted from being there all day,  
13 taking them to an area where they can rest.

14 We used our deuce and a halves, while this was  
15 all going on with security missions, it was dismantled,  
16 we're on spot, our vehicles were available. I made my  
17 GSA buses available to transport firemen, to transport  
18 policemen. Whoever needed it, tell me what you need,  
19 this is where I am, have somebody come get me.

20 It was good that we had a liaison working over  
21 there with the police department CP, because if there  
22 was something hot, he'd get to the phone, the radio, to

1 tell me what was going on.

2           And a lot was my personal cell phone that was  
3 used because we couldn't use radio communications.

4           The radios that we had, the VRC-46s, 12 series  
5 radios, did not work too well in the city because of  
6 all the metal and all the steel and everything like  
7 that.

8           Something like this, I don't know what they  
9 have to do to get a radio system in place, because,  
10 obviously, signal towers were damaged, because, in many  
11 cases, cell phones in certain areas were dead zones.  
12 You couldn't use them at all.

13           So I know there's got to be something that's  
14 got to be out there that should be -- and I'm saying,  
15 as an after action type of thing, looking at this  
16 thing, we were prepared, but we weren't prepared.

17           We were prepared to be there to do something,  
18 but we weren't prepared for the destruction of such  
19 magnitude. And the little things that frustrated us  
20 that we needed to do things to make it better, to make  
21 us better at what we did was not there, and it pissed  
22 me off that I know somewhere there has got to be a

1 platform to say "drop it in place here, this is  
2 equipment that's readily available to you to help out  
3 in an emergency," and we didn't have it, you know.

4 I'm sure there's -- and I've seen them,  
5 because they had them at Police Plaza and they gave  
6 them to the National Guard Liaison we had there,  
7 they've got satellite radios, satellite telephones.

8 Give that stuff to the guys that need it to do  
9 our job, because we need to talk to somebody. In many  
10 cases, when we had to do something, we had to walk  
11 three or four blocks in order to get a signal to say "I  
12 need an emergency vehicle here, there's a body, or I  
13 need something." And to me, that kind of time is too  
14 long, it's too late. But, again, you get the cops say  
15 to you, "listen, I have a mission to look for body  
16 parts." You throw that on a Guardsman and see how you  
17 handle it.

18 You need to go into the building, you know,  
19 some of our POs found parts, we need to go through the  
20 building and find out if there's any other parts.

21 You go into buildings and you find animals.  
22 Animals alive, animals dead, animals dazed, animals



1 hungry.

2           A lot of the emergency areas -- and I have to  
3 say I have never seen such support, that so much food  
4 was put out, so many things were put out to support all  
5 the --

6           **MAJ MELNYK:** This is Tuesday night or is this  
7 now...?

8           **LTC CANDIANO:** Going into Wednesday. Support  
9 services started to come into play, on corners where  
10 bottles of water, things to eat, things to drink, dog  
11 food. I remember, for some reason, dog food, bags and  
12 bags of dog food and some cat food in the event that  
13 somebody found an animal that was alive and wandering,  
14 and here's food to give the animals.

15           Those are the New Yorkers. And believe it or  
16 not, some of my Guardsmen threw that kind of stuff in  
17 the back of their Humvees and they periodically took a  
18 bag of dog food where they thought they saw an animal  
19 or something, broke it open and left it there for them  
20 so they'd have something to eat.

21           That's a human touch. That's a quality that  
22 you're not going to get rid of. And, again, they did

1 that in conjunction with doing their missions.

2 But there were a lot of things that were  
3 really horrific as far as the body parts, and that's  
4 just it. You know, you walk over bodies, you walk over  
5 parts, and thank God, a lot of the soldiers that were  
6 covering the outside sector and perimeter didn't get to  
7 see that. Only a selected few went in there and  
8 actually saw what was going on, to a certain extent.

9 But as the day progressed and as the days  
10 progressed, the nighttime took on a different  
11 environment. It was very eerie, and it was scary from  
12 the standpoint that we saw police boats out there doing  
13 their thing, saw a lot of people doing their thing.

14 You saw a lot of guys that were -- you know,  
15 they had weapons going off to do things, police  
16 department had guys with weapons, snipers doing their  
17 things, because they didn't know if it was over.

18 But all these city agencies really focused --  
19 it was like it should be almost as if it was SOP with  
20 us. That "You guys provide perimeter security or  
21 defense, we need to go in there and fix," because that  
22 was that type of emergency.

1           Something else, if it was a hurricane or a  
2 fire, we know how to react to that. But this, again,  
3 was all together different. And, again, some of us saw  
4 more than you could imagine and I can't get into some  
5 of that stuff, because when I do, it kind of makes me  
6 sick to my stomach and I can't sleep.

7           But the only thing I can tell you is that I  
8 don't think I slept for three days. I think it was on  
9 my third day that I finally got to get a couple hours  
10 of sleep, and I was pretty much pushed down by my  
11 soldiers to say "get the rest," - some of my officers.

12           And the only thing you do is you wait to go  
13 out, you wait to get what's going on and what's a hot  
14 area and what's not hot, and you go there and react.

15           I think, looking at it, you know, three days  
16 later, you're finding bodies or parts of bodies and,  
17 again, we found the nose wheel of the aircraft.

18           We started to find people and curiosity  
19 seekers coming in. [*Tape breaks as helicopter passes*  
20 *overhead*]

21           **MAJ MELNYK:** Curiosity seekers. You left off  
22 there.

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** I really -- I lost my cool at  
2 one point in time. Around Zone 3, around the Battery  
3 Park -- not the Battery Park, but the --

4           **MAJ MELNYK:** Battery Park City?

5           **LTC CANDIANO:** Battery Park City area, there's  
6 an area where I guess, under normal conditions, you  
7 have tables out there and you can look at the harbor  
8 and there's a couple of bistros over there.

9           We came across three people on bicycles. How  
10 they got in there, we don't know. But I remember one  
11 of them had -- two of them had these saddle bags on the  
12 bicycles and each one had chunks of metal and pieces of  
13 debris from the blast.

14           And I said, "What are you doing with that and  
15 what are you doing here?" and my guys held them and  
16 they challenged them, and that's -- we were not  
17 supposed to detain anybody, but when reports of looting  
18 started and things started to get a little stupid,  
19 after a couple of days, again, the first day it was  
20 kind of calm because everybody was focused on that.

21           When there were some instances of looting, the  
22 mission changed a little for us, from security and

1 support to make sure that nothing was being done as far  
2 as the looting goes. And, again, take in mind that no  
3 weapons were authorized to do the mission nor were any  
4 night sticks authorized or anything like that. It's  
5 just that if you see someone doing something, contact a  
6 police officer. And I think by the second night, they  
7 basically started to set up police officers at some of  
8 the streets as a show of force to support what we were  
9 doing.

10 And, again, what we were doing to support  
11 them. And if an incident came up, then we are to  
12 notify the police department and work with them, get  
13 the details and turn them over to the police.

14 **MAJ MELNYK:** You weren't supposed to even lay  
15 hands on?

16 **LTC CANDIANO:** Correct.

17 **MAJ MELNYK:** I know you couldn't actually  
18 arrest.

19 **LTC CANDIANO:** You can't detain. We can hold,  
20 and you can put your hands on them, but you can't  
21 forcibly step on them, hold them to the ground, do  
22 whatever. I mean, they didn't want that, you know,

1 unless it was --

2 **MAJ MELNYK:** Who laid down those rules?

3 **LTC CANDIANO:** I think that pretty much came  
4 out of Troop Command, the 53rd Troop Command. The  
5 police were kind of surprised that some units had flak  
6 vests, some units didn't have flak vests.

7 *[At this point, a helicopter hovers overhead. It*  
8 *is dark out]*

9 They might be here for us.

10 **MAJ MELNYK:** Serious? What is it, thermal  
11 imagery?

12 **LTC CANDIANO:** If that's the case, then you'll  
13 see some fire or police boats coming up.

14 **MAJ MELNYK:** Right.

15 **LTC CANDIANO:** So anyway, the people on the  
16 bicycle, I noticed that they had stuff coming out of  
17 their -- equipment coming out of their -- or things  
18 coming out of their bags.

19 It turned out they had debris from the World  
20 Trade Center. And I said, "What are you doing with  
21 this and who are you, give me some ID."

22 Two of three had ID, one didn't. So right

1 there, that was a flag for us. But the girl on the  
2 bicycle, they must have been -- and they weren't kids.  
3 They were in their 20s, early 20s.

4           So they weren't new to this thing. The girl  
5 made a comment, turned around and she says, "Well, it's  
6 just that, you know, this is a piece of history and I  
7 thought I might be able to sell it on e-Bay."

8           So that just infuriated me, because I said  
9 "There are people dead here. Life, massive loss of  
10 life here, and you're looking to make a goddamn buck  
11 out of this thing."

12           You know, and she started to get on the bike,  
13 after she gave me a gesture, and at that point in time,  
14 I just lost it, because I was tired of what was going  
15 on, and I grabbed hold of the handlebar of her bicycle  
16 and she slipped off her seat. I took what was there on  
17 the bicycle and one of my guys, while this was going  
18 on, called the police department over and the POs came  
19 and they took the three people away with what I call  
20 evidence, because it was from a crime scene, and they  
21 took off with those three people. Don't know what  
22 happened to them.

1           A lot of incidents we got involved with. We  
2 had another incident around the same park area, that  
3 there was a broken window and basically what had  
4 happened is somebody had gone in there to loot and the  
5 guy was in there ransacking shelves.

6           It was a delicatessen. They were ransacking  
7 all kinds of stuff, looking for things. One guy. My  
8 soldiers, a lot of these guys have their own little  
9 Motorola walkie-talkies that have a two-mile range,  
10 because that seemed to be working better than anything  
11 else.

12           So they called me over and said, "Hey, sir,  
13 you know, there's a guy in the store down the block."  
14 Two soldiers went to go get a police officer. Three  
15 soldiers picked up this four by eight piece of plywood  
16 that was on the street from where they were doing some  
17 repair work and they took the plywood and just slapped  
18 it up against the hole in the window to keep the guy in  
19 the store.

20           So they're saying "We got him, we got him, we  
21 got him," and they're holding him, and they were so  
22 proud as hell that they caught a looter in the store.



1           Well, this guy had to be hopped up on  
2 something, because the window next to it, you know, you  
3 get that crackle effect from a blast on a window, this  
4 guy came flying through that window and took off and  
5 ran into the drink out here, the water in the park.

6           So at that point in time, police got on site  
7 and they called the police helicopters and were looking  
8 for him in the river, and I think they finally got him  
9 with one of the police boats.

10        *[LTC Candiano later commented: After the fact, I*  
11        *couldn't corroborate the theft in the store. Later, I*  
12        *was also told that the individual in the store was the*  
13        *owner and was trying to secure his valuables and cash*  
14        *from the register. I don't know what actually took*  
15        *place with the police]*

16                The night after that, we're out here, and  
17 then, you know, the curiosity seekers -- and let me  
18 just say this: I wanted all my guys to see that mess.

19        I wanted them to see it first and foremost at the  
20 earliest possible convenience for them to see it.

21                The reason why I did that is: "Get it into  
22 your head this is what they did to you, this is what

1 those bastards are going to pay for."

2 "Forget the curiosity anymore, it's in there,  
3 now go out and do the job, because of what they did,  
4 and keep that in the back of your mind when you go out  
5 there that somebody did that and they raped you," and  
6 that's the way I looked at it.

7 I wanted it up front so they could go out and  
8 function.

9 So one night we had -- and I can't recall  
10 which night, because the nights just seem like they  
11 were all together, I had a guy come in on a kayak, a  
12 blue kayak with black stripes, coming into the same  
13 area, in area three, with a night vision device on.

14 I don't know if he was a onlooker, I don't  
15 know what was going on with that, but he came in. We  
16 found out where he was and then I went to make a radio  
17 call on it and my soldiers told me that the police  
18 boat's got him, they put him into the police boat.

19 *[LTC Candiano later commented: I personally didn't see*  
20 *the individual on the kayak; I just got the message via*  
21 *cell phone. I did see the helicopters circling the*  
22 *area and was told later that a man was picked up in a*

1 dingy]

2           At that point in time, I believe the police  
3 department shut off its big light with its imagery that  
4 lit up the whole thing, and I just saw flashlights  
5 moving up and down.

6           I don't know what that means. You take it  
7 (inaudible) you know.

8           **MAJ MELNYK:** Could be.

9           **LTC CANDIANO:** I don't know. But I'm sure the  
10 police took appropriate action to subdue that  
11 individual and his kayak. I don't know what happened  
12 with that.

13           There were -- some of my guys made some sharp,  
14 sharp, sharp captures. I don't know if LTC Slack told  
15 you about the man. Two of my soldiers spotted a van  
16 that looked kind of suspicious and it was right -- I  
17 think it was right before his watch.

18           **MAJ MELNYK:** So early morning.

19           **LTC CANDIANO:** It was around four -- yeah. It  
20 was, well, maybe 4:00, 4:30, 5:00 o'clock. The van was  
21 riding around and a couple of my guys said to their  
22 commander in the area that this van has been driving

1 back and forth.

2           With that, they got the police involved, got  
3 the van stopped. There were four people in the van,  
4 two jumped out, two remained in the van. They couldn't  
5 get out in time.

6           But in the van, they found an undisclosed  
7 amount of money, I think about \$7,500 dollars, and a  
8 couple plane tickets out of the country.

9           So they carted those guys off, plus the  
10 soldier that found or spotted it. The FBI came and  
11 took that soldier away.

12           Another incident that I was personally  
13 involved with two days ago was once our mission  
14 changed, that we were out of the security mission,  
15 things quieted down. We started to be given different  
16 assignments.

17           We had street corner security, from street  
18 corner security, we had to do massive sweeps by zone.

19           I was responsible, at that point in time, once  
20 reinforcements came in to support us here, I was  
21 responsible for all of Wall Street, that whole area,  
22 and it was important that we had that whole place

1 secured so that Wall Street can open.

2 So what we --

3 **MAJ MELNYK:** If we could pause here for a  
4 second.

5 (Change tape.)

6 **MAJ MELNYK:** This is MAJ Melnyk, continuing  
7 the interview.

8 Sir, you were talking about sweeping Wall  
9 Street.

10 **LTC CANDIANO:** Right. We got the mission as  
11 part of Zone 5 to secure, provide security around the  
12 Wall Street area, and the idea and the concept was that  
13 the police department, along with the Mayor's office,  
14 wanted to show that it was safe to come back to work  
15 and they felt having a military presence there in the  
16 Wall Street area was important.

17 **MAJ MELNYK:** So this would have been when?

18 **LTC CANDIANO:** Sunday morning, coming into  
19 Monday. I don't know the date.

20 **MAJ MELNYK:** So Sunday night and that's the  
21 first night that you had assistance on the night shift  
22 from --

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** The 204th Engineers.

2           **MAJ MELNYK:** 204th Engineer Battalion. How  
3 did you end up splitting up the perimeter?

4           **LTC CANDIANO:** By that time, there was a  
5 handoff between the 107th Corps Support Group and the  
6 42nd Aviation Brigade, which was established by the  
7 division to come down and take over operational control  
8 of divisional assets on the ground, and then totally  
9 take charge of the whole area here in the handoff.

10           The S-3 of the Aviation Brigade, established  
11 sectors and zones, which was great for me, because it  
12 meant that I could consolidate my troops to a smaller  
13 area and provide crew rest, if you will, to give them  
14 some downtime.

15           And basically from Tuesday to that Saturday or  
16 Sunday, we had no real downtime outside of guys falling  
17 to sleep wherever they were, that type of thing.

18           And, again, going back, to see the faces on  
19 firemen, to see the faces of death and fatigue on  
20 police officers is something that we won't forget  
21 either, because it was just a deer in the headlights  
22 look as far as watching those guys go by.

1           There was one fire truck that was found, and I  
2 wanted to tell you about this, going back toward the  
3 Battery Park City area, that evidently belonged to a  
4 ladder company that the guys that were off shift worked  
5 with and for a moment, also, they all got off the truck  
6 and they held hands around that fire truck and the next  
7 thing you know, you just saw some police officers  
8 consoling the firemen, and it really was touching to  
9 see that, that they were all their and they all had the  
10 same pain.

11           We all had the same pain, but it was really  
12 touching. That's something I won't forget either.

13           But going back to this thing with Wall Street.

14           Go ahead.

15           **MAJ MELNYK:** I was going to say, your soldiers  
16 rotated out in the morning. Where did your battalion  
17 go? They were, it seems, on a more regular schedule  
18 than some of the firefighters.

19           **LTC CANDIANO:** We got bounced around because  
20 it was too far for us to go back to the Bronx and  
21 Jamaica and Brooklyn. They decided to house us in the  
22 armory at 26th and Lex and work out of there.

1           But the Governor decided that they needed to  
2   have an armory set up where they could have  
3   notification of kin and set up as a place for -- you  
4   know, I guess --

5           **MAJ MELNYK:** Bereavement.

6           **LTC CANDIANO:** Bereavement, and set up the  
7   armory to handle that as a center, and also to do  
8   community -- like a town hall type meeting for the  
9   citizens of New York.

10           So, unfortunately, at that point in time, my  
11   battalion was then put on buses and we had to find  
12   another armory and the Troop Command moved us up to the  
13   armory at Harlem, the 369<sup>th</sup> [*Transportation Battalion*].

14           **MAJ MELNYK:** Right.

15           **LTC CANDIANO:** Which kind of ticked me off,  
16   because now I was a 120 blocks away from where I needed  
17   to be at any given time.

18           **MAJ MELNYK:** Was there any given reason why  
19   you weren't put at the Park Avenue Armory of the 107th  
20   Support Group [*located at 67<sup>th</sup> St.*]?

21           **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah, because the Park Avenue  
22   Armory, number one, started to receive a lot of



1 supplies and donations to support the effort.

2           You had the headquarters working out of there,  
3 the 107th Group that was operational to this thing, and  
4 you had a lot of support troops working out of that  
5 armory on standby in case they were needed to go in to  
6 certain areas.

7           My recommendation was Governor's Island, and I  
8 think somebody told me Governor's Island, but after  
9 thinking about it, I supported the move to Governor's  
10 Island.

11           Also, Fort Totten, Fort Hamilton, or Fort  
12 Wadsworth at Staten Island, right over the bridge.

13           **MAJ MELNYK:** So the first night, when you came  
14 out Wednesday morning, where did you go?

15           **LTC CANDIANO:** The first night, when we came  
16 out Wednesday morning, we went right to 26th and Lex to  
17 bed down.

18           **MAJ MELNYK:** So it was like a hot bed rotation  
19 with the soldiers of the 69th.

20           **LTC CANDIANO:** Right. But we had, at that  
21 point in time, no cots for anyone and everyone slept on  
22 the floor with their ruck sacks and their sleeping

1 bags. And you pretty much stayed in the armory, took a  
2 hot shower, and got ready to go back upon -- just prior  
3 to the relief time and the handoff, and that was  
4 basically the way we did business for a couple of days.

5 But the thing -- because our guys, in many  
6 cases, came straight from work, in many cases, they  
7 came not knowing what to expect, there were no changes  
8 of uniform. There were no packages from Momma at home  
9 to show up with.

10 They just came with what they had on their  
11 back. In many cases, up 'til today, soldiers are still  
12 working with the same uniform they had on from a week  
13 ago, and we were waiting for downtime, and that was a  
14 problem that we had, trying to get downtime  
15 established.

16 **MAJ MELNYK:** And plus they bounced you around.  
17 You ended up going to the 369th armory.

18 **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah, and I was ticked about  
19 that. I went from the armory at 26th and Lex to the  
20 armory at Harlem, the 369th. They had no hot water in  
21 the armory at all, because it was under repair. They  
22 had ample enough space, but, again, you're sleeping on

1 the floor.

2           So I requested cots. I requested cots for 400  
3 soldiers, because I figured I had 339 on the ground,  
4 but at the same token, in case I was plussed up with  
5 other soldiers that showed up or other soldiers that  
6 might be OPCON'd to me, at least I had a place to bed  
7 them down. It took another three days before I got  
8 cots.

9           Filters, I was really pissed off about the masks,  
10 because there were a couple of disconnects, because we  
11 went up to one truck that was passing out masks to  
12 police and fire and they would only give us a few, and  
13 not a lot, because it was meant for police and fire.

14           Now we're doing security for everybody and it  
15 was a non-agency on the outside that was there giving  
16 this stuff out, but they felt that we didn't need it,  
17 not realizing that we were that deep in it.

18           In some cases, within our own state command,  
19 they felt that we didn't need that type of mask, that  
20 quality mask, whatever the case might be.

21           I was so infuriated that I went to the 107th  
22 group commander, COL Sieter, and I took a mask from a

1 police officer from the decon site and I said "What is  
2 the best mask for my soldiers? Because obviously the  
3 NBC mask is not too good to use here. It's not meeting  
4 the criteria to do the mission and it's too hot, the  
5 hood especially."

6 I asked the officer, police officer for a  
7 sample, and he gave me a sample, after he  
8 decontaminated my boots, because my boots were a mess.

9 My clothes were a mess. And I gave that model  
10 number to the 107th group commander to say this is what  
11 we need, you know, for us to function in the field.

12 We never got them. Never got the masks. And,  
13 again, because my battalion was on nights, we were the  
14 bastard children out there that, for the most part,  
15 when supplies came in during the day, they were pretty  
16 much depleted by the evening.

17 So my guys normally went out there without the  
18 proper gear, the proper equipment, and nobody could  
19 guarantee me when I was going to get it.

20 Up until today, we still don't have the right  
21 masks. Only a few do.

22 **MAJ MELNYK:** Only a few do.

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** Only a few do. That was one  
2 thing that kind of ticked me off, is the fact that we  
3 couldn't get the proper masks. Another thing was cots,  
4 that we didn't get proper cots, because we're not  
5 authorized cots, based on the MTOE [*Modified Table of*  
6 *Organization and Allowances*]. We don't have a need for  
7 that. But we finally got them and got our folks bedded  
8 down in the armory in Harlem, only to find out that  
9 after everything else, there was no hot water. And  
10 again, 110 blocks may not seem like a lot, but in New  
11 York City in a time of crisis, it can take an eternity.

12           **MAJ MELNYK:** So the Governor's Island idea was  
13 not approved.

14           **LTC CANDIANO:** It was not approved by the guy  
15 in charge of Governor's Island. I guess he didn't feel  
16 it was warranted for him to turn on the electricity.  
17 It wasn't warranted for him to pull the switch to say,  
18 okay, here you go, guys.

19           But just think, the time and effort that would  
20 have been saved if we were right here in the harbor and  
21 could take a ferry right across to Battery Park, to be  
22 right at ground zero real quick, as opposed to spending

1 an hour to an hour and a half coming down from another  
2 armory out of the way.

3           And it's big enough where you can house a  
4 thousand soldiers on that place. Just think of your  
5 support that you could have had there, had they opened  
6 it. But, you know, I guess it's important, but it  
7 wasn't that important. I really think that a federal  
8 agency should have opened its doors, whether or not  
9 that place was shut down or not.

10           So I don't know if anybody pursued the Fort  
11 Wadsworth or Naval stations that night. I don't know  
12 if anybody pursued Fort Totten. That's one for the  
13 books that somebody will have to verify, because I  
14 don't know what happened to that.

15           **MAJ MELNYK:** You were talking about the Wall  
16 Street mission and we got sidetracked.

17           **LTC CANDIANO:** Going back to that. Going into  
18 Monday morning, I did a sweep and I did a sector walk  
19 to see where my troops were, where were they going to  
20 be, because the police chief, the chief of the area, I  
21 believe it was Chief Ward, wanted us to make sure that  
22 we had traffic lanes established for the buses, that

1 the PD would direct the traffic flow, and all we had to  
2 do was provide traffic control, and then establish a  
3 corridor, two main corridors for people that travel up  
4 to the main district, the Wall Street district.

5           And I was pushing all along that MPs were held  
6 in reserve. I couldn't understand that. Here we are  
7 doing the street mission, that really it would have  
8 been ideal to have MPs that handle traffic and crowd  
9 control out there doing it, three MP companies that  
10 were sitting in an armory. [*LTC Candiano later*  
11 *commented: I found out after the fact that MPs were out*  
12 *doing search-and-rescue and traffic control. The MPs*  
13 *that I spoke with at the 107h CSG were assigned there*  
14 *as a reserve and were not committed to the streets.*  
15 *Many MPs were in fact out there doing the important*  
16 *jobs that they do, maintaining law and order]*

17           [Tape break as another helicopter passes overhead]

18           **MAJ MELNYK:** Sir, I would like for you to  
19 address some of the key individuals in your battalion.

20           **LTC CANDIANO:** Do you want to finish the Wall  
21 Street thing?

22           **MAJ MELNYK:** Yes, sir.

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** Before we lose it with another  
2 helicopter. Anyway, what had happened was that one of  
3 my soldiers spotted a mail truck that had gotten into  
4 the area, a step van mail truck, and it was parked near  
5 Wall Street about a block away on a side street, and  
6 the police were called over to take a look at it after  
7 he spotted it, and it turned out that the truck was  
8 hot-wired and somebody from -- whoever drove that truck  
9 was now inside the area.

10           Whether they found the individual or not, they  
11 don't know, but I believe Alcohol, Tobacco and  
12 Firearms, in conjunction with the FBI, took the truck  
13 out of there and it was impounded after the bomb squad  
14 looked at it.

15           He's coming again. [*Refers to helicopter*  
16 *overhead*]

17           Where my CP was set up -- you're going to lose  
18 it.

19           **MAJ MELNYK:** For future listeners of this  
20 tape, we keep getting buzzed by a Huey. That's why we  
21 have the constant breaks.

22           Sir, your CP?



1           **LTC CANDIANO:** Where my CP was set up on South  
2 and Wall Street, I established it close to our police  
3 liaison, their CP. This way, as missions came in, we  
4 were right next to the police department with constant  
5 communication.

6           We had a bomb scare in the building and it was  
7 kind of an eerie feeling because right away you were  
8 established and now you're assisting getting people out  
9 of a building to get them to safety.

10           And that's the way things went there. We had  
11 an incident with a Con Edison worker close to ground  
12 zero that was taking pictures.

13           It turned out that the individual was not a  
14 worker for Con Ed, that he had some sort of ID that the  
15 police took care of and he was seen by a soldier  
16 earlier in a different uniform in that area, and they  
17 felt that he was doing battle assessment, battle damage  
18 assessment, was carted off by the police.

19           **MAJ MELNYK:** Sir, if we could turn to key  
20 leaders, both in your command and who influenced your  
21 command during the incident.

22           **LTC CANDIANO:** Well, the initial liaison, MAJ

1 Magnanini, was kind of critical to what was going on,  
2 because he was a direct liaison between the city  
3 agencies and the military agencies to give us missions  
4 and assistance any which way we could.

5 **MAJ MELNYK:** When did he first come into that  
6 role?

7 **LTC CANDIANO:** I seem to recall him on the  
8 ground from day one or soon thereafter.

9 **MAJ MELNYK:** Was he there Tuesday night when  
10 you hooked up at South and Pike Streets with the  
11 police?

12 **LTC CANDIANO:** I don't believe so, but he  
13 could have. I don't remember. I don't remember,  
14 because it seemed like it was, you know, like a -- kind  
15 of hazy at that point in time.

16 **MAJ MELNYK:** Who was key in mobilizing your  
17 battalion?

18 **LTC CANDIANO:** SGM Rivera, my battalion  
19 sergeant major, or we're still waiting to make him a  
20 sergeant major.

21 1SG Peck, Herbert Peck, from B Battery. They  
22 had the largest strength posture and the most -- the

1 strongest morale and cohesiveness in my battalion, and  
2 they responded en masse.

3 MAJ John Kool, my full-time battalion S-3 was  
4 critical in a lot of the planning stages that we had to  
5 put this thing together.

6 MAJ MELNYK: By that, you mean the discussions  
7 prior to leaving your armory?

8 LTC CANDIANO: Like whether we should be  
9 taking combat gear or not taking combat gear, that type  
10 of thing.

11 I think SFC Coba, my battalion supply NCO was  
12 kind of critical.

13 MAJ MELNYK: How do you spell that?

14 LTC CANDIANO: C-o-b-a. Because as soon as  
15 this whole thing came to play, to fruition, he started  
16 to figure out we need meals planned and ordered for  
17 certain things, we're going to need support for  
18 logistical supplies.

19 And the other thing I did in planning was  
20 basically said "how many cases of MREs do we have? Pack  
21 them up and take them with you, how many days supply do  
22 we have to last before we need a resupply of anything?"

1       Because I didn't know if we'd need it for us or need  
2       it for civilians.

3               But Coba was critical from the standpoint that  
4       with all the state active duty missions we've had  
5       before, he developed a rapport and a relationship with  
6       vendors in the local community to provide those  
7       resources and assets to us.

8               MAJ Kool started to plan everything as if it  
9       was a military operation, you know. He looked at what  
10      types of vehicles would be advantageous to bring with  
11      us versus -- you don't want to take everything, because  
12      a lot of times, everything is going to be in the way.  
13      Go on an assessment, see what you need, and, again,  
14      we're only a 40 minute drive, it doesn't mean you can't  
15      get something here fast enough, and there were still  
16      trips to the armory. So Kool was working that piece of  
17      the pie.

18              MAJ Bati, my exec, when he finally came, and  
19      that's B-a-t-i, he tried to talk to the staff and get  
20      things going.

21              And I had Seargeant Morales was my service  
22      battery readiness NCO, SFC Morales. He was critical,

1 talking to people in the battery to make sure the cooks  
2 were prepared, the mechanics were prepared.

3 My full-time OMS shop had a MSG Joe Grato, who  
4 is not part of my battalion, but made every effort to  
5 make sure that all my vehicles were up. After they  
6 were lined up, personally put his technicians out there  
7 to check all the equipment to make sure that I could  
8 get out the door safely. He was great -- big help.

9 And my A Battery guys, my A Battery commander,  
10 CPT Moshoyannis, was a school teacher or is a school  
11 teacher, and his name is spelled M-o-s-h-o-y-a-n-n-i-s.

12 As soon as the incident happened, he's calling  
13 me, and he's out on eastern Long Island, saying, "Hey,  
14 sir, I'm ready if you need me. I'm ready to come in.  
15 I just need the word from you, because I'll get out of  
16 class and come in." And he's a teacher.

17 CPT Cliff Cotton is my Charlie Battery  
18 commander. Again, he reacted quickly as far as his  
19 troops go.

20 But again, all my commanders did.

21 **MAJ MELNYK:** Were there any -- I don't know if  
22 the right word is heros, but soldiers whose -- what

1 their actions were once they got on site really stuck  
2 in your mind? The initiative they took, anything that  
3 you wanted to bring forward.

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** You know, Wednesday morning,  
5 about 4:00 o'clock, 4:30, I don't know who it was, but  
6 one of my soldiers, and, you see, it's hard, because it  
7 was so much a blur, but just one of my soldiers was  
8 holding the hand of somebody, of a woman that just  
9 looked like -- she wasn't part of the blast. She was  
10 part of a support, bringing in -- starting to bring in  
11 clothes, because a lot of the firefighters and the  
12 police officers were going through tee shirts, pants  
13 and things like that.

14 And there were a lot of volunteer groups that  
15 were bringing in things and she said "God bless you  
16 guys, we feel safe that you're here." And she gave him  
17 a hug, but it seemed like it was just more of a hug, it  
18 was secure for her, and she didn't want to let go of  
19 that.

20 It's just a very -- it's in the memory banks  
21 as far as a picture goes, in my mind.

22 **MAJ MELNYK:** Burned in.

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah. I think it says  
2 something about the role of the Guard in this disaster,  
3 from everybody I talk to, that rather than being  
4 feared, we were a source of strength.

5           **LTC CANDIANO:** And security. There was  
6 security there, because we -- today, when I was doing  
7 my patrol of the wire, because we had this new mission  
8 with the wire.

9           **MAJ MELNYK:** Could you explain that, sir?

10          **LTC CANDIANO:** The mission of the wire?

11          **MAJ MELNYK:** Yes, sir.

12          **LTC CANDIANO:** The wire mission, basically,  
13 it's all the electrical wiring around the World Trade  
14 Center was melted and destroyed as a result of the  
15 blast and the fire, along with all the fiber optic  
16 equipment for telephones.

17                 Verizon was putting in hundreds of thousands,  
18 -to me it seemed like miles - of wire. I mean, it  
19 sounds crazy, but the wire that was being put in that  
20 I'm talking about was electrical wire to support  
21 turning power back on in the buildings.

22          **MAJ MELNYK:** Heavy cables.

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** Extremely heavy cables, in the  
2 neighborhood of anywhere between 12 and 16 inches  
3 thick, each cable, and you're talking maybe 50 cables  
4 to a bundle.

5           And what was happening is this -- the wire,  
6 the cable was being laid out along certain routes, then  
7 buried in certain routes, and then boxes were built  
8 over them to protect them from pedestrians.

9           **MAJ MELNYK:** Where they were on top of the  
10 roads.

11           **LTC CANDIANO:** To walk, or on top of the road.

12       And by touching this cable, even though it's  
13 protected, could do bodily harm. And our role tonight  
14 and today was to make sure that no pedestrian  
15 accidentally walked over those cables to get  
16 electrocuted and to make sure that they were not  
17 tampered with at the same time, in order to supply the  
18 power and everything needed to the center.

19           And that was the mission that we had. But  
20 going through it, I wanted to make sure, as we went  
21 along Broadway, that -- you know, I was concerned about  
22 security issues and security measures, and anytime that



1 we get a mission, I'm the first one that walks the  
2 line.

3           If I feel it makes sense to do and it's safe  
4 to do, I walk it. And today I walked it and mostly I  
5 walk it with either my exec or my three to see what  
6 might be a problem, what works, what doesn't work.

7           And the people, they wanted to take your  
8 picture, they wanted to have your picture taken with  
9 somebody of their family. They wanted to say that I  
10 know a soldier. There was a soldier there to make me  
11 feel good and we had people today telling us, you know,  
12 it's because of guys like you, we're able to sleep at  
13 night.

14           It's because of what you do, I can get back to  
15 work. And when I saw that in the newspapers, that the  
16 National Guard was there or the military was there -  
17 [*Horn blasts in the distance*]

18           **MAJ MELNYK:** I think that's the ferry  
19 departing.

20           **LTC CANDIANO:** Okay. Three blasts of a horn in  
21 an area means a building is coming down.

22           **MAJ MELNYK:** Yes.

1           **LTC CANDIANO:** So if you don't know that, you  
2 know it now. If you hear three quick blasts of a horn,  
3 a building is dropping, and run for your life.

4           You had Air Guard there, you know. And in my  
5 sector, in my zone, it wasn't -- by Tuesday night I was  
6 reinforced in that zone. I forgot to tell you that.

7           **MAJ MELNYK:** Tuesday night.

8           **LTC CANDIANO:** Tuesday night. By Tuesday  
9 night, I picked up -- not Tuesday night.

10          **MAJ MELNYK:** Tuesday was the night of the  
11 incident or the day of the incident.

12          **LTC CANDIANO:** By Wednesday or Thursday night,  
13 I picked up 642 Aviation Battalion and then by --

14          **MAJ MELNYK:** Which is Army Guard.

15          **LTC CANDIANO:** Army Guard.

16          **MAJ MELNYK:** Aviation.

17          **LTC CANDIANO:** Then by Wednesday night, I  
18 picked up a 120 guys from the Air Guard. That's  
19 important.

20                 So little by little, I had all of these  
21 battalions OPCON'd to me to cover that zone, because we  
22 were tightening it up a little bit to -- once the area

1 was secure, we were adding more support inside to help  
2 out with support efforts, to move equipment in and  
3 troops or people, for that matter.

4 So the Air Guard jumped right on board.  
5 There's been a lot of Navy folks here. All Reserve  
6 agencies, part of New York, plus agencies outside of  
7 New York, militarily, that wanted to be here and  
8 participate.

9 But I just wanted to let you know about that,  
10 and it was really kind of important that it was a team  
11 effort.

12 CPT Joe Prudin (phonetic) made some --  
13 assisted in some arrests and things of that nature and  
14 he was one of the guys that I was saying was sharp on  
15 this van incident.

16 **MAJ MELNYK:** CPT Prudin is?

17 **LTC CANDIANO:** Is our headquarters battery  
18 commander and he's also a New York City fireman. So he  
19 had a personal interest in this thing, as well.

20 While we were out there checking the status of  
21 the wire that was being secured by the construction  
22 workers, and we were going to provide security over

1 that over the next few days, people went out of their  
2 way to come up to you and thank you for your efforts,  
3 try to take a picture with a soldier, to give you a  
4 hug, to give you a card, just something to say thank  
5 you for being there, and that emotion that was felt,  
6 the last time I saw anything like that was during  
7 Desert Storm, where people went out of their way to  
8 cheer you on.

9           And ironically, from day one when this whole  
10 thing happened to now, when you're driving a military  
11 vehicle on a highway or as we were going to our  
12 armories to change and get additional equipment, people  
13 would go out of their way to honk their horns at you  
14 and come out of the houses and try to bring you  
15 something to drink at a traffic light or do anything  
16 they could to make you feel that you did something  
17 really great.

18           It was very emotional. It was very emotional  
19 for our soldiers and very emotional for the people,  
20 too, in the community, because we are a part of the  
21 community, and that's the important thing.

22           We belong, where we eat and where we work,

1 we're there.

2 And then today was very emotional for a lot of  
3 my soldiers out there because we got cards from kids.

4 (Tape Change)

5 **MAJ MELNYK:** This is MAJ Les'Melnyk,  
6 continuing the interview with LTC Candiano, the  
7 commander of the 1st of the 258 Field Artillery, on 18  
8 September, in Battery Park, New York City.

9 Sir, you were last talking about the benefits  
10 of being a Guardsman and serving your community.

11 **LTC CANDIANO:** Yeah. I just can't say enough  
12 about how the community responded to us being here.  
13 Normally, it's something where they say, you know,  
14 during a snow storm or natural disaster, that, "thank  
15 you, thank you, thank you," but this was a different  
16 type of thank you, because it was a different response,  
17 and it's a response to say that, "yeah, normally, I'm  
18 here to help, but now it was I'm here to help and I'm  
19 here to serve" and it was something that people,  
20 although in the midst of not knowing what to do, to  
21 look up to the skies or look for bombs or whatever the  
22 case might be, they really felt secure.

1           They felt secure with the police presence, but  
2 for some reason, that Guard presence made a difference  
3 to people who were walking the streets. We got hugs,  
4 we got drinks, we got all kinds of stuff.

5           There were two National Guardsmen that were  
6 just working, and I have to find out from one of my  
7 officers how this took place, but a businessman from  
8 the Wall Street center said, "Listen, if you guys get  
9 jammed up with your mortgages, I'm willing to pay your  
10 mortgages, just because you're here."

11           I swear to you, I could not believe that, he  
12 made that comment. But that's how secure they felt  
13 with this presence here, because we got here fast, we  
14 really did. It was something that was picked up on the  
15 news right away, that National Guard were on site that  
16 night, and that was important that we got there real  
17 quick and we showed that we were taking care of  
18 business.

19           It was impressive and I'm proud of my  
20 battalion.

21           **MAJ MELNYK:** Can you assess the feelings, the  
22 morale of your battalion? Clearly, there's a lot of

1 people who will be disturbed by what they saw, but then  
2 there's the reaction of the community. Where do you  
3 feel your men are right now?

4 **LTC CANDIANO:** Well, I believe, as is the same  
5 with the other battalions, there's going to be some  
6 closure there. There has to be some closure, but there  
7 won't be closure at the same time from the standpoint  
8 that we got a job done.

9 We came here to do something and I think we  
10 all exceeded our expectations and our mission. We did  
11 more than anybody can expect a human to do, a human  
12 being to do, and, again, you've got to give credit to  
13 those fire and police guys out there, because they've  
14 got the dirty job. They really do.

15 But my expectations of my soldiers were such  
16 that they were going to go in there, provide security  
17 and do it professionally, but they took it one step  
18 further, because it was personal and professional, and  
19 it didn't matter and, you know, sometimes people talk  
20 about race relations, human relations, things of that  
21 nature. It didn't matter. There were no boundaries as  
22 far as the human soul goes. It didn't matter what the

1 color of your skin was, what the nationality was, to  
2 include Muslim, Afghan, whatever. It didn't matter.  
3 If you were hurt or you were in trouble, somebody was  
4 there to help pick you up.

5           And that's what it was. It didn't matter. It  
6 didn't matter. You're an American, you're a citizen,  
7 and we're going to pick you up. And that's the  
8 important thing.

9           And then one day when this is all over, these  
10 guys will go back to driving garbage trucks or  
11 delivering mail or being a delivery man, it doesn't  
12 matter, or working in the delicatessen. These guys are  
13 going to go back to that job, but when that telephone  
14 rings to say come back, I think you're going to see  
15 something where they're going to do it with a  
16 vengeance, because they've been smacked around, but  
17 they know that if they get here faster the next time,  
18 they'll be able to respond faster and take care of the  
19 needs of the people faster.

20           And they got here pretty quick. So they want  
21 to do this. This is important to them. Hopefully, it  
22 won't happen again, but if it does, there's been a lot



1 of lessons learned for me that I can see and, again,  
2 I've seen leadership that you would not see down to  
3 that E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4 level, and that's amazing that  
4 they stepped up to the plate and they hit a home run  
5 each and every time.

6           Never had a problem with discipline, never had  
7 a problem with morale. The only problem I have is the  
8 unknown, because you're on state active duty, why isn't  
9 it federal? For the type of disaster. Personal  
10 questions come into play for the soldier, which is  
11 hard, and we can't get the answers and, in some cases,  
12 the leadership can't give you the answers, and that is  
13 what is frustrating.

14           How does the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act  
15 effect me? Am I going to be covered? Am I going to  
16 have a job? Can I be excused because of a unique  
17 situation? How long are we going to be out there? And  
18 the biggest thing, as a commander, that I felt I was  
19 not given to get the job done, you know, creature  
20 comforts go a long way for a soldier.

21           If you get him a good hot meal and you get him  
22 a good place to sleep and you give him a clean uniform

1 and warm socks and comfortable boots, they'll go balls  
2 to the wall for you and keep going.

3 In this case, being bounced around from unit  
4 to unit, not being able to take hot showers, not being  
5 able to have a clean change of clothes, had some  
6 impact. Whether it was a great impact, I would have to  
7 say no, because they were back out here doing the job  
8 again the following day or when their shift picked up.

9 They bit the bullet and they did what they had  
10 to do, because the simple fact was they were standing  
11 here, they were breathing, they had loved ones home,  
12 but they were doing it because there was somebody that  
13 could potentially could still be alive in that pile of  
14 rubble, and that's what they wanted to do.

15 They were bitter that they couldn't get in  
16 there to do what they wanted to do, [*i.e., help dig for*  
17 *survivors at ground zero*], but they all knew that they  
18 were there for a specific mission.

19 And, again, I'm proud of them from the  
20 standpoint that they knew that there was emergence, an  
21 emergency that took place. They reacted to that  
22 emergency and they don't want to leave until they are

1 told to stand down. And that's the thing, they won't  
2 go until they're told to.

3           And I'll tell you what, knowing the hearts and  
4 souls of some of these soldiers and what they've seen  
5 and what they've done, I wouldn't be the least bit  
6 surprised if they take off that green uniform when they  
7 say stand down and they'll put on a pair of jeans and a  
8 tee shirt and go back to get on some line and serve  
9 food to somebody else.

10           That's what they'll do. It's not that they're  
11 trained to do that. It's just that they feel that they  
12 need to do more.

13           And that's the thing, that I think closure is  
14 required for a lot of my guys because they'll walk out  
15 of here saying "Could I have done more?", you know, and  
16 I ask myself, as a commander, "is there anything that I  
17 could have done to get the response time down to get  
18 here faster? or is there anything I could have done to  
19 possibly help a life?," but at the same token, I think  
20 the biggest thing for me was walking over bodies not  
21 knowing that I was walking over bodies.

22           That's a tough sell, it really is, and it's an

1 American and it's on your own turf. That's the tough  
2 sell.

3 That's basically it.

4 **MAJ MELNYK:** Thank you, sir, for taking the  
5 time to talk to me.

6 **LTC CANDIANO:** My pleasure.

7 (The interview was concluded.)

8 \* \* \* \* \*